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foreword
ancient Method, novel subject, 
ambiguous outcome
philippe c. schmitter
this book takes an ancient method, comparison, and applies it to a novel subject, 
regional integration organizations. one of the most evident descriptive features, 
first, of the post-World War II era and, then with renewed vigour, after the end of 
the cold war has been the proliferation of these rios. today, there is virtually not 
a region of the globe that does not have at least one of them and there are many 
countries that belong to several of them.
political science does not seem to know where to place these organizations. its 
sub-field of international relations – to the extent that it has been dominated by 
‘realism’ and its step-child, ‘neo-realism’ – has some difficulty even in explaining 
how these islands of regional cooperation and integration can exist in the context 
of (allegedly) pervasive rivalry and anarchy. if their existence is recognized, it is 
quickly discounted – either as a side-product of domination by some hegemonic 
power – a sort of second-grade empire – or as a convenient façade behind which 
sovereign states strike momentary compromises based exclusively on national 
interests and relative power. students of comparative politics have been even less 
well equipped to deal with rios and have tried their best to stay away from them, 
leaving the descriptive effort to so-called ‘area specialists.’ the only scholars who 
took them at all seriously for many years were members of a declining breed of ‘io 
Specialists’ – perhaps best exemplified by Innis Claude Jr. and his masterful text, 
Swords into Plowshares, where rios occupy an honourable but secondary status 
alongside the United nations and its specialized agencies.1
the great exception, of course, has been a select set of european rios, i.e., 
the european coal and steel community, the european economic community, 
the european atomic energy community and, most recently, the european Union. 
although only a very small portion of the total number of rios active in europe, 
these four have succeeded in generating a lively and expanding academic enterprise 
of their own. virtually all conceptualizing and theorizing about the role of rios has 
come to be based on this experience alone. this has had the subtle effect of shifting the 
focus from cooperation between consenting and still sovereign national states to the 
voluntary, gradual and fitful process of their integration whereby these autonomous 
units cede and/or pool their sovereignty to a higher order, supra-national, polity that 
1  If I am not mistaken, this textbook has been continuously in print – which must be 
some indication that it is still used in undergraduate courses in the United states.
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is capable of taking initiatives, making decisions and implementing rules without 
the unanimous consent of all of its member states. from this point of departure, the 
european process can be regarded as unique. not only have the many other rios 
covering the surface of the globe not yet acquired this property of supra-national 
legitimate authority, but the european Union itself has only a precarious, selective 
and contested grasp of it. Nevertheless, the sheer prospect that – maybe – conditions 
exist elsewhere for successful trans-national regional integration and not just cross-
national regional cooperation is so mesmerizing both empirically and normatively 
that it continues to dominate most efforts at conceptualization and theorization. if 
this were to happen and, especially, if this were to happen across several regions, it 
could produce nothing less than ‘the new world order’ that has been such a chimera 
since its arrival was announced at the end of the cold war. 
The Source of the Conceptual Problem
politics on this planet gradually became dominated by one type of unit: the sovereign 
national state (sns). from its heartland in europe in the 15th and 16th centuries, this 
genus of political organization in which a monopoly of authority over all coercive 
functions came to coincide with a distinctive territory and population spread to other 
continents – usually by violent means. The doctrine of ‘Nulle Terre Sans Seigneur’ 
– no land without a sovereign ruler – undoubtedly also helped in this process of 
extension. outside of europe, only those societies that possessed a singular identity 
and managed early to acquire some rudiments of stateness, e.g., Japan, thailand and 
china, managed to escape being subordinated to or colonized by a european sns. 
This left only a number of deserted islands, submerged reefs, floating icebergs, and 
one uninhabitable continent outside the realm of state authority. not coincidentally, 
these ambiguous territories (plus one large rock – Gibraltar) continue to this day to 
generate interstate conflicts that are particularly difficult to resolve.
not surprisingly, the academic discipline of political science has been deeply 
impregnated with prior assumptions of stateness. all of its proven laws or working 
hypotheses should be prefaced with the caveat emptor: ‘assume the existence of a 
state and, only then, will the following assumptions, concepts and relations be true, 
…’.2 we simply do not have a convincing vocabulary or an operational logic for 
analyzing or even speculating about other forms of political organization.3
All of which makes it difficult for us to discuss the properties of and prospects 
for integrating ‘trans-national regions’. it is virtually impossible to compare them 
– unless we are willing to make one of two assumptions:
2  nationhood, however, has not proven so easy to presume. an immense literature has 
been devoted to exploring the (mostly negative) consequences of states without nations and 
nations without states. the notion that the coincidence of the two was a prerequisite for orderly 
and legitimate politics (the so-called westphalian system) was theoretically convincing, but 
almost impossible to attain empirically.
3  the major exception would be the literature in anthropology on so-called ‘stateless 
societies’ although it does not seem to have developed a distinctive and alternative set of 
concepts.
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these units are merely snss at various early stages in their formation and will 
therefore follow already established national developmental trajectories; or 
these units are merely specialized instances of another political organizational 
type, namely, the ‘intergovernmental organization’ (igo) formed voluntarily 
by consenting snss and explained exclusively by their powers and purposes. 
only if both of these assumptions seem contestable do we have the burden of 
inventing a distinctive theory of trans-national regional integration. If one suspects 
that world regions composed of previous snss are not going to repeat the state-
building experience of their members, and/or if one suspects that they might 
nevertheless develop some capacity to become actors in their own right, then does 
one have to give serious thought to developing a specialized vocabulary and a 
distinctive theory of transnational or interstate integration. and, only with such a 
vocabulary and theory in hand, can one compare the practices and performances of 
such regional organizations. i suspect that the authors of the essays in this book share 
three suspicions:
That Trans-National Regional Organizations (TNROs) can – under certain 
circumstances – become political actors in their own right;
That they are likely – for reasons to be specified – to develop according to processes 
different from those that previously produced snss; and 
that they may never acquire all of the distinctive properties of a sns, but still form a 
new type of stable and significant political unit. 
 
if this is the case, they have accepted the challenge of trying to develop an 
approach to explaining why (and where) such organizations might emerge and how 
they might eventually form ‘semi-sovereign, non-national, semi-states’ (sns2) or, 
more digestibly, trans-national regional polities (tnrps). it should be stressed 
that these assumptions, concepts and hypotheses are focused on the process of 
regional integration, not regional cooperation.4 the latter may or may not be rooted 
in distinctive organizations, but it always remains contingent on the voluntary, 
unanimous and continuous decisions of its sns members. ‘entry’ into and ‘exit’ 
from such arrangements is relatively costless; ‘loyalty’ to the region as such is (and 
remains) minimal. ‘Legitimacy’ – voluntary compliance with collective decisions – 
is based exclusively on utility of output, not on normative expectations about input, 
i.e. on what the tnro accomplishes, not on how it does it.  hence, collective efforts 
at the regional level are likely to be erratic, conditional and confined to pre-specified 
issues. it is only when a tnro starts to become a tnrp, i.e., only when it acquires 
some legitimate capacity (however limited) to act on its own by initiating proposals, 
making decisions, and/or implementing policies that the regional process can be 
said to switch from cooperation to integration. and, in so doing, both ‘entry’ into the 
4  in europe, cooperation at the regional level began as early as 1815 with the creation 
of the concert of europe. it was not until the treaty forming the european coal and steel 
Community in 1952 was signed and ratified that the region acquired its first formal instrument 
of integration.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
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region and ‘exit’ from it become much more costly – and the latter may eventually 
become prohibitive. ‘loyalty’ to a distinctive regional identity seems to come more 
belatedly, but ‘conformity’ to specific regional norms – even those produced against 
the consent of a given SNS member – can develop much more rapidly.
The Place of ‘Regions’ in the Literature
political science (with a few exceptions to be noted) has long recognized the descriptive 
status of ‘regions,’ but denied the need for any special analytical treatment of them. 
considered as sub-units within an existing sns, regions are merely the remnants of 
territories that might have gained sovereignty but did not. their past unique identities 
may be persistent enough so that their inhabitants continue to contest – sometimes 
violently – the domination of the winning SNS, but regions only acquire the status 
of actors if they actually manage to secede or are granted some recognized (but 
subordinate) role within a federal or decentralized polity. in the latter case, they 
are considered especially useful for comparative purposes – precisely because they 
have already been integrated, i.e., share a common political culture, legal system, 
constitution status and, often, party system, and therefore can be expected to vary in 
performance only due to exogenous shocks and diverse socio-economic conditions. 
considered as supra-units composed of multiple snss, regions have also been 
declared useful for comparative purposes. Under the label of ‘area studies,’ political 
scientists have conducted considerable research based on the presumption of cultural, 
historical or geo-strategic properties shared by all of the snss within the same 
region. they have virtually never (except, as we shall see, in the case of western 
europe) considered the region as such a relevant actor worthy of explanation. if the 
‘area’ happened to have some regional organizations in common, their behaviour 
was regarded as strictly ‘intergovernmental,’ i.e., as the mere by-product of the 
relative power and distinctive interests of its sns members.
TNROs are not a new phenomenon. Functionally speaking, the first to appear was 
the central commission for navigation on the rhine in 1868. territorially speaking, 
the first was the Organization of American States in 1890. Both still exist and have 
experienced some expansion in their collective tasks, although neither is remotely 
similar to a tnrp. descriptively speaking, tnros have increased rapidly in number 
over the past decades and extended their reach to cover most of the Earth – much 
as national states did several centuries earlier. today, there are very few snss that 
do not ‘belong’ to some tnro, and there are many that belong to many more than 
one. the reasons for this remarkable proliferation are somewhat obscure, but seem 
to resemble those that previously promoted national stateness: unconscious diffusion 
of fashionable practices, deliberate imitation of the success of other regions, self-
defence against external predators, calculated imposition by imperial hegemons, and 
some ‘cloning’ from one tnro to another. their spread and the resulting cacophony 
of acronyms have produced considerable confusion and only some timid attempts 
at comparison. 
The experience of Europe since the early 1950s with integrating – peacefully 
and voluntarily – previously sovereign national states is by far the most significant 
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and far-reaching among all such efforts. as such, it has attracted far more scholarly 
attention than any other tnro. it stands to reason, therefore, that the european 
economic community (eec), the european community (ec) and, most recently, 
the european Union (eU), are collectively the most likely organizations to provide 
some lessons for those trans-national regions that are just beginning this complex 
and historically unprecedented process. But such a ‘historico-inductive’ strategy for 
theory-building and case-comparison is by no means uncontested.5 partly, this is 
because many students of European integration have quite self-consciously defined 
it as a unique case and described it as such, or they denied its status as a potential 
TNRP and filed it away as merely an extreme example of regional cooperation among 
snss, along with hundreds of other intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, 
those who have tried to identify its more generic ‘integrative properties’ have tended 
to disagree about what these were and how far they would carry the process. scholars 
and practitioners from other regions have not found it easy to exploit their work. in 
those rare cases where such comparisons were made, the conclusion was invariably 
negative, i.e., the ‘other’ region could not possibly expect to replicate the relative 
success of the eec/ec/eU.6  
The Ambiguity of the Outcome
no student of tnrps or even tnros can ignore the disappointing history of most of 
them in the post-world war ii period.  some were never more that mere façades for 
hegemonic domination. Most of them failed to reach their initial objectives, much 
less to expand these objectives. those that have persisted may not have succeeded in 
doing very much.  During the 1960s, there was a flourish of activity among so-called 
third world countries in latin america, the Middle east and sub-saharan africa to 
produce regional organizations for a variety of ambitiously stated economic, political, 
and cultural purposes. eager young scholars went off to study the east african 
federation, the west indian federation, the central american common Market, the 
United arab republic and other such exotic creations.7 with the exception of the 
cacM (which does have the dubious distinction of having had two of its members go 
5  a literature has recently emerged that intentionally seeks to liberate the study of 
regional integration from its european roots and biases. for a representative collection 
of essays on the ‘new’ regionalism, see fredrik söderbaum and timothy M. shaw (eds.) 
(2004), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: palgrave). also, 
finn laursen (ed.) (2004), Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives 
(aldershot: ashgate).
6  for an early example of this, see ernst B. haas and philippe c. schmitter (1964), 
‘economics and differential patterns of political integration: projections about Unity in latin 
america,’ International Organization 18:4, 705–37.
7  i have to confess that i was among them: Mexico and Latin American Economic 
Integration, with ernst B. haas, research series, no.5, institute of international studies, 
University of california, Berkeley, 1964;  The Politics of Economics in Latin American 
Regionalism, with ernst B. haas, Monograph series, institute of social sciences, University 
of denver, september 1965; ‘the process of central american integration: spill-over, spill-
around or encapsulation?’, Journal of Common Market Studies IX, 1 (Fall 1970), 1–48.
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to war with each other), none of these still exist. the subsequent generations of trans-
national regional organizations seem more modest in their initial objectives – most 
were created as little more than free trade areas or inter-governmental ‘talk shops’ 
– but they have persisted longer than their forerunners and they have sometimes even 
acquired additional capabilities. one of which is especially intriguing since it has the 
potential for generating global implications, namely, the mandate to intervene when 
one of their members becomes or is threatened with becoming autocratic. needless to 
say, regionalism as an insurance policy for domestic democracy has had a chequered 
history – Paraguay in Mercosur was one thing; Zimbabwe in SADC has been quite 
another. the european Union’s intervention into the internal affairs of austria turned 
into something of a farce.  
Nevertheless, the mere issuing of such a policy by a regional organization – not 
to mention its insertion into virtually all treaties negotiated between the eU and 
other countries or regional organizations – is a path-setting development. Were these 
formal commitments to become politically effective within each region and were 
these regions to enter into arrangements for mutual support and collective sanction 
vis-à-vis each other, the potential exists for eventually providing the building blocks 
for an alternative, more rule-bound and less violent world order than the present 
one built on snss and capped at the global level by an ineffectual United nations. 
‘Peace in Parts’ was the provocative title of one of the first attempts at comparing 
trans-national regional organizations.8 with their recent proliferation in numbers and 
extension in area, this prospect may have become less remote.
8  Joseph s. nye, Jr. (1987), Peace in Parts (washington, dc: University press of 
america), a re-issue from the original (Boston: little, Brown & company, 1970).
series editor’s preface
series editors have basically two tasks: to guarantee the quality of the publications and to 
guard the topical boundary of the series in order to contribute to a specific discourse. In 
the latter respect, we receive book proposals, which are squarely within the series topic 
and proposals, which fall clearly outside the series intention. andrea ribeiro hoffmann 
and Anna van der Vleuten’s proposal was difficult to label. Most Regional Integration 
organizations are based on intergovernmental agreements and are not immediately and 
generally recognized as ‘non-state actors’. Being convinced about both the intellectual 
quality of the proposal as well as the methodological and theoretical soundness, the main 
question was: does the topic fit the subject of our series?
The “confidence” (as Andrea and Anna call it in their preface) we had in the editors 
and the authors was therefore not related to their quality as researchers as such, but to 
their ability to position regional integration organizations in the larger discourse on 
non-state actors. That ‘confidence’ was based on what Philipe Schmitter explicitely 
refers to as the ‘shared suspicions’ of the authors, ‘that trans-national regional 
Organizations (TNROs) can – under certain circumstances – become political actors 
in their own right” and that they can “form a new type of stable and significant political 
unit” (Schmitter page xiii of this publication, italics mine). Closing or Widening the 
Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations turns that 
‘shared suspicion’ into a plausible and convincing explanation, based on a variety of 
empirical evidence, methodological and theoretical approaches.
andrea ribeiro hoffmann and anna van der vleuten have not only co-opted a 
number of scholars from different disciplines and with different research traditions 
into the production of an edited volume. They have – more importantly – succeeded 
into bringing them together on several occasions and guiding the debate(s) on the 
basis of a set of questions, which inform and connect the author’s approaches. 
according to andrea ribeiro hoffmann en anna van der vleuten “[t]here is 
no easy, general answer to the question [whether] rios widen or close the gap 
between citizens and policy makers” (page 201). An “(e)asy general answer” can 
only be found if we ask easy and general questions or engage in easy and general 
debates. the editors and authors of Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and 
Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations have clearly opted for another 
approach. they adopted an approach, which closed a part of the disciplinary gap in 
the study of non-state actors. what probably started as a multidisciplinary enterprise 
in June 2004 became more and more interdisciplinary as the authors met on several 
occasions. the end result is a publication that serves and connects the students and 
practioners of law, politics and governance.
Math noortmann
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list of abbreviations
accp   association of caribbean community parliamentarians
ACP   African Caribbean Pacific 
acs   association of caribbean states
afr   assessor for federal relations
ais   andean integration system
alalc   latin american free trade association
asean   association of southeast asian nations
Bango  Barbados association of non-governmental    
   organizations
Bcoc   Barbados chamber of commerce and industry
Bec   Barbados employers federation
Bpsa   Barbados private sector agency
BwU   Barbados workers’ Union
caic   caribbean association of industry and commerce
can   andean community of nations
capes   support coordination for higher education, Brazil
caricoM  caribbean community
cBc   caribbean Business council
ccl   caribbean congress of labor
ceB   Brazilian entrepreneurial coalition
cec   caribbean employers confederation
ceec   central and eastern european countries
cet   common external tariff
cida   canadian international development agency
cMc   common Market council
cMg   common Market group
cni   national confederation of industry
CNPq   National Council on Scientific and Technological   
   development, Brazil
codesUl  southern council for development and integration
cohsod  council for human and social development
coted   council for trade and economic cooperation
cpdc   caribbean policy development center
crecena  regional commission for foreign commerce of the   
   argentine northeast
csM   caribbean single Market
csMe   caribbean single Market and economy
ctUsaB  congress of trade Unions and staff associations of   
   Barbados
ec   european commission
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ecJ   european court of Justice
ecsc   european coal and steel community
ep   european parliament
esaf   economic and social advisory forum
eU   european Union
fao   food and agriculture organization
fgv   getúlio vargas foundation
fiesp   industrial federation of the state of são paulo
foceM   fund for the structural convergence of MercosUr
fpÖ   austrian freedom party
fta   free trade agreement
ftaa   free trade area for the americas
gatt   general agreement on tariffs and trade
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chapter 1
legitimacy, democracy and rios: 
where is the gap? 
anna van der vleuten and andrea ribeiro hoffmann
Introduction: A Gap?
in the 1990s, a ‘new wave of regionalism’ rolled over the world and has developed to 
such an extent that virtually every state in the world is now member of some regional 
organization or agreement (Breslin et al. 2002). new regional organizations were 
created and existing ones were revived and enlarged. these regional integration 
organizations (rios) were heralded as the building blocks of a new global order 
which would be characterized by prosperity thanks to trade liberalization, and by 
peace thanks to democratization. rios would reduce the legitimacy gap which 
had resulted from processes of regionalization and globalization. rios would re-
democratize politics. 
have rios lived up to these expectations? in the intervening years, several events 
have cast doubt on their capacity to do so. regional cooperation was unable to offer 
a powerful solution to the financial and economic crises that rocked Southeast Asia 
and latin america in 1998. regional cooperation had no answer to increasing ethnic 
violence and terrorist attacks in africa and south asia. and in addition, rios were 
not perceived as democratizing agents but, on the contrary, as bulwarks for elitist 
policy making in the interest of some happy few. even the european Union, which 
can be credited for five decades of prosperity and peace in Western Europe and 
for housing the world’s only directly elected supranational parliament, continues to 
suffer from a legitimacy problem. in direct elections to its european parliament in 
June 2004 there was an extremely low turn-out, especially in its new member states 
in central and eastern europe. one year later, french and dutch ‘no’ votes in the 
referendum on a proposed constitution for the eU made it clear that a majority of the 
people in these countries disapproved of further integration of this kind. does this 
mean that rios do not, in fact, reduce the ‘legitimacy gap’, but rather widen it? how 
should we judge their contribution to a legitimate and democratic world order? 
these questions have not been answered satisfactorily yet. research on regional 
cooperation used to focus on the explanation of the consecutive successes and 
failures of economic integration (see for instance Axline 1994; Mansfield and 
Milner 1997; Mattli 1999). the New Regionalism Approaches have explained 
regional integration predominantly in terms of its success (or failure) as an answer 
to economic globalization (see Bøås, Marchand and shaw 2005; Breslin et al. 2002; 
fawcett and hurrell 2000; hettne, inotai and sunkel 1999; laursen 2003; schirm 
2002; söderbaum and shaw 2003). surely, economic success constitutes an important 
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aspect of legitimacy, more precisely of ‘output legitimacy’ as fritz scharpf (1999) 
calls it, and some argue that this is the only aspect of legitimacy to be found at the 
regional level. Yet, we shall argue that this is too limited a view. 
other studies focus on democracy and legitimacy at the global level. the “Battle 
of Seattle” in 1999, when non-state actors representing a wide spectrum of causes 
joined in mass protests against the wto, sparked off a stream of literature on 
transnational civil society and global governance (see coicaud and heiskanen 2001; 
Held and Koenig 2005; Scholte 2002; Zweifel 2006). This literature investigates 
the legitimacy gap in relation to global and functional international organizations. 
however, regional organizations differ from global and functional organizations in 
important respects, both on the ‘demand-side’ – as regards the high expectations 
citizens have in terms of regional development, security, employment – and on the 
‘supply-side’, as regional integration is ‘multidimensional’, including economic, 
political, social and cultural aspects. for that reason, the issue of legitimacy and 
regional governance deserves special attention, as also Jon pevehouse argues 
(Pevehouse 2002; Pevehouse 2005). He focuses specifically on the issue of whether 
rios contribute to the success or failure of domestic transitions to democracy, 
showing how regional organizations influence the cost-benefit calculations of 
domestic actors. he does not discuss democracy within regional governance or the 
legitimacy of rios in a wider sense, but his argument will serve as a starting point 
for the chapters in the last part of this book.
of course, there is a wealth of literature on the european Union (eU) and its 
alleged democratic deficit. Much of the literature, however, lacks a comparative 
perspective, considering the eU as sui generis, a unique phenomenon, and is therefore 
unable to explain and interpret developments in other regional organizations. the 
ideas about the eU, legitimacy and democracy put forward by philippe schmitter 
(2003) and fritz scharpf (1999), however, have been used as stepping stones for 
further conceptualization, adapted to non-european regional organizations. 
this volume thus borrows insights from various strands of work on regionalism, 
global governance, transnational civil society and domestic democracy in order to 
answer the question of whether rios make the gap between governing elites and 
their constituencies – which has resulted from processes of regionalization and 
globalization – wider or smaller. Opinions on this question differ and contradict 
each other. Some argue that rios have put the citizenry at a distance, widening the 
gap between governments and the governed. Others hold that rios have enabled the 
mobilization and development of a transnational civil society which may replace or 
supplement forms of domestic participation and control (scholte 2002). Some hold 
that regional governance makes for elite policy making and suffers from a ‘democratic 
deficit’. Others, meanwhile, see evidence that regional organizations contribute to a 
just global order and the realization of democratic values and rule of law both within 
and beyond states (pevehouse 2005). it is not our aim to elaborate a ‘user’s guide’, 
setting out how rios should be made more democratic and regional governance 
more legitimate. we do not argue that rios are the ‘good guys’, serving the interests 
of humanity, or the ‘bad guys’ for failing to fulfil such expectations. The issue, for 
us, is to investigate the meanings of legitimacy and democracy in a non-national 
political system. we shall explore the issue from different angles, not focusing on a 
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single rio but assessing and explaining similarities and differences between rios 
in terms of legitimacy and democracy. this will include the presence of mechanisms 
which can influence legitimacy at the regional level; the quality of participatory 
arrangements involving supranational parliamentary actors, subnational state actors 
and transnational non-state actors; and also the willingness of rios to intervene and 
preserve democracy in their member states.
Key Concepts 
among observers there seems to be a consensus that there ‘is still no consensus on 
the main concepts in the study of regionalism’ (söderbaum and van langenhove 
2006, 9). In this section, we shall present the definitions of the key concepts which 
have guided the authors of this volume. in several chapters, the authors will further 
elaborate or refine these definitions.
Regionalization, Regionalism, RIOs, Region
cooperation between states takes many different forms, ranging from global 
agreements to security alliances, customs unions and common markets. regional 
cooperation or regionalism differs from regionalization. The latter ‘defines a trade-
driven, bottom-up process of intensifying interactions and transactions of private 
economic and other non-state actors, especially business firms, which leads to 
increased interdependencies between geographically adjacent states, societies and 
economies’ (hänggi et al. 2006, 4). By regionalism we refer to the process of state 
actors, belonging to a certain region and reaching agreements cross-nationally. as 
opposed to ‘bottom-up’ regionalization, which is a primarily economic process, 
regionalism is a ‘top-down’ political process, ‘a conscious policy of nation states 
for the management of regionalization and a broad array of security and economic 
challenges’ (hänggi et al. 2006, 4). states are the central actors from a formal point 
of view, concluding the agreements which are binding upon all the other actors 
involved, but this does not imply that state actors are the sole players. 
non-state actors such as business, think tanks and civil society organizations play 
a role in regional policy making, for instance in the form of ‘track-two diplomacy’ 
aimed at resolving conflicts between and within states through unofficial contacts 
and interactions (caballero-anthony 2005, 158). in this volume, the concept of state 
actors refers to the government at the national level as well as to subnational actors, 
such as state governments in federal states and the governmental representatives of 
cities and municipalities. the category of non-state actors encompasses actors often 
referred to as ‘civil society’ and non-governmental organizations, trade unions, but 
also private interest groups such as business associations. they are often thought to 
offer a potential remedy for the lack of parliamentary control at the regional level, 
but of course the fundamental difference with parliamentarians is that none of these 
actors is directly elected and thus they all represent specific interests without being 
directly accountable to those whose interests they represent. part four of this volume 
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will further investigate the role of non-state actors in rios and their potential role in 
widening or closing the ‘legitimacy gap’. 
regional integration organizations (rios) are thus formal institutions which 
are capable of ‘purposive action like raising and spending money, promulgating 
policies, and making discretionary choices’ (Keohane 1989, 175). rios all differ in 
their institutional set-up: they can be purely or partially intergovernmental, and have 
institutionalized decision making along more or less supranational lines. in spite 
of these differences, rios may be distinguished from other forms of international 
cooperation in terms of three aspects: territoriality, identity and scope. 
first, there is the aspect of territoriality. rios are composed of states belonging 
to a region. for that reason, rios have a restricted membership, requiring candidate 
members to be located within a certain geographical area. this territorial aspect 
makes them a specific kind of international organization, distinguishing them from 
global or functional organizations. It also begs the question of how to define a region 
– or: how do we know a region when we see one? A region presupposes some 
geographical coherence, but geography alone does not determine what a region is. 
the pyrenees and the alps, for instance, with many summits reaching over 3000 
metres above sea level, are expensive obstacles to the free movement of goods and 
people, but they do not constitute the southern borders of the region of Europe. the 
region of southeast asia is composed of island states and of continental states, in 
spite of ‘the stopping power of water’ (cf. Mearsheimer 2001, 114–27). From these 
examples, it follows that ‘natural’ borders are not given and natural, but constructed 
and geopolitical (see Katzenstein 2005, 6–13). Geography is one necessary, but not 
a sufficient, condition for a group of states to constitute a region. For that reason, 
territoriality and identity, the first and second aspects defining an RIO, cannot be 
considered separately. 
the second aspect is identity. rios often refer to a common identity based on 
the shared history of this territorial entity. to be member of a region, a nation must 
share this identity, based on some combination of cultural, economic, linguistic, 
or political ties (see Mansfield and Milner 1999, 591). The members of a region 
define and redefine themselves. Identity is intersubjective, as it expresses not only 
the meaning an actor attributes to the self, but also the meaning which the other 
attributes to the self. in order to label a geographical area a region, some consensus 
about the self-definition of the region is required, as well as external recognition of 
the area as a region.1 this shared regional identity is institutionalized in the founding 
documents of an rio and its conditions for membership, enabling an rio to exclude 
certain countries and include others. these constructed territorial and identity aspects 
make RIOs a specific kind of international organization, distinguishing them from 
organizations with potentially a global membership such as the Un. 
thirdly, rios have a potentially broad mission which evolves from a limited 
set of tasks to a more encompassing role, as opposed to functional international 
organizations which focus on a specific policy area, such as health (WHO), food 
(fao), security (nato) or labour relations (ilo). this also sets them apart from 
bilateral preferential trading arrangements and free trade areas, which eliminate 
1  we thank andrea ruggieri for pointing this out to us. 
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internal trade barriers (negative integration) but do not aim at any further steps 
implying positive integration.
These specific aspects do not suggest that we conceive of rios as entities which 
are or will become state-like actors. an rio is not a supra-state actor but an inter-
state political system. it derives its power and weakness from precisely this status, 
being as strong as its constituent parts will accept. even the european Union, the 
most institutionalized rio, is clearly not a state since it lacks sovereignty, the 
crucial feature defining a political collective as a state. the eU ‘does not claim 
a sovereign status and is not recognized as sovereign state by the other members 
of international society’ (Werner and De Wilde 2001, 303) – nor by its citizens. 
Member states ‘have handed over powers to a degree unprecedented in the history 
of international organizations’ (werner and de wilde 2001, 302), but those states 
continue to claim their sovereignty before domestic and international audiences and 
those claims continue to be recognized. this has an impact on our discussion of 
legitimacy and democracy, as it implies that the regional level complements rather 
than replaces the national level, which remains a locus of political representation, 
checks and balances. 
Legitimacy and democracy: why bother?
studies on legitimacy classically concentrate on the ideal relationship between 
the nation state and domestic civil society. the processes of regionalism force 
us, however, to reconsider this relationship and include another level of analysis. 
Building on Scharpf (1999), we elaborate a ‘non-national’ definition of legitimacy, 
based on the premise that legitimate governance is responsive (input legitimacy), is 
accountable (control legitimacy) and provides effective solutions (output legitimacy) 
in order to merit the trust of its citizens. democracy is understood here as a political 
system in which ‘governors are answerable to the governed for their actions and 
omissions’ (scholte 2004, 211). tholen and erthal offer a further elaboration of 
these concepts, applied to regional integration organizations (tholen, chapter 2; 
erthal, chapter 3).
if rios are not state-like entities, and if we do not expect them to develop into 
states, why then worry about issues of legitimacy and democracy? Zweifel, for 
instance, argues that the idea of an ‘international state’ is indispensable for being 
able to apply the concept of democracy to the global level (Zweifel 2006, 13). From 
this, it would follow that we need to think in terms of a ‘regional state’, for our 
efforts to make sense. we have just pointed out, however, that we do not conceive of 
rios as regional states. tholen and erthal will return to the question how one may 
conceive of democracy and legitimacy in non-state contexts, showing that Zweifel’s 
preoccupation with an ‘international state’ is unnecessary if one abstracts from form 
and focuses on function (tholen, chapter 2; erthal, chapter 3). 
still, there are at least two apparently good reasons to dismiss the whole issue 
of regional democracy and legitimacy as irrelevant. first, while rios may be 
missing many aspects of democracy that are present in most modern states, one 
could argue that this is of no importance as the lack of civic participation is easily 
compensated for by the benefits of regional cooperation such as peace and prosperity. 
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Output legitimacy compensates for the lack of input legitimacy. secondly, one 
could argue that what is important is democracy at member-state level. it is here 
that the preconditions for democracy exist (shared understandings and a demos) 
and democracy is institutionalized. the national parliament is entitled to approve 
decisions taken at the regional level, so if democracy functions properly at member 
state level, there is no need for ‘regional democracy’. 
On closer inspection, there are weaknesses in both arguments. The first statement 
presupposes that one aspect of legitimacy is reducible to other aspects. at the 
normative level, we do not find support for this as different aspects of legitimacy are 
considered complementary to each other, each of them being a necessary – though 
not sufficient – condition for legitimate decision making. From a sociological 
perspective, the argument would mean that citizens support regional cooperation 
only as long as they perceive clear benefits from it. As soon as times get tough, there 
is no longer any reason to comply with regional policies. 
the second statement presupposes that institutionalized regional cooperation 
does not affect domestic democracy. it ignores the possibility that domestic 
democracy might suffer if decision making is shifted to a higher level which, for 
lack of resources and information, it cannot control in the same way as it controls 
national-level decision making. for instance, national parliaments are usually able to 
block the ratification of a regional agreement, but they are not involved in preceding 
phases of regional policy making and have no power to amend the agreement reached. 
in general, all social systems need some mechanism which gives them legitimacy, 
in the sense that it makes them acceptable and valid, susceptible to public consent. 
a social system which lacks legitimacy would, it is supposed, degenerate into a 
dysfunctional system, characterized by abuses of power. for these reasons, we hold 
that the issue of democracy, legitimacy and regional governance warrants further 
attention.  
Key Questions and Outline of the Volume
Key questions
this volume focuses on a set of interrelated questions in order to clarify the 
connections between regional governance, legitimacy and democracy. regional 
integration has created a system of governance in which policy making no longer 
takes place solely at the national and sub-national levels, but has also shifted to a 
higher level. This shift is generally perceived as a ‘rescue of the nation-state’ – to 
borrow Alan Milward’s famous expression (Milward 1992) – in a globalizing world 
as well as a cause of a legitimacy deficit, putting the citizenry at a distance. 
we assume that this shift affects the positions of actors in the national, sub-
national and international political arenas and the extent to which non-state actors, 
subnational state actors and parliamentary actors influence decision making and 
control executive power. Yet, we need to say more about these shifts in positions and 
capabilities if we are to detect patterns, formulate explanations and analyze whether 
rios ‘widen the gap’ between policy makers and citizenry or whether they ‘reduce 
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the gap’ – and under which conditions they have the potential to do so. From these 
aims, the following questions have been derived:
given the ‘state-oriented’ concepts of legitimacy and democracy, what do the 
concepts of legitimacy and democracy mean in non-national political systems 
such as regional integration organizations? 
to what extent do rios display input legitimacy, control legitimacy and 
output legitimacy? 
to what extent do regional parliaments and subnational state actors contribute 
to closing the legitimacy/democracy gap?
to what extent do non-state actors (civil society) contribute to closing the 
legitimacy/democracy gap? 
do rios display output legitimacy in the sense that they strengthen democracy 
in their member states? 
these questions are dealt with in the different parts of this volume, as will be set out 
in the next section.
Outline of the volume
After the introductory first part, the second part of the book will aim to clarify the 
key concepts and answer the question of the conceptualization of legitimacy and 
democracy in non-national political systems and the question of to what extent rios 
display input legitimacy, control legitimacy and output legitimacy.
Part Two 
in Chapter 2, Berry tholen argues that a normative debate is taking place between 
those who consider RIOs as a contributing factor in the legitimacy deficit which 
characterizes the processes of policy making at the global level, and others who 
welcome rios as a way to strengthen legitimacy. as these two camps disagree 
on the way the present situation ought to be assessed, they also differ on the most 
desirable way forward. tholen claims that part of the debate is caused by differing 
interpretations of the concepts of legitimacy and democracy. elaborating on work 
done by fritz scharpf, he develops a clear articulation of legitimacy, distinguishing 
between input, control and output legitimacy, and rethinking the concepts in order 
to fit regional governance. Tholen points out, furthermore, that in judging the 
functioning of rios, their position within a desirable world order should be taken 
into account.  
in Chapter 3, Juliana erthal discusses the relevance of the concept of regional 
democracy. She takes the attributes of democracy, as identified by Robert Dahl, as a 
point of departure and elaborates these to fit RIOs. Next, Erthal investigates to what 
extent the quality of democracy in rios is constrained by the varying quality of 
democracy in their member states. she illustrates the argument with an assessment 
of regional democracy in the seven rios investigated more extensively in the other 
chapters of this volume. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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in Chapter 4, Bob Reinalda identifies the characteristics of RIOs which may be 
relevant to the different aspects of input, control and output legitimacy. He first traces 
the development of regional cooperation, focusing on the economic regionalism of 
the post-second world war period. next, two different perspectives in ir theorizing 
on rios and their contribution to legitimacy are presented: a sceptical view and an 
accountability view. In order to investigate the validity of these conflicting views, 
reinalda develops a set of indicators for different aspects of legitimacy and compares 
31 regional integration organizations all over the world. his analysis enables him to 
confirm the accountability view and to argue that the sceptical view on legitimacy 
in rios is disputable.
Part Three 
the chapters in this part analyse the effects of institutions created by state actors 
to reduce alleged democratic deficits – institutions such as regional parliamentary 
bodies – and explore the changing role of sub-national state actors in RIOs decision 
making. they also aim at explaining the similarities and differences between rios 
as regards the quality of regional democracy.
in Chapter 5, Andrés Malamud and Luís de Sousa trace the development of five 
regional parliaments: the european parliament, the parlatino, the parlacen (sica), 
the parlandino (can) and the parlasur (Mercosur). they assess the contribution of 
these parliaments to regional representation (and thus to input legitimacy), decision 
making (output legitimacy) and the monitoring of the executive branch and the 
bureaucracy (control legitimacy). on the basis of this comparison, they identify 
a set of factors which offer a plausible account of the differences between these 
parliaments. 
in Chapter 6, Marcelo Medeiros investigates how governance has been changing 
in the Mercosur integration process, focusing on the relationship between the regional, 
national and sub-national levels. he shows how the inclusion of the subnational level 
(cities, border regions, provinces and the like) influences democratic interactions 
between and within the levels. the chapter highlights the incipient rise of constituent 
diplomacy by subnational state actors, which could provide a bridge between citizen, 
state and regional integration organization. 
Part Four 
the chapters in this part explore the potential role of non-state actors in remedying 
the loss of democracy and legitimacy resulting from regionalization and regionalism. 
As legitimacy concerns functions that have to be fulfilled, it is not only elected 
parliamentarians or sub-national state actors which contribute to it. what is needed is 
a fundamental understanding of the possible and necessary forms of the involvement 
of non-state actors to complement the traditional concept of representative democracy. 
these observations lead us to the following empirical questions: which roles do non-
state actors actually fulfil within different RIOs, and what influence do they have 
in terms of input, control and output legitimacy? and which factors explain their 
influence or lack of it? 
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in Chapter 7, Michelle ratton sanchez explores the participation of non-
state actors in Mercosur. she traces the development of institutional participatory 
mechanisms in Mercosur. next, she assesses whether these mechanisms have 
empowered non-state actors, enabling them to increase the input and control 
legitimacy of Mercosur policy making. Ratton Sanchez clarifies the imperfections in 
the organizational structure of Mercosur and its functioning. 
in Chapter 8, gerda van roozendaal explores the conditions under which non-
state actors are able to contribute to the input and control aspects of legitimacy 
in caricom, a regional organization in the caribbean. she looks at the processes 
through which non-state actors become involved, as well as at the nature of the 
actors themselves. the chapter includes a study of Barbados, a major caricom 
member state, since influence is not only exercised at the level of Caricom itself, but 
also at the national level. 
Part Five 
this part addresses the question of whether rios strengthen democracy in their 
member states and thus acquire output legitimacy. in chapter 3, erthal explores 
the relationship between the quality of democracy at the nation-state level and the 
quality of regional democracy. chapters 9 and 10 investigate the role of rios in 
promoting and preserving democracy in their member states, especially in instances 
where democratic values are violated. Under which conditions are rios willing to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of their member states? and, what are the effects of 
such interventions on the quality of democracy in the member states?
in Chapter 9, anna van der vleuten examines under which conditions rios 
intervene in the domestic affairs of their member states. By applying different ir 
theories, different expectations may be formed concerning rio behaviour in cases 
where democratic values are violated in a member state. van der vleuten tests these 
expectations by examining two rios: the southern african development community 
(sadc) and the association of southeast asian nations (asean). 
in Chapter 10, andrea ribeiro hoffmann explains the institutionalization process 
of political conditionality in the european Union and Mercosur. next, she assesses 
the functioning of the democratic clause of these rios in an evaluation of domestic 
political developments in paraguay and austria. she explains to what extent the 
rios involved succeeded in securing democracy in these countries. 
Part Six 
The final part deals with the five key questions and their interrelationship. In 
Chapter 11, the editors summarize the results obtained in the different chapters. 
they show how the answers formulated by the authors in this volume contribute to 
a better understanding of the relationship between regional governance, legitimacy 
and democracy. This enables us to formulate a first, cautious answer to the main 
question: do we have reason to believe that rios reduce the gap between citizens 
and policy makers, or, rather, do rios widen that gap?
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part 2
Defining and Assessing Legitimacy 
and democracy in rios

chapter 2
rios, legitimacy and democracy. 
A Conceptual Clarification
Berry tholen
Conceptual Confusion
as many have observed before, the past decades have been marked by an increase in 
regional cooperation of states, in all parts of the world. parallel to this has been the 
growing attention of scholars to this phenomenon – the latter probably developing even 
faster than the regional cooperation itself. this scholarly interest has not only been 
of an empirical nature, describing and explaining the phenomenon of regionalism. 
normative issues have also been broadly discussed, and in many studies regional 
integration organizations have been marked as a source of legitimacy deficit. 
A legitimacy deficit?
the development of these organizations should be understood, so the argument 
goes, in terms of a shift in governance that has led to problems of accountability 
and control and a lack of civic participation. new decision-making centres have 
been established at an international level, but these centres lack (to a large extent) 
powerful parliaments, legal systems with independent courts accessible to citizens, 
an adequate system of popular representation, etc. (van Kersbergen 2001). 
furthermore, the basic characteristics of a legitimate political system, such as shared 
understandings among all the people involved, a demos and a shared public sphere, 
are lacking (lehning 1998). others, however, argue that growing regionalism 
actually strengthens legitimacy because it helps overcome deadlocks in international 
decision making and remove inefficient competition between states to deal with 
cross-national issues. the establishment of regional integration organizations makes 
more effective cooperation possible (scharpf 1999).
these two camps in the normative debate disagree on the way the present 
situation is to be assessed and, consequently, they also differ on the best path for 
future development. from a ‘true believer’s’ point of view, what is needed is still 
more regional integration – eventually leading to a global government. This would 
bring maximum effectiveness and efficiency to decision making and problem 
solving. regionalism is seen as an exemplary step towards a better global order. 
for the sceptics, this is obviously is a worst case scenario, resulting in multiple 
deficits in legitimacy. On a global scale, it would be even more problematic to realize 
an accountable and representative system, because a demos would be completely 
absent and genuine party-building would be impossible. 
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this, of course, is an overly schematic sketch of the existing normative debate on 
the consequences of regionalism. it leads us, nonetheless, to a number of important 
observations. for one, it demonstrates that regional integration functions as a central 
case in a broader dispute on the legitimate world order. if issues of legitimacy are 
interesting in this time of globalization, they certainly deserve to be investigated 
in relation to the development of regional integration organizations (rios). they 
represent, for ‘believers’ and sceptics alike, something of a test case. the above 
sketch shows, furthermore, that apparently different normative issues in this field 
are formulated in terms of legitimacy, making one wonder: is this disagreement not 
(also) one about the meaning of the concept of legitimacy itself? do both sides in the 
debate share the same understanding of legitimacy? ‘legitimacy’ is a widely cited 
concept in the debate, but is it clear what is meant by it? a few observations from the 
literature on legitimacy and the european Union show this is not clear.
Understandings of legitimacy
first of all, we can see that in different studies, ‘legitimacy’ is understood in different 
ways. Quite often legitimacy is used as a synonym for democracy, and the use of the 
term in this sense often turns up in studies on ‘the democratic deficit’ (Follesdal 1998; 
weale 1998). in other studies, legitimacy is understood as some kind of combination 
of democracy and legality (Beetham and lord 1998). in most studies, however, the 
exact meaning of legitimacy is left implicit; research on the power and influence of 
the parliament or the decision-making structure within the eU is simply presented as 
relevant to the concept of ‘legitimacy’.
Secondly, we witness that not only the specific content of ‘legitimacy’ differs 
between studies, but also the object of legitimacy.  this leaves us with the question of 
whether legitimacy in the field of regional cooperation is a characteristic of decisions, 
of decision-making systems, of power holders, or possibly of organizations? this 
vagueness as to the object of legitimacy was already present in Max weber’s 
classical text on the subject. in Politics as a Vocation, legitimacy first seems to be 
characteristic of the rule or the commands of power holders, but then the term also 
refers to government as such (weber 1919, ch 1).
a last factor that brings further confusion to the debate on the legitimacy of 
rios is the logical status of the concept of legitimacy. weber introduced the concept 
as a sociological one. according to this understanding of the term, legitimacy 
refers to the likelihood of governmental decisions being obeyed by citizens – not 
out of hope or fear, but because of some ‘internal motivation’. weber presented 
three categories of possible ‘internal motivations’; that is three ideal typical types of 
authority (weber 1919, ch 1). in his Political Writings, however, weber used these 
sociological concepts as normative ones (weber 1988). in these texts, legitimacy 
referred to the conditions that must be fulfilled for decisions (or governance as such) 
to be binding or valid. 
distinguishing between these two conceptual categories is important for several 
reasons. first of all, these different concepts imply different kinds of questions and 
different kinds of answers. in a sociological study we ask: do people accept political 
decisions (or a regime, etc.) as binding for them? in a normative study we ask: when 
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should decisions (or a regime, etc.) be accepted as binding? furthermore, they differ 
in their approach to the question ‘legitimate for whom’? in a sociological study, it is 
of relevance to define the group of people which should be asked whether they accept 
this decision (or regime, etc.). in a normative study we apply a rational argument 
that should be equally convincing to everyone. in some contemporary studies, these 
two categorically different understandings of legitimacy seem to become mixed up. 
Beetham and lord, for instance, take legitimacy (in a normative sense) to mean 
‘normative justifiability’ plus ‘express consent of the appropriate subordinates’ 
(Beetham and lord 1998). this approach at least suggests that the latter is not an 
aspect of its normative justifiability but merely an empirical matter. 
our aim in this chapter is to develop a clear articulation of legitimacy in the 
normative sense. in this articulation, we focus on regional integration organizations 
(rios) as they are key to the current global shifts in governance. our articulation 
will help us to engage systematically in the study of rios and since ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘democracy’ have a central role in this book, we will return to their relationship 
to one another once the concept of legitimacy has been clarified. In the following 
section, we point out how our understanding of the concept of legitimacy is related to 
the context in which it developed: that of states. in section 3 we shift our perspective 
to legitimacy in regional multi-level systems. in section 4 we shall add the global 
system to the picture. In the final section we will use our interpretation of the 
legitimacy of rios to investigate the issue of ‘rios and democracy’.
Legitimacy and State
in the introduction to this chapter, we have outlined the debate between the two 
positions on the legitimacy of rios. on the one hand, there are alarmists who 
point out legitimacy deficits: RIOs lack proper parliaments and judicial review, for 
instance. By others, meanwhile, regional cooperation is judged positively because 
it means solving coordination problems. two different arguments, two different 
conclusions – and probably two different conceptions of legitimacy, as well. At the 
outset it is not clear whether either position is significantly stronger than the other. 
what we can point out is that beyond the apparent disagreement, the two arguments 
also have something in common: both take the state as the basis for judgement. 
The sceptics point out the legitimacy deficits of RIOs, thereby taking the state as 
the baseline by which legitimacy is to be judged. to ‘believers’, the advantages of 
new regional (or international) organizations or decision-making systems are spelled 
out in terms of their likeness to the coordination systems within existing (federal) 
states. one party focuses on the differences between rios and states, the other on 
the similarities – both take the state as their point of reference. 
States and RIOs
of course, the state-parallel that is often construed in dealing with rios’ legitimacy 
must not strike us as odd. we are familiar with the concept of legitimacy as referring 
to states. Until quite recently, any book about ‘legitimacy’ would have had to refer 
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to the ‘state’. The concept developed while the state as we know it was finding 
its shape. ideas like individual liberties, an independent judiciary, volonté de tous, 
representation, and so on, were developed and found their realization in the political 
entities that we have learned to call states.
Furthermore, RIOs are often pictured and characterized in ways – and indeed 
present themselves in ways – that remind us of states. Maps are drawn of the territory 
of the rio and this territory encompasses a clear, regionally concentrated part of 
the globe, not just some set of areas that cartographers accidentally gave the same 
colour. we read that people living in this region have historical ties that go beyond 
ethnic or linguistic difference: a common history of oppression under colonialism 
or shared cultural roots. the political authority within the region tends to broaden 
its scope beyond the narrow functional tasks that global international organizations 
have. from economic cooperation, many regional integration organizations move on 
to incorporate other functions that have classically been the domain of states. 
however tempting the step from ‘legitimacy and state’ to ‘legitimacy and rio’ 
might be, our question must remain: are rios to be judged in the same way as 
states are, in order to be called legitimate? to that question, various answers have 
been given in recent years. One answer is affirmative. Regional cooperation and the 
establishment of rios imply shifts in decision-making power from states to other 
forums. in order to be legitimate, arrangements for control, accountability and the 
like should follow the shifts in decision making. rios should develop exactly the 
same institutions states have. states, however, have not dissolved. even the greatest 
pessimists hold that states still have some autonomy (de vries 2001). what we 
witness in institutionalized regional cooperation, therefore, is not a simple shift in 
governmental power, but a change into something new. Many argue that the eU 
should not be seen as a (deficient) state, but as a sui generis, that must be judged by 
its own criteria (Bader 1999; curtin 1997).
Functional equivalence
How should the legitimacy of RIOs, if they are not to be understood as (deficient) 
states, be judged? of course, if it still is ‘legitimacy’ we are interested in, our 
perspective cannot be radically different from the one we employ when judge 
states. Basically it must deal with the issue: what characteristics must it have for its 
decisions to be binding and its actions accepted by its citizens?
an answer that has been developed in recent years is the notion of ‘functional 
equivalence’. A first interpretation of this idea takes functional equivalence to 
mean that an rio does not need exactly the same institutions as states have to 
be legitimate; there should, however, be equivalent institutions for each national 
institution. there need not be parliaments, as exist in states, but there has to be some 
body that represents the citizens’ interests. such an understanding of functional 
equivalence, however, is vulnerable to the same critique as the idea that rios should 
become identical to states. It still does not fully take into account the specific co-
existence of rios and states. we have to look for an interpretation of ‘functional 
equivalence’ that is less naïve. a more sophisticated interpretation should not take 
existing institutions or arrangements within states at a starting point and then look for 
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equivalents within rios. the alternative approach is to identify those functions that 
must be fulfilled within any political system in order for it to be called legitimate. This 
more sophisticated version of functional equivalence will enable us to distinguish 
between arrangements or institutional designs that contribute to the legitimacy of 
the decision-making system, and those that are dysfunctional. consequently, this 
approach to functional equivalence will not give us a demarcation criterion with 
which to distinguish between legitimate systems and those which lack legitimacy. it 
will, however, help us to point out what measures and arrangements contribute to the 
legitimacy of the system, and which do not.
Legitimacy in Regional Multilevel Governance
Scharpf’s functional approach
on one rio in particular, the literature on legitimacy is enormous: the eU. only 
in a small minority of these publications, however, is the concept of legitimacy 
systematically addressed. sometimes a list of desirable institutions is presented. 
often it is one institution or practice within the eU that is investigated. for our 
purposes, a list of ‘necessary items’ is much too arbitrary as a starting point. as 
argued in the previous section, for a meaningful articulation of the legitimacy of 
rios a functional approach is called for. one promising approach is that of fritz 
scharpf. his distinction between input and output legitimizing functions might be 
an appropriate starting point. scharpf describes  his perspective on legitimacy as 
functional. 
in this view, legitimating arguments invoking shared legitimacy beliefs imply a socially 
sanctioned obligation to comply with government policies even if these violate the actor’s 
own interests or normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at 
low cost (scharpf 2003, 3 italics in orig). 
In that definition he clearly follows Weber, and in doing so he seems to take a 
sociological focus. in the text immediately following these lines, he refers to the 
effects of responsiveness (input legitimacy) and of providing effective solutions 
(output legitimacy) to promote greater trust in modern institutional arrangements on 
the part of citizens. Yet, scharpf reassures us that he attempts a conceptual normative 
articulation. input and output legitimacy both rest, scharpf maintains, on the 
premise that legitimate government must serve the common good of the respective 
constituency, and that this function must be protected both against the self-interest 
of governors and the rent-seeking strategies of special interest. ‘input legitimacy’ 
basically means government by the people, and ‘output legitimacy’ government for 
the people. 
Input legitimacy is oriented at collective decision making and realizing the 
public will. scharpf develops this aspect of legitimacy by referring to rousseau’s 
work on the formation of the general will, but also to the work of habermas and 
others on communicative rationality and public deliberation. Output legitimacy, 
on the other hand, involves effective governmental steering in the public interest. 
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scharpf here draws on the ideals of balancing power as they have been formulated 
in the Federalist Papers, and earlier by de Montesquieu and even aristotle. output 
legitimacy, according to scharpf, is not only about blocking the power of special 
interest and preventing wrongdoing. it also is about ‘institutional arrangements 
facilitating the vigorous pursuit of the common interest and effective problem-
solving’ (Scharpf 1999, ch 1; Scharpf 2003, 3–5). These two kinds of legitimacy are 
complementary in serving the common good; the one cannot be reduced to the other. 
institutional arrangements vary widely among constitutional democracies, scharpf 
observes, but they ideally serve either or both of these functions. in fact, most forms 
can be said to serve both functions. 
over the years scharpf has presented and elaborated this distinction in many 
publications. Basically, however, the argument has remained the same. he criticises 
time and again those that maintain that the eU suffers from some kind of crisis of 
legitimacy, the solution to which lies in further democratization. while he agrees 
that in certain respects the legitimacy of the eU might be threatened, in his analysis, 
the problem is not to be found on the input side, but on the output side. it is problem-
solving gaps and coordination problems that make for the EU legitimacy deficit 
– not lack of popular participation, and better performance in one dimension cannot 
substitute for the deficits in another. Scharpf agrees with those critics that argue that 
state-like participatory democratic policy making at the eU level is improper because 
one of the necessary preconditions for this is not fulfilled: a collective, a people with 
a common identity is non-existent (scharpf 1996; scharpf 1999; scharpf 2003).
Scharpf re-examined
scharpf’s distinction between two kinds of legitimacy, of course, rings familiar. 
it echoes dichotomies such as ‘democracy versus effectiveness’ or ‘participation 
versus steering’. scharpf has articulated a familiar distinction into an elegant and 
more elaborate position. when observed more closely, however, his distinction is 
not as clear and convincing as it at first seems. Three observations can substantiate 
this claim.
first, a central concept in his understanding of input legitimacy is the public 
or general will. through participation in public deliberation and decision making, 
in whatever form, the general will is expressed. in output legitimacy the central 
concept is the public interest. that is the point of orientation for effective problem 
solving. A first question that must be raised is: what exactly is meant by the public 
interest and how does it differ from the general will? scharpf’s argument does not 
allow that the public interest can in some way be deduced from the general will; that 
would mean that output legitimacy could be reduced to input legitimacy. scharpf 
cannot refer to aims or values that have, in effect, been chosen in the decision-
making process to stuff out public interest (see: sangiovannivincentelli 2002). his 
work however, hardly gives us a clue as to how public interest is to be understood. 
only one passing example is given: results should accord with ‘plausible norms of 
distributive justice’ (Scharpf 1999, 13). Any further justification for this example 
is lacking, however. our point is not that problem solving in the public interest is 
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irrelevant for legitimacy. we simply observe that scharpf offers us a very limited 
articulation of what is in the public interest. 
second, the category of output legitimacy, as scharpf presents it, encompasses 
two quite different aspects. on the one hand, it is about avoiding and remedying 
decision-making traps and thus about effective problem solving. on the other hand, 
it is about the prevention of wrongdoing and checks on power holders. we may grant 
the point that both aspects are about ‘governing in the public interest’. But are they 
not two quite distinct functions? scharpf himself observes that there is ‘an obvious 
and problematic tension’ between institutional arrangements designed to fulfil either 
of these tasks (scharpf 2003, 5). the logical conclusion would be to accept that there 
are in fact two different functions at stake here.
third, on the input side the central idea is the development or expression of the 
general will. in recent discussions on deliberative democracy, it has become clear 
that in fact two ideals are involved in the advocacy for participation in government. 
one ideal is that of (practical) rationality: deliberation means having a discussion, 
in which the better ideas prevail. the other ideal takes a more political perspective, 
it is concerned with equal opportunity and checks on the most powerful, to prevent 
them dominating the weaker (Bohman 1997; King 2003; Macedo 1999). this 
distinction between ideals in deliberation can be understood as two functions that 
might be fulfilled by deliberative and participatory arrangements. The participation 
of citizens in policymaking can lead to better, that is more rational decisions, and 
their participation may be an effective way to guard their individual interests. in 
his classical work on representative government, J.s. Mill makes an effort to bring 
both aspects into a parliamentary system: civic participation is better than despotic 
rule because one man cannot see what many can and because each man is himself 
the best guardian of his own interests (Mill 1991/1861, 238–9); an electoral system 
should at the same time guarantee that the most competent men become member 
and make for an equal representation of different interest groups so as to prevent 
the tyranny of a specific group (Mill 1991/1861, ch. VI and VII); parliament is to be 
understood as a ‘congress of opinions’ playing a role in finding good policies and as 
a ‘committee of grievances’ critically controlling government (Mill 1991/1861, 282). 
the example of Mill’s work and the discussions on deliberative democracy lead us 
to the conclusion that scharpf’s input-category in fact contains two functions. 
Scharpf’s matrix rearranged
scharpf’s approach to legitimacy, presenting different aspects of the common good, 
is appealing. the distinction he makes, however, is not completely convincing. our 
comments suggest another categorization to judge whether specific arrangements 
are functional to legitimacy:
do they contribute to rational decision making (input legitimacy)? 
do they contribute to preventing the abuse of power (control legitimacy)?
do they contribute to the realization of outcomes in the public interest (output 
legitimacy)? 
each of these builds on a long tradition. 
•
•
•
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Input Bringing practical rationality into political decision making is an ideal that 
can be traced back to aristotle and plato. the latter maintained in The Politeia that 
the wise should be kings as they have privileged access to the relevant knowledge. 
at least since the reformation the idea has developed that, in principle, all people 
can and should participate in rational debate and contribute to the formation of 
opinion. since early modern times this idea has done its work and led to civic 
participation and public debate as we know it (habermas 1962). practical rationality 
has increasingly come to be understood as something for which communication and 
even debate was necessary. since the beginning of the 20th century, as the social 
sciences have developed, this tradition has in a sense witnessed a revival of platonic 
ideas as special expertise (based, this time, on scientific enquiry) was advocated 
for rational decision making. a recent renewal of the tradition has emphasized the 
importance of including the experiences of ordinary people, especially those that 
are ‘socially excluded’. Many recently introduced new participatory arrangements 
for governance have been advocated for their potential contribution to rational 
decision making: citizen polls and citizen policy juries at the local level or forums of 
accredited ngos and epistemic communities at the international level. 
Within this functional field of legitimacy we typically find debates on the best mix 
of broad civic participation and the inclusion of experts and on the optimum balance 
between unlimited access (leading to problems of coordination) and regulated entry 
(hindering open debate).
Control the tradition of control has its roots in aristotle’s analysis of mixed 
constitutions, in which different societal groups hold each other in check through the 
calculated distribution of offices (The Politics). The rationale here is political: it is 
about ‘power blocked by counter power’, in the classical phrase of de Montesquieu 
(Montesquieu 1748/1979, l. Xi ch. iv). the other topical formulation is that of ‘checks 
and balances’, as elaborated in the federalist papers. this political rationality is also 
invoked in arguments for democratic rights. as Mill pointed out, each individual’s 
interest is served best when everyone has a say. having a voice in decision making, 
albeit via one’s representative, is an effective barrier against special interest and 
tyranny (Mill 1991/1861, ch 3). these ideals typically found their way into modern 
law: constitutions in which the relations between counterbalancing offices are fixed, 
and which also present individual freedoms that can be invoked to block the exercise 
of power. 
Within this functional field of legitimacy, one of the topoi is that on horizontal 
versus vertical control. adherents to the latter, in debates on establishing control, 
opt for arrangements in which power holders are held accountable by some forum. 
those who favour horizontal control put their trust in arrangements of competition, 
peer review and countervailing powers.
Output within political theory, a distinction is often made between procedural and 
substantial theories of justice. procedural political theories tell us how decisions 
should come about. They, broadly speaking, cover the field of input and control. The 
output tradition is closer to the theories that put forward a substantial interpretation 
of justice. they tell us what we should try to realize, what is worthwhile to defend 
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and foster. it is a tradition that deals with aims or values that are the yardstick for 
success. they involve ideals like individual security and development, the equitable 
distribution of goods, economy in the use of collective resources or environmental 
sustainability. which actors are involved in what capacity and at which moment is 
not of relevance from this perspective.
Of course, failure to realize a specific output-value can have many causes. Scharpf 
had his reasons to focus on a particular cause of failure: coordination problems. 
the causes of failures to realize the output-aims that contribute to a system’s 
legitimacy might be elaborated in scharpf’s version of the rational choice analysis 
of coordination problems, or in any other. that, however, is of no consequence for 
the output criterion. for output-legitimacy, decision making might simply be viewed 
as a black box. what is relevant is the quality of the decisions coming out of it. 
Within this functional field, debates are typically about the priority of specific values 
or aims: for instance, relief of poverty now versus general economic development 
over the long term; economy versus environment. 
summing up, we propose, following scharpf, to assess the legitimacy of an 
organization or a system of decision making according to the extent to which it 
contributes to the realization of the common good. realizing the common good 
is to be measured on three complementary aspects. Regarding specific aspects or 
arrangements within that system we have to ask, firstly, whether they contribute to 
rational decision making. the second question needs to be whether they contribute 
to a system of countervailing power or effective accountability. the third question is 
whether they contribute to the realization of outcomes that accord with substantial 
universal principles. In a later section we will flesh out these basic requirements 
of legitimacy, especially in relation to ‘democracy’. Before doing that, however, 
we want to add a global dimension to our picture, in order to make our analysis 
complete.
Legitimacy in a Global Pluralistic System
in our introduction we came across two opposing positions. one of them held that 
rios are not and cannot be called legitimate, simply because they are not and 
cannot be like states. in the last two sections we have developed an interpretation 
of legitimacy that would allow for rios to be part of a legitimate system. that 
leaves us with the other position in the debate. adherents to the second position 
argue that the cooperation of states in regional integration organizations helps solve 
all kinds of coordination problems. the gist of the argument is that we should 
aim for institutionalized global cooperation. the issue that has to be addressed 
now, is whether regional co-operation should only be a phase in the development 
towards global government? is there a lasting role for rios in a just world, and if 
so, under what conditions? there is a further reason to turn to the global level. in 
investigating the concept of legitimacy hitherto, we have focused on arrangements 
and developments within RIOs and specific regions. Scharpf’s claim, as cited above, 
is that input and output legitimacy rest on the premise that legitimate government 
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must serve the common good of the respective constituency. can there be any 
justification for narrowing down the domain of legitimacy in such a manner?
World government
the ideal of a world government and global democracy has, in recent years, again 
found its supporters. as many problems and disasters in our world can be said to be 
a direct or indirect consequence of the existence of many states all following their 
own interests, the argument for ending the international anarchy of states certainly 
has its appeal. Would not the fight against insecurity and the continuous threat of 
war, inequality and suppression be better conducted by one world government? 
there would be no more safe havens for terrorists; the consequences of the uneven 
distribution of natural resources could be compensated by an effective tax system; 
equal rights for all could be guaranteed; pollution problems could be tackled without 
the endless disputes between states, and so on (archibugi 1998; held 2002).
the ideal of a world government, however, has been criticized since its very 
inception. a classical comment is that of Kant. he pointed out an important difference 
between arguments for the establishment of states, and arguments that can be given 
for a world state in a situation in which particular states already exist. it can be argued 
that individuals in a state of nature rightfully choose to partake in a state because 
it means moving from lawlessness to a lawful order. individuals have nothing to 
lose in giving up their ‘lawless freedom’. states, however, ‘already have a lawful 
internal constitution, and have thus outgrown the coercive right of others to subject 
them to a wider legal constitution in accordance with their conception of right’ (Kant 
1795, 104). fusing states into a world state could easily mean despotism, because it 
would mean disregarding the differences between the nations in the world. a similar 
argument has more recently been made by rawls. peoples in the world should be 
able to organise and govern themselves – up to a certain level – and that means 
accepting a plurality of states in the world (rawls 1999). 
on the one hand, the notion of a world state is appealing because it promises 
an effective approach towards solving international problems and realizing a more 
peaceful and just world. on the other hand, it might mean despotism because it 
implies overriding the differences that exist between – and are valued by – peoples. 
is a feasible middle course conceivable?
A middle course
one route that has often been chosen, is that of the development of some kind of 
federal world state (habermas 1992; pogge 1992; pogge 1998). it remains unclear, 
however, how exactly decision-making power would be distributed. in practice, it 
probably comes down to either a global state, or a plurality of independent states 
(Mertens 1996; tholen 1997). it seems reasonable to look for a middle course that 
could in some sense incorporate the continued existence of states.
to imagine such a middle course, we might start with Kant’s ideal of a federation 
of free states, a league of nations, to guarantee eternal peace. the league would be 
established by a treaty and it is in international law that Kant invested his trust. 
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in recent times we have witnessed that the existence of international law alone 
often is not enough to prevent disasters like war between states or ethnic cleansing. 
others have put their hope in international organizations, like the Un or the world 
Bank. international law is already complemented by real organizations, but this 
still seems inadequate – international organizations have often proved weak and 
ineffective (tesón 1995). we could move further, however. some have pointed out 
that we must also take into account all kinds of transnational networks of citizens, 
of experts, of corporations, and also of executive officials (Haas 1992; Keane 2003; 
Keck and sikkink 1998; slaughter 2004). these international transnational networks 
must also be understood as part of the international middle ground. a last addition 
to this cumulative picture of a feasible middle position between a world state and 
an anarchy of states is that of rios. walzer, for example, stresses the importance 
of regional integration organizations like the eU in his argument for a ‘third degree 
global pluralism’. ‘[i]t offers’, so he maintains, ‘the largest number of opportunities 
for political action on behalf of peace, justice, cultural difference, and individual 
rights; and it poses, at the same time, the smallest risk of global tyranny’ (walzer 
2000, 8). 
the proper conclusion seems to be that we can value the cooperation of states within 
rios as positive, without necessarily accepting the premise that the ultimate goal is 
a world government. in a world that includes regional integration organizations, in 
addition to states and international organizations, an optimum of both universal and 
particularistic values might be realized, as walzer puts it. this implies a high level 
of checks and balances and in this multi-centred regime the number of agents that 
can be involved in deliberation is maximized. here the aspects of input and control 
legitimacy return. it is noteworthy, however, that ‘the respective constituency’ must 
now include every individual in the world, and also that rios are understood to be 
part of a world system that is regulated by international law: they are supposed to 
obey international principles and regulations and they are themselves the result of 
international treatises and recognized by other international organizations.
To judge his multi-level world system Walzer, as a matter of fact, also uses specific 
ideals of output legitimacy like justice, cultural difference, and so on, that refer to 
desirable states of affairs in the world at large, but also in each specific state. For 
distributive justice we logically take a global perspective, as it involves comparing 
the conditions of people everywhere in the world. for a value as individual liberty, 
we should concentrate on the way individuals are treated by particular states. we 
can take this as an articulation of output legitimacy of rios. it makes us ask, for 
example, whether an rio contributes to democratization, the rule of law and respect 
for individual liberties within member states. 
RIOs, Legitimacy and Democracy
Now that we have clarified the concept of legitimacy, including its relationship to 
world order, we are ready to bring the concept of democracy into the picture. one 
of the confusions we pointed out earlier lies in the use of the terms ‘democracy’ and 
‘legitimacy’. while sometimes these terms are used synonymously, at other times 
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they are understood quite differently, and one also reads of ‘democratic legitimacy’. 
here, we suggest that the ideal of democracy is indeed part of what makes a system 
legitimate. different aspects can be distinguished within the concept of ‘democracy’, 
however, and these aspects can be categorized following our three legitimacy-
functions. 
Input: democracy as participation of non-state actors in RIOs    
the central issue in input-legitimacy is the participation of non-state actors in 
decision making at RIO level, in order to develop rational – that is well-informed 
– policies. In the existing literature on this topic the category of non-state actors is 
often labelled as ‘civil society’. Many kinds of actors and many sorts of participatory 
arrangements are presented. often a distinction is made between parliamentary and 
non-parliamentary arrangements. with the former, the case of reference is that of 
national parliaments, composed of individual delegates chosen through direct or 
indirect general elections (see part three of this volume). in the latter case, the 
model is that of corporatism: civic participation is realized through the (formal) 
involvement of (representatives of) societal groups (see part four of this volume).
if we follow this distinction, we can point out two groups of criteria for the 
evaluation of existing arrangements within rios. for a parliamentary type structure 
to contribute to input-legitimacy, this has to be open to all societal voices, and debates 
should be public so they can be part of public opinion making. in more corporatist 
structures, the focus is on non-governmental organizations and the opportunities they 
have to play a role in policy debates. in the literature on international governance, 
much is expected of non-governmental organizations (Keane 2003; Keck and 
sikkink 1998; risse 2000; verweij 2003; witte 2002). Yet, these actors can only 
contribute to input legitimacy if they are able to bring many different voices into 
the public debate. this depends on their practical capacity to organize, freedom of 
organization and speech, and to what extent the institutional arrangements at rio 
level are conducive to public deliberation. 
Control: democracy as specific checks on the use of power in RIOs
central to research on control legitimacy are the existence and functioning of checks 
and controls. such functions typically concern checks on executive powers and 
therefore involve judicial review (including the level of legalization and access to 
courts) and parliamentary or corporatist control. here, again, civic involvement is of 
interest, but this time to a different end. here, our question is: are there participatory 
arrangements and do they contribute to countervailing the power of the executive 
within the rio?
regarding parliamentary arrangements the criteria of evaluation are: is there some 
parliamentary body? does it have only an advisory role or effective veto-power? 
does it have such competencies on all issues dealt with by the executive? can it turn 
to a court? for a more corporatist system our criteria involve: does accreditation of 
some kind of non-state actors mean that they have formal power? do these non-state 
actors have the qualities to develop a powerbase and use it? Much of the literature 
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on non-state actors in ios casts doubt on this last point (cerny 2001; dahl 1999; 
ottaway 2001; scholte 2002). 
Output: democracy as an aim of RIOs’ activities
in our short excursus on the legitimacy of rios in a global setting we have found that 
we also have to take into account the ability of rios to contribute to the realization of 
basic values like democracy and the rule of law in member states. here ‘democracy’ 
is to be understood as an aspect of output-legitimacy, as we have defined it above. 
the criteria for evaluating a rio and its arrangements involve here: do they 
effectively contribute to the furthering of civic participation within the political 
systems of the member states? do their actions lead to guaranteeing individual rights 
within their region? are citizens of member states empowered to stand up for their 
rights and interests in participatory arrangements and via a legal system?
Conclusion
we started this chapter by sketching a debate. on the one hand, it was argued that 
rios are not and cannot be legitimate in taking binding decisions. on the other hand 
rios were claimed to solve coordination problems which individual states cannot 
solve, which makes for their legitimacy and may even bring us to the conclusion that 
we should opt for a world-state. By analysing these positions we discovered their 
weak points. More importantly, however, this analysis was of use in articulating 
the concept of legitimacy. it enabled us to step beyond the conceptual confusions 
common in the debate on the legitimacy and democracy of rios. 
the concept of legitimacy, as we have formulated it, refers to functions that must 
be fulfilled for decisions to be considered as binding. To do so, they must lead to the 
realization of the common good; we distinguished three aspects that we labelled as 
input, output and control. this distinction, we pointed out in the last section, helps 
us to understand the relation between the norms of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘democracy’. it 
also shows us the way to different sets of criteria for the evaluation of rios.
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chapter 3
discussing regional democracy
Juliana erthal
Introduction1 
the main aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between national and 
regional democracy. this is an issue not often addressed, as most of the literature on 
democracy and democratic deficit focuses on either one of these levels. Those who 
have attempted to deal with this relationship have mainly focused on the influence 
of regional integration on national democracy (see, for example, anderson 1999; 
schmidt 2006). here, i take regional democracy as the dependent variable, and ask 
which elements influence democracy at the regional level. In this context I will focus 
on two specific conditions: national democracy and regional parliaments. First of 
all, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the concept of democracy in the context 
of regional governance and the criteria by which democracy of regional integration 
organizations (rios) should be assessed. the main challenge in this regard is to 
define the type of democratic control that should be exercised at the regional level, 
and the criteria to be used to assess democratic regional governance. the approach 
formulated in this chapter takes the criteria used in the national setting as reference, 
and develops a series of minimal attributes for the concept of regional democratic 
governance as a first step towards a closer understanding of the topic. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the relevance 
of debating the question of democracy in rios. it presents a discussion of robert 
dahl’s concept of democracy (and polyarchy) and suggests the utilization of dahl’s 
criteria to construct an instrument for the assessment of regional governance. it 
also defends the possibility for democracy at the regional level. the second section 
discusses the relation between regional democracy, regional parliaments and national 
democracy. it shows how rios created by well-established democratic states have 
a better chance of having a functioning parliamentary institution and of being more 
democratic than those created by weaker democracies.
The Concept of Regional Democracy
since its inception, the concept of democracy has been contested and debated. 
Definitions of democracy proliferate. This calls for a minimal specification of the 
attributes to be taken into account. in the case of rios, the lack of consensus even 
1 i am very grateful to anna van der vleuten and Berry tholen for helping me develop 
the argument presented in this chapter, and also to andrea ribeiro hoffmann and Marcelo 
coutinho for useful comments.
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precedes the definition of its attributes, raising the question of whether the term 
should be applied in relation to this kind of political system at all.
among the authors who reject the idea of democracy in connection to processes 
of regional integration is dahl (1999), who provided some grounds for the claim that 
democracy and rios are incompatible. in brief, he argues that populations in general 
have difficulty in controlling the foreign policy decisions of national governments, 
which would suggest that this difficulty would be even greater in international 
organizations. according to him, for adequate popular control and participation at 
the international level, it would be necessary to create appropriate institutions for 
participation and control, in addition to a public debate, competition between parties, 
and the control over bureaucracies by elected leaders (Dahl 1999, 31–32). Dahl 
also emphasizes the issue of the size of political systems: a larger population will 
mean a more heterogeneous society and greater the discord in questions of policies 
concerning the public good. if we accept this argument, we must also accept that 
RIOs would negatively influence the prospects for regional democracy since the 
creation of rios means a considerable growth in a polity’s size.
despite dahl’s scepticism about the possibility of democratic international 
organizations, we will take his work on democracy as a basis on which to develop a 
better understanding of regional democracy.2 should dahl’s pessimism prove well-
founded, then we will come up against a fundamental obstacle to the objectives of 
this chapter. however, we will argue that while dahl offers a strong argument about 
democracy and international organizations in general, he pays little attention to the 
specific case of RIOs, and presents no ontological, logical or practical obstacle to 
regional democracy.
the topic of democracy at the regional level has been the subject of debate, 
particularly among those interested in the case of the european Union (eU). the 
‘democratic deficit’ and ‘legitimacy deficit’ of the EU have been much discussed, but 
without arriving at a clear distinction between these two concepts. this has been dealt 
with by tholen in the previous chapter of this volume. like the concept of legitimacy, 
discussed in Chapter 2, applying the concept of democracy brings difficulties to the 
study of regional systems because the concept of democracy was defined for the 
analysis of national political systems. this observation raises questions on which 
parameters should be used to judge regional democracies. another weakness of the 
literature is the absence of a consensus in terms of the criteria to be adopted for 
the analysis of democracy at the regional level. Berthold rittberger illustrates the 
consequences of this problem as follows:
it is evident that the benchmarks against which democracy at the eU-level are measured, 
and, consequently, the means through which the democratic deficit should be remedied 
depend on the researchers’ assumptions of what constitutes democratically legitimate 
governance (rittberger 2005, 33).
2 in a recent work (dahl 2005), dahl himself used his criteria for national democracy 
to evaluate international systems of governance. i am, then, following dahl’s suggestion of 
standards for international democracy.
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this problem is not exclusive to rios. philippe schmitter (2003) discusses 
the parameters by which the assessment of the new national democracies would 
be appropriate and, after arguing that the negative classification of Latin American 
and east european regimes in comparison to older european democracies is unjust, 
he states that ‘(…) we must not hold neo-democracies to the highest standards of 
performance that took previous democracies decades (if not a century) to acquire 
(…)’ (schmitter 2003, 13).
in the same manner, the institutions of rios (and particularly the eU) have been 
judged based on the democratic performance of well-established national political 
systems.  the question which then arises is: should we really measure the democratic 
performance of regional systems according to national parameters? But, on the other 
hand, should we lower our requirements for representation and participation simply 
because this is another system? democratic theory authors have been demonstrating 
the importance of democratic values for decades. these values do not lose their 
relevance simply due to the advent of a new level of political interaction. there 
are no easy answers to these questions, but taking an analysis of the attributes of 
the concept of democracy as our point of departure, we will verify their pertinence 
to the regional level, so that we may develop a parameter for the assessment of the 
democratic characteristics of rios.
A minimum concept for regional democracy 
the currently dominant idea of democracy includes a series of claims which can 
be understood using the notion of the various dimensions of democracy. these 
various dimensions correspond to the dimensions of citizenship, their counterpoint. 
Marshall distinguishes between civil, political and social citizenship (Marshall 
1967). civil citizenship corresponds to the rights necessary to individual freedom, 
among them the right to justice. the right to justice ensures the protection of all 
other civil rights – namely freedom of movement, freedom of the press, thought and 
religion, and the right to property and to sign valid contracts. In tribunals, we find 
the institutions essential to the preservation of civil rights. political citizenship refers 
to participation in the exercise of political power, be this through participating in an 
organization invested with political authority, or through the right to elect those who 
do so. its corresponding institutions are parliaments and local government bodies. 
social citizenship is related to the guarantee of a minimum of economic welfare and 
participation in social inheritance; it thus encompasses the ways in which citizens 
enjoy the ‘civilized’ conditions of society. to construct a minimum concept for 
regional democracy, we will start from the notion of political democracy which is 
the political dimension of democracy, and associated with political citizenship.  
not only it is necessary to distinguish between different types of democracy 
according to the notions of citizenship, we also have to specify which model of 
democracy is to be used as a reference. in his work on models of democracy, david 
held (1987) undertakes a careful analysis of which he considers to be the most 
important and emblematic of the classical and modern theories on democracy. the 
author establishes a general division between models of participative (or direct) 
democracy and representative (or liberal) democracy. held (1987, 4) characterizes 
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participative democracy as a decision-making system of public affairs in which 
citizens are directly involved. Representative democracy, in turn, is defined as a 
system of elected public service workers who obey the law and represent the interests 
and visions of citizens, within the rule of law of a state. 
there is discussion about the respective merits of representative and participative 
democracy. carole pateman (1970) defends democratic ideals that emphasize 
participation, in a clear critique of authors who defend what is known as representative 
democracy (such as dahl and schumpeter). a democratic system is, therefore, not 
only a system of national institutions, but also a participative society (pateman 1970, 
20). the concept of participative democracy posits that the existence of democratic 
institutions at a national level is insufficient, by itself, and that democracy requires 
structures of democratic authority at all levels of society. the exercise of democracy 
prepares individuals for the democratic process itself, which exerts an important 
educational function and ensures the stability of the system, making it self-sustaining. 
participative democracy broadens the concept of politics to include all of society, as 
well as of the concept of participation and, consequently, of democracy.
still, the requirements presented by a representative system of democracy 
are considered as the basis for all democracy, even by those authors who 
criticize representative democracy theory. pateman highlights the importance of 
representative democracy, noting, however, its insufficiency and defending a broader 
role for participation, as defined in the theory of participative democracy (Pateman 
1970, 20). other critiques of the representation criteria do not reject the criteria of 
representative democracy, but rather they go beyond representation, including other 
criteria considered essential by the authors (Mainwaring et al. 2001; santos 1998). as 
our aim is to evaluate regional systems which are relatively new and still struggling 
to satisfy demands for democratic legitimacy, it therefore seems reasonable that for 
the discussion of the concept of regional democracy we should adopt a minimum 
political, representative approach. this view is developed by dahl. in spite of his 
critical and negative view on the relationship between democracy and international 
organizations (dahl 1999), he adopts the same criteria for the assessment of 
international organizations as those he uses for national systems: the creation of 
institutions that enable citizens to participate; influence and political control more or 
less equivalent to those of national democracies; the availability of information on the 
political process for the population; the existence of public debate; the development 
of political parties that mobilize this debate; and the control of the international 
bureaucracy by elected representatives (or their functional equivalents) (dahl 1999, 
31 and 2005).
 in A Preface to Democratic Theory (dahl 1956) dahl elaborates ‘populist 
democracy’ as a system which is able to restrict tyranny, be it of the majority or 
minority. it grounds itself in the principle of the majority to maximize the values 
of popular sovereignty and political equality, and the process of formulating public 
policies must be subjected to these values. political equality corresponds to the 
notion that control over government decisions is exercised by the people so that 
the preference of all members of this group is of equal value. popular sovereignty 
is defined as a condition whereby the political choices made are those which are 
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preferred by the greatest number. For both these conditions to be satisfied, therefore, 
the principle of majority government must be obeyed.
In search of a theory that specifies which parameters in a society render it 
democratic, dahl seeks to identify the necessary conditions for the goals of populist 
democracy, popular sovereignty and political equality to be maximized. this, in 
turn, is connected to majority rule which, through a process of choices, results in 
the victory of the option which attracts the preference of the greatest number of 
members involved. in this way, the author establishes eight ‘more or less observable’ 
conditions (dahl 1956, 76) in the real world that are associated with this rule. these 
are the conditions:
‘During the voting period:
all members of the organization practice acts that we suppose constitute a 
manifestation of preference before presented alternatives, that is, voting.
in the tabulation of these manifestations (votes) the weight attributed to each 
individual’s choice is identical.
the alternative with the greatest number of votes is declared the winner.
During the pre-voting period:
every member which considers a set of alternatives, at least one of which 
they find preferable to any of the other alternatives presented may insert their 
preferred alternative(s) among those presented to the voting.
all individuals posses identical information on the alternatives.
During the post-voting period:
the alternatives (leaders or policies) with greatest number of votes win all 
others (leaders or policies) contemplated with less.
the orders of the elected public servants are executed.
During the inter-voting stage:
all decisions taken between elections are subordinate or executory to those 
taken during the election period, that is, the elections are, in a certain sense, 
controllers;
 or the new decisions, taken during the period between elections, are guided 
by the seven preceding conditions operating, however, under very different 
institutional circumstances;
 
Or both.’ (Dahl 1956, 84–5).
for dahl, the requisites for democracy, summarized above, represent social 
preconditions which are necessary for the construction of a non-tyrannical system 
of governance. his conditions for democracy place emphasis, therefore, on the 
restrictions on tyranny imposed by the social dimension of a political system. the 
author presents his argument as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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... an increase in the extension in which one of the social preconditions is present is perhaps 
much more important in the strengthening of democracy than any given constitutional 
elaboration. whether we are concerned about tyranny of the majority or the minority, 
polyarchic theory suggests that the first and crucial variables to which political scientists 
must direct their attention are social and not constitutional. (dahl 1956, 83)
in Polyarchy (1971), Dahl redefines the minimum conditions under which a 
society may be considered democratic, associating them to the equal opportunities 
the citizens must have. in this work, dahl emphasizes the dimension of contestation, 
exploring the conditions which significantly increase the chances of public 
contestation and the existence of a ‘polyarchy’ – a democratic political system ‘ín 
practice’, as opposed to a utopian ideal. he establishes that for a government to 
remain equally responsive to all its citizens for a period of time, all these citizens must 
have equal opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify their preferences to 
other citizens and to the government by way of individual or collective action, and 
have their preferences equally considered in the conduct of government – that is, 
considered without discrimination by content or source of the preference (dahl 1971, 
2). these conditions are necessary even if, according the author, they are probably 
not sufficient for the existence of democracy. Dahl’s next step is to establish a list of 
eight criteria for the three conditions above to be satisfied, when applied to societies 
with a large number of citizens such as modern nation-states (dahl, 1971):
freedom to enter and form organizations
freedom of expression
freedom to vote
right of political leaders to compete for support and votes
alternative sources of information
Eligibility for public offices
free and fair elections
institutions that make government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference
Making clear his proviso that other conditions may also be necessary for a system 
to be considered ‘strictly democratic’, the author focuses on a characteristic of 
democracy which he considers central, that is, government’s continued responsiveness 
to citizens’ preferences, citizens being considered politically equal. in this way, a 
democracy is a political system which is completely, or almost completely, responsive 
to all its citizens (dahl 1971, 2). in this context it is also important to remember dahl’s 
notion of polyarchies. the author uses the term polyarchies to refer to real political 
systems, thus differentiating them from the utopian ideal of democracy which serves 
as parameter for the assessment of human experiences. with this concept, the author 
also establishes the idea of degrees of democracy, meaning that a system does not 
necessarily have to be classified exclusively in terms of ‘yes or no’, but can be seen 
as more or less polyarchic. this opens up possibilities for assessing and comparing 
imperfect regional democracies as regional polyarchies.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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Delegative democracy and regional democracy
even if dahl’s polyarchies seem to offer openings for discussing ‘less fully established 
democracies’, guillermo o’donnell (1992) argues that the democratic theory 
devised by dahl takes the democratic practices of capitalist developed countries as its 
reference. Many Latin American countries do not have sufficiently institutionalized 
democratic regimes, which has resulted in a specific kind of democracy in these 
countries: delegative democracy. he argues that:
a non-institutionalized democracy is characterized by the (basically class-based) restricted 
scope, by the weakness, and by the low density of whatever political institution it has. other, 
non-formalized but strongly operative practices – especially clientelism, patrimonialism, 
and, indeed, corruption – take place of the former, jointly with various patterns of highly 
disaggregated and direct access to the policy-making process (o’donnell 1992, 6).
the absence of an institutionalized regime is related to the functioning, scope 
and force of its institutions. there is, according to o’donnell, a second transition 
to be made after the passage to a democratically elected regime. this is the passage 
to a consolidated institutional democracy. for this, democratic institutions must 
undergo a process of consolidation and strengthening, in a dynamic that includes the 
aggregation of interests and the stabilization of agents’ expectations. the appearance 
of formal organizations is part of the strengthening process of an institutional system 
(o’donnell 1992, 5). o’donnell cites argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, ecuador and peru 
as countries which are considered democracies according to dahl’s criteria, although 
the second transition, that which leads to a consolidated institutional system, has 
not yet been observed. this lack of institutionalization results in a system where 
democratically elected representatives are free to govern according to their own 
will, to the degree allowed by existing power relations. among the prerogatives of 
such a delegative democracy is the absence of the need for accountability before 
governmental institutions and other private or semi-private organizations. the 
president possesses, in this context, total authority, the congress and the parties being 
marginalized from the majority of decisions important to the country. limits on the 
executive’s powers are not set by institutions, but solely by non-institutionalized 
power relations. it is true that even representative democracy implies a certain 
level of delegation, but in delegative democracy this dimension is exaggerated 
and, crucially, it differentiates itself from representative democracy on the issue of 
accountability. o’donnell argues that:
representation entails the idea of accountability: somehow the representative is held 
responsible for the ways in which he acts in the name of those for whom he claims to be 
entitled to speak. in consolidated democracies, accountability operates not only, nor so 
much, ‘vertically’ in relation to those who elected the officer (except, retrospectively, at 
times of elections), but ‘horizontally’ in relation to a network of relatively autonomous 
powers (i.e., other institutions) that have the capacity of calling into question and 
eventually punishing ‘improper’ ways of discharging the responsibilities of the given 
officer. (O’Donnell 1992, 8–9)
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this relationship between representation and accountability, according to 
o’donnell, is what draws the line between the public and private spheres of the 
interests of those who occupy public offices. 
these remarks are useful in the discussion about regional democratic governance. 
even though it is possible that the criticism of democratic latin american regimes 
made by O’Donnell, which classifies them as delegative and distinguishes them from 
consolidated democracies, underestimates these new democracies by comparing 
them unjustly to political systems which have had considerably more time to evolve 
(as highlighted by schmitter 2003), his work calls attention to the importance of the 
correspondence between norms and practices in democratic systems - that is, their 
institutional consolidation. 
evidence of democratic institutionalization is a certain degree of conformity 
between actual conduct and the conduct prescribed by formal norms (o’donnell 1996, 
18). in relation to regional systems, this problem is commonly underestimated, as 
demonstrated by félix peña (peña 2003a and 2003b) in his research on the southern 
Common Market (Mercosur). The author argues that there is an effectiveness deficit 
built into the rules of Mercosur, and that this deficit has a significant effect on the 
credibility and legitimacy of the regional integration process. this concern about 
the rules’ effectiveness is justified by the author as follows. First, respect for the 
rules guarantees that the national interests of the participants will be reciprocally 
respected. Because Mercosur is the result of a voluntary integration process between 
states that, until now, had not wanted to give up their sovereignty, this reciprocity is 
of great importance to the sustainability of integration over time. second, the author 
identifies an accumulation of rules that are not obeyed or have not even completed the 
cycle of legal approval. among the possible reasons for this, the author emphasizes 
insufficient consultation of the members of society, or the weak participation from 
civil society in the representative institutions. this lack of participation may be 
due to a lack of transparency in the negotiations and the process in general. for 
that reason, peña argues that the credibility and legitimacy of the latin american 
integration process could benefit from greater civil society participation in regional 
negotiations. 
Keeping this in mind, we agree with o’donnell that it is necessary to go beyond 
dahl’s decisive criteria, which separate polyarchies from non-polyarchies, and add 
new criteria (O’Donnell 1996, 8–9) for a more meaningful distinction between 
politically democratic systems so that variations within the same category of polyarchy 
may be better identified. Of course, the inclusion of more criteria entails the risk that 
we end up with a concept which in reality will not find any correspondence at the 
regional level, not even approximately. following o’donnell and peña, it seems 
appropriate, however, to include the need for institutional consolidation among the 
elements which compose regional democracy. these elements, according to our 
discussion so far, are schematized in table 3.1.
although we cannot refer to any existing set of regional institutions as completely 
democratic according to the attributes of the concept developed, the idea is that they 
can, potentially, be democratized. the idea of degrees of democracy, or polyarchies, 
as dahl refers to them, can be particularly useful in this context.  
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this observation brings us back to dahl’s rejection of the notion of democratic 
international organizations. despite the fact that most international organizations 
do not aim at the construction of a democratic system of governance, this is not 
true in the case of rios. dahl does not differentiate between types of international 
organizations. the author does not consider the peculiarities of rios as compared 
to other international organizations, as described in chapter 1 of this volume. Yet, 
it does not seem appropriate to compare the population’s interest in foreign policy 
decisions to its interest in regional policies, as dahl does. interest among United 
states citizens in the policies of the state department concerning southeast asian 
security issues, for instance, is not comparable to the interest of indonesian citizens 
in asean policies on security, trade, employment, and health in their own and 
neighbouring countries. rios are a particular type of international organization, 
which may promote the integration of their member states, not only economically 
but also politically and culturally. to the extent that rios pursue such political, 
economic and cultural objectives, it is important that they also develop mechanisms 
for participation in and control of their decision-making process, as argued by tholen 
(chapter 2). 
it is obvious that rios also differ among themselves as regards their scope and 
institutional set-up, but rios such as Mercosur and the eU  indeed aspire to be 
responsive to their citizens, developing regional parliaments and holding (or planning 
to hold) direct elections for their representatives. the observation that regional 
parliaments of rios other than the eU have yet to struggle to become powerful 
institutions (see Malamud and de sousa, chapter 5) does not negate the fact that 
they do intend to create a representation mechanism over time. in a similar way, in 
the case of the eU (where the issue is most polemic at the moment), the apparent 
consensus about the non-desirability of a set of institutions that resemble the national 
polity does not necessarily set aside the democratic values that are valid for national 
democracies. according to philippe schmitter,  
Table 3.1 Regional democracy
regional democracy
freedom to enter and form organizations
freedom of expression
freedom to vote
right of political leaders to compete for support and votes
alternative sources of information
Eligibility for public offices
free and fair elections
institutions that make governmental policies depend on 
votes or other expressions of preference
consolidation of democratic institutions, or conformity 
between observed behaviour and formal norms
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... when it comes to the design question, there seems to be a general awareness that the 
rules and practices of democracy at each of these levels can not, should not be identical. 
especially when it comes to ensuring the accountability of a polity of the size, scale, scope 
and diversity of the european Union demands a literal re-invention of democracy, a task 
that was not even attempted by the convention that drafted the unsuccessful constitutional 
treaty. (schmitter 2005, 6)
The criteria defended by Dahl do not refer to any specific form of institutional or 
constitutional design, but they do present the values and social characteristics that a 
democratic polity should have. as schmitter points out, one of dahl’s most valuable 
contributions has been to call our attention to the fact that democracy is a political 
system capable of reinventing itself without violent ruptures. 
indeed, one could claim that this is the most distinctive and valuable characteristic of 
democracy: its ability to re-design itself consensually, without violence or discontinuity 
– even sometimes without explicitly diagnosing the need for such a ‘radical’ change in 
formal institutions and informal practices. (schmitter 2005, 16)
continuous change in democratic polities constitutes a revolution in itself, 
although it is possible that the actors involved in such a revolution are not aware 
of the importance of these changes. regionalism can, then, be included among the 
democratic revolutions of the contemporary world. it combines changes already 
experienced in democracy (the considerable growth in the size of polities, for 
example) with other ongoing changes, such as the appearance and ever greater 
relevance of organizational citizenship, the professionalization of politics, political 
guardianship, and multi-level governance (schmitter 2005). democracy is a political 
system which is under a continuous process of change, and is therefore capable of 
transforming itself to fit a regional system of governance. It is not my intent to 
defend the argument that the regional systems in existence today are sufficiently 
democratic, but simply to defend the point of view that rios can be democratic 
and, therefore, democratized. the aim of this section was to present a minimal set 
of criteria developed to analyze national democratic polities, and argue that these 
criteria do not lose their value once we enter the regional arena. 
Conditions for Regional Democracy: National Democracy and Regional 
Parliaments
after discussing the meaning of democracy and the relevance of the concept for 
evaluating rios, we will now discuss the role of regional parliaments and national 
democracy as prerequisites for regional democracy. 
Regional parliaments
regional parliaments can be seen as an indicator of democratization at the regional 
level. the existence of a regional parliamentary assembly actually implies that a 
considerable number of the nine criteria selected for regional democracy may have 
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been fulfilled (see Table 3.1). If the citizens of a RIO are able to vote for regional 
parliament members (as well as to be elected as a representative) in free elections, 
then they have the right to participate in political organizations, the right to vote, to 
compete for votes, and to be elected to public office; five out of the nine criteria are 
thus met. if they also have freedom of expression and multiple information sources, 
the total rises to seven. But none of this is really a sign of regional democracy unless 
the two last criteria are satisfied: the institution that depends on votes (the parliament) 
should be responsible for governmental policies – that is, it should have real powers 
to influence the regional political process; and its role in the regional system should 
be respected, as a consequence of its institutionalization.
failure to satisfy the last two criteria means that the existence of a regional 
parliament does not necessarily mean regional democracy, even if members of 
parliament are directly elected. for examples of parliaments with little or no political 
power, we need look no further than the central american parliament of the central 
american integration system (sica), and the andean parliament of the andean 
community (can).3 on the other hand, the issue of empowering regional parliaments 
is certainly not free from controversy, especially in the european context. it is no 
coincidence that in the eU this theme is one of the most disputed, the eU being the 
RIO that possesses the most powerful parliament of all its peers – the European 
parliament. as anderson (1999) points out, the issue of further empowering the ep 
becomes more contested as it is intertwined with discussions about the future and the 
final goals of the integration project.
... those who seek to eliminate or reduce the democratic deficit face an uphill battle; their 
agenda, which typically includes a much strengthened european parliament, is virtually 
indistinguishable from the agenda of those who seek to push the integration process in 
the direction of a federal outcome: a United states of europe. since the end point of 
integration has always been bitterly contested among the member states, a situation that 
has intensified in the post-Maastricht period, it should come as no surprise that progress 
on eliminating the democratic deficit has often fallen victim to deadlock on these more 
fundamental debates about integration and national sovereignty (Anderson 1999, 4–5).
another way to look at the relationship between regional parliaments and 
democracy in rios is to consider the potential these institutions have for a positive 
influence on the democratization of the regional system as a whole. The relationship 
between democracy and the existence of a powerful parliament is developed by 
steven fish (2006), who argues that the presence of a ‘strong’ legislative in national 
political systems exerts a positive influence on democratization. His measurement 
of the power of national legislatives is based on an index (the parliamentary power 
index, or ppi), which takes into account measures of the parliament’s capacity to 
3 Until recently, the former Mercosur’s Joint parliamentary commission could have 
also been included among parliamentary structures with no real power over the integration 
process. it was substituted by the newly created parlasur, which has been established with no 
significant legislative, budget, or control powers. An evaluation of the influence this regional 
parliament will exert on the south american integration will only be possible in the future, 
after it has completed its transitional phases (erthal 2006).
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monitor the president and the bureaucracy, their liberty in relation to presidential 
control, their authority in specific areas and the resources at their disposal to finance 
their activities (Fish 2006, 7–8). The author demonstrates that there is a strong 
correlation between the improvement of the ppi-rating of a country and the rating it 
receives in the freedom house democracy index. while countries that receive good 
PPI-ratings tend to receive significant improvements in Freedom House rating, the 
same did not occur with those states with low ppi-ratings. according to the author, 
this occurs because a weak parliament hampers horizontal accountability, its limited 
relevance discouraging the development of political parties which establish the link 
between population and elected representatives (Fish 2006, 12–13). Fish’s data show 
that even countries which are impoverished or emerging from long-term autocratic 
regimes may become open regimes and that ‘would-be democratizers should focus 
on creating a powerful legislature’ (fish 2006, 18).
transferring this logic to the regional level, the hypothesis would be, in the case 
of rios, that the inclusion of a parliament, or some equivalent legislative institution, 
in the regional system should tend to, just as with national systems, provide a strong 
democratizating impetus. in this way, a regional parliament appears not only as the 
product of an effort to make the system more democratic – as is the usual interpretation 
in literature on regional integration – but is also an agent of democratization in itself. 
according to this hypothesis, therefore, in rios which incorporate a parliament with 
effective powers, we should also see an intrinsic democratizing impulse and they 
should therefore tend to democratize over time.
National democracy
A second factor influencing regional democracy is national democracy. Democracies 
are more likely to commit to long-lasting international agreements and bind themselves 
to international institutions than non-democracies (Ikenberry 2001). But the specific 
influence of national democracy over the democratic characteristics of RIOs has not 
yet been established. Using statistical analysis, Marcelo coutinho (2001) establishes 
a correlation between democracy, development and regional integration. he argues 
that democracy directly influences the stability of countries which, in turn, affects 
their degree of credibility and is, therefore, a condition for regional integration. in 
the same way, development also influences integration positively, since developed 
countries are at less risk of facing economic crises and offer greater security to 
external investors. Both democracy and development affect the structure of domestic 
political preferences, political institutions and the availability of information for 
external actors (coutinho 2002, 6). according to the argument, the probability 
that an integration process will be successful and institutionalize is greater among 
democratic and economically developed countries. 
coutinho argues, furthermore, that this correlation is strongest when the aggregate 
values of democracy and development are considered – that is, ‘the joint strength 
that these variables assume regionally’ (coutinho 2002, 16). coutinho demonstrates, 
therefore, the existence of a correlation between the national and regional levels. 
The levels of democratization and development of countries – especially seen in 
an aggregate form in their region – result in ‘objective structural conditions’ for 
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the success and institutionalization of regional integration processes. this argument 
makes clear that national democracy, along with development, must be seen almost 
as pre-requisites for regional institutionalization, although the direct effects of 
national institutions on the democratic characteristics of rios remain unclear.
despite the lack of information about the relationship between national and 
regional institutions, if the remarks presented here about the importance of national 
democracy and regional parliaments are valid, then we can expect both these factors 
to exert a positive influence on regional democracy. The more democratic the 
member states of a given rio, the more democratic the rio will tend to be. if we 
admit that a powerful regional parliament is an important contribution to regional 
democracy, then rios created by democratic countries would also tend to endow 
their regional parliaments with effective powers. this chapter does not provide 
in-depth case studies to test this hypothesis, but it offers a preliminary indication 
based on the comparison of the indicators for political rights attributed to countries 
by freedom house (2006),4 for the rios which are discussed in further detail in 
chapters 5–11 of this volume: the EU, the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (caricom), the sica, Mercosur, can, the southern african development 
community (sadc) and the association of southeast asian nations (asean). 
indices of the democracy of the member states in these rios are summarized in 
table 3.2. the last column assesses whether the regional parliament has any power 
vis-à-vis the regional ‘government’ (the council of ministers or the summit of leaders 
of state and government).
the data indicate that the eU, being the rio with the parliament endowed with 
the greatest real powers, is also the rio whose members have the highest democracy 
ratings.  even if we add candidate countries (croatia: 2; republic of Macedonia: 3; 
and turkey: 3) to the average, it still remains well above the others, at 1.2. the eU 
is followed by Caricom, SICA and Mercosur, all of which score significantly below 
their European counterpart, but remain within the ‘Free’ category (1–2.5). These 
are RIOs that have not transferred significant powers to the regional parliamentary 
assemblies they have developed. it is interesting to observe that the rios with the 
lowest scores – SADC and ASEAN – are the only ones that have no parliamentary 
structure at all. the sadc parliamentary forum is, in spite of its name, not formally 
part of sadc but an autonomous interparliamentary organization (see van der 
vleuten, chapter 9). 
this observation reveals that despite having created weak parliaments, the 
national governments of “Free” RIOs do, in general, have democratic standards in 
mind, and seek to legitimize their integration enterprise by creating such assemblies. 
this could be less of a preoccupation for heads of state coming from national polities 
which are themselves less democratic. these remarks point to a correlation between 
4 The Freedom House Political Rights index reflects a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being 
the highest level of political freedom and 7 the lowest. on this scale, countries are divided 
into three categories: free (1.0 to 2.5), partly free (3.0 to 5.0) and not free (5.5 to 7.0). despite 
its methodological limitations, the freedom house indices remain of great use, since they 
are the only available indicators with the necessary breadth and continuity for this type of 
assessment.
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national democracy and the creation of regional parliaments, and are compatible 
with the observations made in chapter 5 of this volume, where the authors include, 
among other elements, domestic institutions as an influencing factor in the successful 
creation of legitimate regional institutions.
Nonetheless, it is hard to draw significant conclusions from these observations, 
since these rios have not developed (at least so far) any supranational authority 
and have not, thus, generated a democratic deficit as national parliaments remain 
‘in control’. so far, the only case available for observing the relationship between 
regional democracy, regional parliaments and national democracy is the eU. other 
rios may have developed regional parliaments, but have not created a regional 
system of governance. since the main reason for the ever greater empowerment of the 
EP has been the perception of a democratic deficit created by European supranational 
governance (rittberger 2005), we could perhaps expect that other rios would also 
follow this path: the impetus for transferring powers to regional parliaments should 
Table 3.2 Regional and domestic democracy compared
RIO Average score on 
political rights of 
the member states 
(between brackets: 
range of scores)*
Name regional 
parliament
Control by the 
regional parliament 
of the regional 
government
european Union 1.03 (1–2) european parliament yes
caricom 2.0 (1–7) assembly of 
caribbean 
community 
parliamentarians
no
central american 
integration system 
(sica)
2.14 (1–4) parlacen partial
Mercosur 2.4 (1–4) parlasur no
andean 
community (can)
2.75 (2–3) parlandino no
sadc 3.5 (1–7) no parliament –
asean 4.75 (2–7) no parliament –
*Source: freedom house 2006
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come with the strengthening of the regional decision-making process and the ensuing 
democratic deficit. On the other hand, it is also possible to imagine other paths for 
institutional development in rios outside europe. important questions remain, 
which have yet to be answered satisfactorily. can a regional parliament develop 
its powers and become an institution capable of relatively broad influence before 
national sovereignty is pooled in a regional executive? can elements other than a 
democratic deficit provide significant incentives to strengthen regional parliaments? 
is it possible to develop a regional parliament when national democracy is weak? 
May a regional parliament act as a democratizing agent for national democracies? 
these questions remain open and serve as motivation for further research. 
Conclusion
this chapter has discussed the relevance of the concept of regional democracy, 
the criteria which can be used to assess it, and two conditions which may 
influence its success – namely, the existence of regional parliaments and domestic 
political democracy. the chapter argued in favour of the possibility of regional 
democratic governance and, therefore, the democratization of rios. democratic 
values remain valid, regardless of the level at which political decisions are taken. 
preliminary indicators for the concept of regional democracy have been developed 
here, based on dahl and o’donnell, indicating the importance of ‘institutions that 
make governmental policies depend on votes or other expressions of preference’ 
and ‘consolidation of democratic institutions or conformity between observed 
behaviour and formal norms’ (see table 3.1) to speak meaningfully about regional 
democracy. finally, it has been argued that the presence of regional parliaments 
and domestic democratic institutions in member states seem to contribute to the 
democratic quality of regional integration organizations. regional parliaments 
are considered important institutions for the fulfilment of the democratic criteria 
selected for rios and as agents of further democratization. at the same time, those 
rios created by democratic states seem to be more inclined to create and empower 
regional parliamentary institutions. for the improvement of democracy in rios, 
we should focus on strengthening democracy at the national level and empowering 
regional parliaments.
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chapter 4
the Question of input, control and output 
legitimacy in economic rios
Bob reinalda
scholars disagree on the question of whether intergovernmental organizations 
(igos) have only output legitimacy, or also have input and control legitimacy. the 
same question may be asked of regional integration organizations (rios). Based 
on an analysis of 31 economic rios, this chapter will answer the question of 
whether economic rios contribute primarily to output legitimacy, as is generally 
assumed, or also contribute to input and control legitimacy. the chapter deals with 
the characteristics of economic rios relevant to legitimacy and presents in the 
last section the indicators which permit empirical research into the three forms of 
legitimacy within economic rios.
Two Conflicting Views
igos, according to robert dahl, are inherently ill-suited to democratic governance. 
he regards them as bureaucratic bargaining systems and argues that governments 
take decisions without much control by, or even awareness of, the citizens of the 
member states (Dahl 1999, 33–4; see also Erthal, chapter 3). The legitimacy of 
igos, according to dahl, is not to be found in their ‘democraticness’, but rather 
in their effectiveness, superior knowledge and concern for affected parties. elite 
bargaining in igos in terms of legitimacy as discussed in this volume is not a matter 
of ‘input’ or ‘control’ legitimacy, but rather of ‘output’ legitimacy. others, such 
as ruth grant and robert Keohane, argue that the authority of igos to act in the 
international arena is explicitly conferred on them by nation-states, which implies 
that they can be held accountable for their behaviour. for these authors, legitimacy 
depends on conformity to established international agreements and shared norms. 
the legal instruments here are the charters of the igos ‘that specify the procedures 
by which they have to act to make their rulings authoritative, defining what is often 
referred to as “input” or “process” legitimacy’ (Grant and Keohane 2005, 35). 
hence, they assume that input and control (or process) legitimacy may exist and 
can be recognized. the responsibilities of igos may become recognizable through 
the purposes, procedures and bodies mentioned in their charters with the aim of 
monitoring these responsibilities and providing checks and balances in the decision-
making process. igos may also be held to standards articulated in international 
law, for instance, if they violate human rights treaties or provisions of international 
courts or tribunals. the existence of these two views leaves us with the puzzle of 
whether legitimacy of igos is only a matter of effectiveness or output legitimacy (as 
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dahl, with his sceptical view, assumes), or also one of support and transparency or 
input and control legitimacy (as grant and Keohane, with their accountability view, 
suggest). Before defining indicators for the three forms of legitimacy I will elaborate 
further on economic RIOs specifically.
The Process of Integration and the Nation-State
in order to avoid the impression that there is only one successful example of 
regional integration which casts its shadow over other efforts, i will not take the 
western european integration process as my starting point, but rather the rise of 
economic regionalism, of which the european case is a part. economic regionalism 
has a dynamic, rather than static, character. cooperation between nation-states may 
evolve from less to more intensive forms, from free trade agreements to far-reaching 
integration. Bela Balassa’s range of five categories of integration starts with no tariffs 
or quotas (a free-trade area) and continues with the addition of, in turn, a common 
external tariff (a customs union), a free flow of production factors (a common 
market) and harmonization of economic policies (an economic union). it ends with 
unification of policies and political institutions (total economic integration) (Balassa 
1994). In reality, there are even more than these five categories. A preferential trade 
agreement, for instance, can be considered a weaker form of a free-trade area and 
a monetary union differs from an economic union. Some organizations do not fit 
Balassa’s range, because their function as ‘booster organizations’ remains restricted 
to encouraging regional free trade and/or economic cooperation. sometimes one 
of Balassa’s categories applies, but the RIO’s purposes reach beyond this specific 
category. the purpose of a customs union, for instance, may be to become a common 
market or monetary union, whereas in other RIOs, a customs union is the final 
destination. regionalism thus demonstrates its dynamic character. ‘early stages of 
integration tend to concentrate on the elimination of trade barriers and the formation 
of a customs union in goods. as integration proceeds, the agenda expands to cover 
non-tariff barriers, the regulation of markets, and the development of common 
policies at both the micro- and macro-levels’ (hurrell 2000, 43).
Andrew Hurrell clarifies this dynamic character by dividing regionalism into five 
categories, ranging from rather autonomous transnational economic networks within 
a certain region (that is, economic regionalization that is not based on the conscious 
policy of a group of states) to a cohesive and consolidated regional unit (which he 
calls ‘regional cohesion’). his second category refers to regional political activity 
in conjunction with common attitudes. regional awareness (or identity) matters 
because of the ‘shared understandings and the meanings given to political activity 
by the actors involved’ (hurrell 2000, 41). internal factors (religious traditions, 
history, or culture) as well as external factors (security threats or cultural challenges) 
may highlight common elements that promote more intense forms of cooperation 
than the original coincidental regionalization. his third category, ‘regional interstate 
cooperation’, follows on from this common understanding and serves as a ‘means 
of responding to external challenges and of co-ordinating regional positions in 
international institutions or negotiating forums’, or can be developed ‘to secure 
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welfare gains, to promote common values, or to solve common problems, especially 
problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence’. whether this 
interstate cooperation is formal or informal, it is ‘very clearly statist, designed to 
protect and enhance the role of the state and the power of the government’ (hurrell 
2000, 42). this applies still more to his fourth category (‘state-promoted regional 
integration’), which is based on specific policy decisions by governments designed 
to reduce or remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and 
people. In his final category regional cohesion forms the organizational basis for 
policies within the region across a range of issues. it enables the region to play a 
defining role in the relations between this group of states and the rest of the world. 
Regionalism Subordinated to Universalism
although rios developed before global international organizations, they became 
subordinate to them. Regionalism first developed in the Western Hemisphere. The 
international Union of american republics (iUar) was established in 1890, and the 
central american Union in 1907. in the early 20th century, the iUar, predecessor of 
the organization of american states, represented the multilateral regional approach 
driven by the Us and used in conjunction with the Monroe doctrine. obviously 
aware of the power relations which dominated that part of the world, the founders 
of the league of nations recognized the iUar in 1919. article 21 of the league’s 
covenant reads: ‘nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of 
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings 
like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace’. 
in 1945, during the foundation of the league’s successor, the United nations 
(Un), the american states expressed their fear that the dumbarton oaks proposals 
for the Un would restrict the capabilities of regional arrangements or agencies with 
some autonomy in relation to the Un security council. the Us and other powers, 
however, feared that such independent regional arrangements could undermine 
the authority of the universal security council which they wanted to establish. 
a compromise was reached. the authority of regional arrangements would be 
accepted, as long as they recognized the Un’s objectives. regional arrangements 
were covered by a special chapter of the Un charter with three articles. article 52 
in chapter viii reads: 
nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United 
nations. 
although this Un chapter explicitly refers to security, this understanding of the 
combination of universalism and regionalism has also had an impact on regional 
arrangements for economic and social cooperation between states. in principle, 
the Un only recognizes and accepts economic regional arrangements when they 
correspond with Un objectives. Most european economic regional arrangements 
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in the 1930s – such as the British Commonwealth, the French customs union with 
its colonies, the Baltic entente and the trade agreement between Bulgaria, hungary, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia – were protectionist. The Oslo States were among the few 
that favoured free trade. after 1945, a protectionist orientation was hard to accept 
within the Un system, given the dominant free-trade orientation of the general 
agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt). however, the emergence of the gatt 
regime itself was a political compromise. the failure of the havana charter of a 
proposed international trade organization created a situation in which political 
support for gatt was exchanged for two major exceptions to the Most-favoured-
Nation Treatment as a fundamental GATT standard – namely, the creation of 
customs unions and common markets. in practice, gatt policies tried to limit these 
exceptions by arguing that regional arrangements with the character of customs 
unions or common markets were acceptable as long as ‘trade creation’ occurred and 
‘trade diversion’ was avoided (choi and caporaso 2001). Just like the Un, gatt 
has ensured that regional arrangements are required to declare their existence, which 
is followed by an assessment of whether regional arrangements are in line with 
gatt’s general policies. the world trade organization (wto) has maintained 
gatt’s method in this regard.
Re-active and Pro-active Regionalism
the driving forces behind the creation of rios have been external challenges and the 
search for strategies to cope with them. for examples of this, we need only look at 
the Us in the early 20th century, when the Us opted for a multilateral approach in the 
Western Hemisphere in which Europe was not to intervene, and again in 1944–1945, 
when the Us initiated the process of international institution building and soon after 
promoted western-european integration as a shield against communism (ikenberry 
2001). here, the external challenges, whether of an economic or a security nature, 
caused a re-action by the hegemon, which in international relations takes the form of 
an international cooperative alliance whose aim is to resist that challenge. although 
realists, who stress the importance of the hegemon’s role in creating regimes, assume 
that such alliances will be temporary, history has shown that cooperation often goes 
through a process of institutionalization which enhances the permanent character of 
cooperation.  
however, regionalism does not only result from hegemonic strategies, but also 
from the pro-active policies of weaker states in a certain region. in order to withstand 
external challenges they themselves may try to become stronger players by uniting 
on a regional basis. the reluctance of the ‘north’ to let the ‘south’ participate in the 
world economy on fairer, more equal terms was already an issue at the 1944 Bretton 
woods conference. it was decided, however, to give european recovery priority 
over southern development (Murphy 1997). this imbalance encouraged the latin 
american states to strengthen their position in the world economy through regional 
cooperation. this pro-active strategy was based on the ideas of the Dependency 
School. for them, regionalism became ‘a tool in the struggle to end the exploitative 
and dependent relationship between the developing countries (the south) and the 
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industrialized countries (the north)’ (fawcett 2000, 15). latin and central american 
rios, as well as others, are therefore to be seen as autonomous developments, rather 
than as copies of western european integration, although to some extent they have 
drawn on european ideas and experiences. 
on the subject of economic regional cooperation among developing states, andrew 
axline discerns four generations of regionalism. an analysis of this development may 
help to determine the conditions for successful regional cooperation in relation to 
legitimacy. The first generation consisted of attempts to transfer the policies of trade 
liberalization that had been applied in industrialized economies to an underdeveloped 
setting. examples of this are the latin american and caribbean free trade associations 
established during the 1960s and the association of south east asian nations. the 
second generation moved away from regionalism as a means of promoting trade 
and economic growth and used regionalism as a means of industrialization and 
economic development, known as ‘regional import substitution’. although promoted 
by the UN regional Economic Commissions, this conflicted with GATT policies. 
the third generation had a greater political impact since regional cooperation was 
heading towards the adoption of a common front among developing countries using 
regional policies as a form of ‘collective self-reliance’. ‘Joint policies within the 
region were augmented by regional external policies towards third countries and 
common negotiating positions in larger international forums’ (axline 1994, 3). this 
politicization led to turbulent times for rios, but although weakened most rios 
remained in existence. 
new regional starts (both as reorganizations and new institutions) made around 
the end of the cold war (during the late 1980s and early 1990s) mark a fourth 
generation, with a move back to trade liberalization measures ‘often on the basis of 
overlapping bilateral agreements rather than multilateral regional obligations’. the 
andean group is an example. another characteristic, revealed by Mercosur and the 
Southern African Development Community, is ‘specific cooperation on individual 
programmes among several countries’ (axline 1994, 4). the liberalization process of 
the 1980s, in line with the ideas of Milton friedman, promoted regionalism as a shield 
against the consequences of this ‘new’ globalization. in the insecure environment 
of the revived cold war of the 1980s, when bipolarity was still dominant, various 
regional organizations, often with a strong economic character, represented a serious 
attempt ‘to create a security consensus in a given area without the direct backing 
of a major external power’, according to louise fawcett (fawcett 2000, 16). the 
1990s represented a different era which allowed greater freedom to regionalism, the 
restraints of the cold war having vanished. furthermore, the Us actively promoted 
regionalism and even became a practitioner. feeling the need to manage the 
increased levels of interdependence in the region, the Us became a regional player 
through nafta (north american free trade agreement) and its ftaa strategy for 
the western hemisphere (free trade area for the americas). now, preferential trade 
agreements were used with increasing regularity to help prompt and consolidate 
economic and political reforms among prospective members, which had been ‘a 
rarity during prior eras’, according to Mansfield and Milner. Finally, regionalism 
was accompanied by ‘high levels of economic interdependence, a willingness by 
the major economic actors to mediate trade disputes, and a multilateral (that is, 
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the gatt/wto) framework that assists them in doing so and that helps them to 
organize trade relations’ (Mansfield and Milner 1999, 601).
Conditions for Successful Regional Cooperation
an analysis of the hampering, stagnation and failure of economic rios in their 
ongoing evolution as described above produces at least four conditions which must 
be met for successful regional cooperation, two at the level of the state and two at 
the level of the RIO. States engaging in regional cooperation must have sufficient 
‘stateness’, as well as sufficient and stable domestic support. RIOs, in turn, must be 
able to produce an acceptable distribution of benefits (or losses) and contribute to an 
understanding among their member states’ citizens of their double allegiance (both 
national and regional). 
the first condition refers to a nation-state’s need for sufficient and viable 
institutions in order to cooperate regionally. its political, economic and social systems 
must be developed and flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances as a result 
of external influences while maintaining political and administrative continuity. 
this ‘stateness’ was lacking in the 1960s, when newly-created african states began 
to function as independent but still inadequately equipped entities. a lack of state 
strength and its negative impact on regionalism are also found more recently as the 
result of state failure. ‘in many parts of the post-colonial world political instability, 
civil war, economic mismanagement, and environmental degradation interact to 
undermine the cohesion of state structures, to erode the economic base and social 
fabric of many weak states, and to produce a deadly downward spiral leading towards 
disintegration and anarchy’ (hurrell 2000, 67).
the second condition is that, given the distributive consequences of cooperation, 
governments engaged in regional cooperation must be able to gain support from 
within their domestic system widely enough to continue and intensify integration. 
‘those groups suffering losses due to a particular policy or changes in a policy will 
oppose it, while those benefiting from the policy will support it. Various domestic 
groups thus will demand different policies, and a government’s economic policy 
choices often will reflect the underlying preferences of the strongest and best-
organized interests within society’ (Mansfield and Milner 1997, 12). Governments, 
therefore, must remain aware that the discriminatory effects of regionalism may 
endanger their popularity, particularly if they want to intensify cooperation.
the third condition for success is that governments should agree not only on 
common policies contributing to the region’s development, but also on an acceptable 
distribution of the benefits between them. The 1960s showed that if agreed 
mechanisms for the (re)distribution of gains and losses from integration are absent, 
polarization arises between ‘growth’ and ‘stagnation’ poles (cf. Axline 1977, 83–8). 
latin american experiences during the same era reveal three problems which beset 
integration endeavours (cf. Macbean and Snowden 1981, 187–8):
 
the distribution of costs and benefits, especially when dynamic destabilizing 1.
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tendencies emerged that seemed to benefit most those already better off; 
the incipient politicization of the integration process; and 
the necessity among partners to agree on underlying policy goals, which 
became problematic given the high degree of politicization and strong 
nationalist feelings. 
If the costs and benefits of regional integration are unevenly distributed among 
the participating states, those not benefiting from them will oppose policies that will 
bring regional gains. this also raises the issue of identity: does national identity 
prevail in such situations, or is there sufficient regional identity to counterbalance 
any nationalist feelings?
this leads us to the fourth condition: that governments and populations develop 
a sense of ‘double allegiance’ which combines national and regional understandings 
in such ways that further integration is not blocked. this implies that governments 
are capable of successfully playing ‘two-level games’, in which they are aware of 
national preferences and domestic support and also manage to look for opportunities 
to intensify regional integration and to win domestic support for them, even when 
integration can bring potential costs with it. such situations require awareness among 
citizens that they are both national subjects and participants in a rio. the term ‘double 
allegiance’ refers to a situation in which national allegiance remains undiminished 
while citizens develop a secondary allegiance which allows regionalism to continue 
its existence or to intensify cooperation (cf. Milward 1995, 19). the creation of 
this secondary allegiance also depends on the rio. the minimum to be expected is 
that a rio which seeks to intensify cooperation also tries to receive support from 
the citizens of its member states, either by engaging them and their representatives 
in the common endeavour, or by providing transparency about what is taking place 
within it. 
The first and the third condition for successful regional cooperation (‘stateness’ 
and ‘rioness’) can be related to control legitimacy, the second and the fourth 
condition (domestic support and double allegiance) to input legitimacy.
Identifying Input, Control and Output Legitimacy
in order to establish whether economic rios display any of the three forms of 
legitimacy, indicators for each of the three forms need to be established. if economic 
rios have higher aspirations with regard to regional integration (establishing, 
resuming, or intensifying cooperation), their concern for legitimacy should increase, 
not only with output legitimacy (effectiveness), but also with input and control 
legitimacy (support and transparency). the subordination of regional to universal 
organizations can be related to output legitimacy because it presupposes the universal 
organizations’ consent for regionalism. this leads to the following indicators of 
input, control and output legitimacy of economic rios.
with regard to input legitimacy, it can be argued that inputs coming from actors 
other than governments contribute to this kind of legitimacy. it is assumed that, if 
such representation is taking place, often in a consultative form, governments have 
2.
3.
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felt the need to increase the organization’s legitimacy by engaging actors involved 
in domestic or international politics. indicators are therefore representations by such 
actors as: 1) parliamentarians, 2) interest groups, 3) non-governmental organizations 
(ngos) with a consultative status, 4) experts, 5) subnational authorities, and 6) 
igos with an observer status.
with regard to control legitimacy, it can be argued that the presence of independent 
bodies playing a role alongside governments during the decision-making process 
within a rio represents this kind of legitimacy. it is assumed that governments and 
rios establish such international bodies in order to increase control legitimacy. 
they contribute to checking and balancing the principals (governments) and their 
involvement provides greater transparency and accountability than if governments 
were the sole decision makers. indicators are the availability of: 1) independent 
secretariats and supranational organs, 2) dispute settlement bodies (tribunals, 
courts), 3) autonomous monetary institutions (for instance, involving central bank 
governors), 4) ombudspersons and auditors, and 5) parliamentary structures with 
co-decision powers.
with regard to output legitimacy, it can be argued that recognition by authoritative 
igos such as the Un or gatt represents this kind of legitimacy for economic rios. 
it is assumed that by seeking such recognition, economic rios will improve their 
effectiveness and thus their output legitimacy. the same goes for formal cooperative 
agreements with other international or regional organizations. indicators are the 
presence of: 1) an observer status granted by the UN, 2) notification by the GATT/
wto, 3) an observer status granted by the wto, 4) an observer status granted by 
other igos, and 5) cooperative agreements with other igos. 
Input, Control and Output Legitimacy in 31 Economic RIOs
in order to investigate the issue of legitimacy empirically, 31 economic rios were 
selected as characteristic of their region: eight from africa, four from asia and the 
Pacific, five from the Middle East and Western Asia, nine from the Western Hemisphere 
and five from Central and Eastern Europe/former Second World (Western Europe 
was excluded). in order to ensure comparable data one encyclopaedic handbook was 
used as a source for all organizations (europa directory 2001).
table 4.1 provides an overview of these rios and their main characteristics. 
the most common kinds of economic cooperation found among the selected rios 
(sometimes in combination) are: booster organizations (11), preferential trade 
agreements (11), customs unions (8) and free trade areas (6), with only two common 
currencies (monetary union), one common market and one economic union (see table 
4.1). with regard to integration perspectives beyond preferential trade agreements, 
two rios will remain a free trade area and two a customs union, whereas 16 also 
aim towards a common market, economic union and/or monetary union (one even a 
political union). This number confirms the dynamic character of integration assumed 
by hurrell. But it must also be mentioned that the more intensive forms of integration 
remain small in number (which is different from the purpose of becoming more 
intensive). 13 of these 31 rios went through a process of reorganization, most of 
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them during the 1990s (9) and 1980s (3). these reorganizations indicate that these 
economic rios were able to adapt to serious changes in their environment and 
confirm Axline’s move from the third to the fourth generation of regionalism (back 
to measures of trade liberalization due to the new economic mood of the 1980s).
although most of the rios selected are primarily economic organizations, nearly 
half of them (15) include a security dimension (institutionally: 12; ‘on the agenda’: 
3), an issue hinted at by fawcett and mentioned by hurrell as a factor relevant to 
regional awareness. five security dimensions are found in booster organizations, 
four in preferential trade agreements, three in free trade areas, two in customs unions 
and one in an economic union. this implies that economic regional cooperation, 
irrespective of type, does not need to restrict itself to economic issues.
tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 provide the various forms of legitimacy (input, control 
and output) found according to the indicators discussed above. The general finding 
of the investigation with regard to the three forms of legitimacy is that all forms of 
legitimacy (input, control and output) are found in the group of 31 rios. comparing 
the three forms of legitimacy, output legitimacy proves the strongest of the three 
with a ‘total value’ of 74, followed by input legitimacy at 52 and control legitimacy 
at 43. this order was determined by assessing the legitimacy aspect of each rio 
(with a scale ranging from ‘absent’ to ‘very strong’, in combination with grades 
ranging from zero to five; see legend under Table 4.2) and calculating a total score 
for all 31 RIOs. Referring to the two views discussed in the first section (Dahl’s 
sceptical view and grant and Keohane’s accountability view) we may conclude that 
the data does not support the sceptical view. input and control legitimacy may be 
weaker than output legitimacy, but they are clearly present.
Output legitimacy is expected by both views. the subordination of regionalism 
to universalism implies that, in order to perform, rios need to pursue the same 
goals as universal igos, such as the Un and gatt/wto, and/or need to conclude 
formal agreements with other IGOs. The findings shown in Table 4.4 confirm these 
expectations. According to the five indicators, output legitimacy was found in 17 
RIOs having a UN observer status, 19 providing GATT/WTO notifications, 13 
having a wto observer status, two having an observer status elsewhere, and 23 
having concluded cooperative agreements with other igos. conclusion: given the 
total numbers of observer statuses (32), notifications (19) and agreements (23), RIOs 
are recognized by universal ios, thus enhancing their output legitimacy.
Input Legitimacy is not expected by dahl but hinted at by grant and Keohane. 
It is related to the necessity of finding sufficient domestic support in combination 
with an understanding of the evolving integration. according to the six indicators, 
input legitimacy was found in 19 parliamentary structures (of which two were just 
proposals), 19 arrangements for interest group representation, nine arrangements 
for ngo representation, three arrangements for the inclusion of experts, and one 
arrangement for subnational authorities representation. although these indicators 
do no necessarily reveal their actual influence (see, for instance, Malamud and De 
sousa, chapter 5), it must be observed that parliamentarians are involved in nearly 
two-thirds of the cases (19 of 31 rios). this equals the number of arrangements for 
interest group representation (19) and is roughly twice as large as the arrangements for 
ngo representation (9). seven rios provide outsiders (igos) with the opportunity 
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to observe directly what is going on within their organization (see table 4.1). the 
numbers of other indicators (experts, subnational authorities) remain small. the 
conclusion is, then, that the numbers of parliamentary structures and interest group 
representation (both 19) indicate that input legitimacy matters, mostly through these 
channels, rather than through ngo or igo representation. it must be observed that 
the engagement of parliamentarians in this group of rios is a rather recent, post-
Cold War phenomenon – one arrangement dates back to 1979, three to 1989, nine to 
the 1990s and four to 2002.
Control Legitimacy is not expected by dahl but is hinted at by grant and Keohane 
and relates to providing transparency and checks and balances vis-à-vis governments 
in order to avoid the problems that beset earlier integration endeavours. according 
to the five indicators control legitimacy was found in four active secretariats, 
19 arrangements of dispute settlement (often as a court of justice: 12; two being 
planned), 16 arrangements with autonomous monetary institutions (of which nine 
involving central bank governors), and four auditing arrangements; no co-decisive 
parliamentary structures were found (see table 4.3). control legitimacy is thus most 
visible in judicial procedures (in 19 of 31 rios) as well as in autonomous monetary 
arrangements (16). control by other arrangements, such as active secretariats or 
independent commissions (4), auditors (4) or co-decisive parliaments (0), is rare. 
the conclusion is, then, that control legitimacy is present, and is effective mostly 
through judicial and monetary channels. dispute settlement arrangements often 
are part of a rio’s design, but it may take a while before they start functioning. 
independent monetary arrangements arise during the process of integration. 
table 4.5 shows the distribution of the results of the major legitimacy indicators 
among the various kinds of cooperation among the 31 rios (this time combinations 
are neglected). For instance, seven out of 11 booster organizations, five out of nine 
preferential trade agreements, three out of five free trade areas and all five customs 
unions have parliamentary arrangements. Five out of 11 booster organizations, five 
out of nine preferential trade agreements, three out of five free trade areas and all 
five custom unions have a dispute settlement arrangement. The table indicates that 
all kinds of cooperation display almost all of the ten legitimacy indicators to some 
extent. there are hardly any empty cells (with the major exception of the economic 
union column). this implies that awareness of legitimacy is a matter of regionalism, 
independent of its specific form. It underlines the previous conclusion that Dahl’s 
sceptical vision with regard to input and control legitimacy is disputable.
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Table 4.5 Legitimacy Indicators According to Kinds of Regional Cooperation
KIND OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
Booster 
organization 
n=11
preferential 
trade 
agreement 
n=9
free 
trade 
area
n=5
customs 
Unions
n=5
econo-
mic 
Union
n=1
INPUT 
LEGITIMACY
parliamen-
tarians
7 5 3 5 0
interest groups 6 7 3 2 1
ngos with 
consultative 
status
3 3 3 0 0
igos with 
observer 
status
4 2 0 1 0
CONTROL 
LEGITIMACY
dispute 
settlement 
Bodies
5 5 3 5 1
autonomous 
Monetary 
institutions
3 6 3 3 1
OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY
Un observer 
status
5 5 3 3 1
gatt/wto 
Notification
0 9 5 5 0
wto observer 
status
4 5 2 2 0
cooperative 
agreements 
with igos
7 8 4 4 1

part 3
rios, regional parliaments
and subnational state actors

chapter 5
regional parliaments in europe and 
latin america: Between empowerment 
and irrelevance
andrés Malamud and luís de sousa
Introduction1
after four centuries of gradual development, the modern parliament was born in 
england in the 17th century as an instrument by which the rising bourgeoisie could 
control the monarchy. it claimed legislative supremacy, full authority over taxation 
and expenditure, and a voice in public policy through partial control (exercized 
by impeachment) over the king’s choice of ministers. It later spread to America – 
becoming a separate branch of power – then to continental Europe and subsequently 
to the rest of the world, becoming the emblematic institution for political deliberation 
and legislative decision-making in modern nation-states (orlandi 1998). parliaments, 
or analogous legislative assemblies, were also established in several subnational units 
such as states or provinces, some of which were originally autonomous but later 
united into federal nation-states. subnational parliaments date back at least as far as 
the 18th century, being present in the american colonies when independence was 
declared and the constitution established. supranational parliaments, in contrast, are 
a much more recent phenomenon.
The first significant supranational parliament was the European Parliament 
which, in the words of the 1957 treaty of rome, ‘represents the peoples of the 
States brought together in the European Community.’ The Parliament’s first direct 
elections were held in June 1979; since then, it has derived its legitimacy from direct 
universal suffrage and has been elected every five years. Other processes of regional 
integration have attempted to replicate such a supranational legislative assembly, 
latin america being the region where these experiments have gone the farthest. 
in november 2005, membership of the inter-parliamentary Union (ipU) accounted 
for 143 national members and seven associate members, all of the latter having an 
international nature.
this phenomenon raises some questions. first, why should region-makers take 
the trouble to establish a regional parliament (rittberger 2003) when integration is 
1  the authors are grateful to daniel Bach, helena carreiras, anne-sophie claeys-
nivet, olivier costa, helge hveem, Michelle ratton sanchez, Bob reinalda, andrea ribeiro 
hoffmann, Miriam saraiva, anna van der vleuten and laurence whitehead for useful 
comments. luís de sousa acknowledges the Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian for funding 
part of this research project under the aegis of the Programa Gulbenkian de Estímulo à 
Investigação 2003.
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first of all an economic endeavour? Second, are regional parliaments real parliaments, 
or do they fail to come up to the mark? third, how are these parliaments different, 
especially regarding those that have taken root in europe and latin america?2 this 
article addresses these questions through a comparative analysis of five regional 
– also called supranational – parliaments. It includes all the Latin American cases 
mentioned plus the Mercosur parliament (an embryonic institution that deserves 
closer scrutiny) and the european parliament. some bodies are excluded from this 
comparison: the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe is not discussed, 
since it has no ambition to develop any further and the african cases are too young 
to be evaluated.
This article proceeds as follows. Each of the first five sections analyze one 
parliamentary assembly in order to summarize its historical evolution, examine 
its structure and assess its competences and performance in light of the classical 
parliamentary functions. these functions are fourfold: representation (related to 
input legitimacy), legislation/decision-making (output legitimacy), monitoring of the 
executive branch and the bureaucracy (control legitimacy), and leadership selection 
and formation – which, as Weber (1994) argued, was essential to democracy. The 
last section elaborates a handful of comparative conclusions. 
The European Parliament (EP)
Anyone looking for the first time at the institutional fabric of Europe is likely to be 
surprised by the numerous arrangements that overlap, interact and cooperate to make 
this a unique case of regional integration. due to the level of integration reached 
between its members and the scope and intensity of its policy competencies, the eU 
has become the core organizational structure in europe. there is, however, a series of 
other organizations, established prior to the 1957 rome treaties, whose contributions 
to the singularity of the European integration process have been noteworthy – albeit 
less wide-ranging and encompassing fewer decisional competencies. some of these 
international organizations have survived independently of the european integration 
process, even if they have retained only a symbolic or deliberative role (for example, 
the council of europe) or have later been incorporated into groups involved in the 
european treaties (for instance, the western european Union). some organizations 
have limited their membership to european nations; others, such as the oecd, have 
extended their activities to other countries and regions of the world. however, one 
common feature of most of these organizations is the existence of a parliamentary 
assembly.
one could also mention other parliamentary initiatives such as the nordic 
council (which includes representatives from the scandinavian parliaments), the 
Benelux inter-parliamentary consultation council, the Baltic assembly, the Black 
sea parliamentary assembly for economic cooperation and the parliamentary 
conference of central european initiative. none of these extra-eU bodies have, 
2  the two african parliaments are much newer than the rest, are less developed and 
only joined the ipU in 2005.
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however, played a similar role to the european parliament with regard to the 
european integration process, and nor do they enjoy comparable competencies. of 
all the regional parliamentary bodies, the ep is the only one that has developed real 
decision-making powers and become a central component of the complex decision-
making structure of the european Union. in order to understand how the ep has 
evolved from merely another parliamentary assembly into the foremost one, it is 
useful to review the structures and processes of the european community.
Evolution and competencies of the European Parliament
the founding fathers of the 1951 treaty of paris (ecsc) sought a rupture with the 
past. the failure of the council of europe as an institutional response to the idea 
of a united europe was a clear example of what the ex-members of the council, 
such as paul-henri spaak, wanted to avoid in their new project (Urwin 1997, 78). 
their ambitious project was based upon an institutional compromise between 
intergovernmental and supranational decision-making and a tripartite liberal 
constitutional framework: an executive that initiated and implemented policies; an 
assembly in which those policies were debated and decided upon; and an independent 
judicial body whose members reviewed decisions and settled conflicts.
the originality of this regime lay in the translation of the traditional tripartite 
division of powers – executive, legislative and judicial – into an international 
institutional arrangement which combined intergovernmental and supranational 
decision making. The competencies of the three major political bodies – the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament – were 
intertwined to the extent that a clear-cut division of the executive and legislative 
powers was, and remains, difficult to establish.
two institutions share the executive function: the european commission and the 
council of Ministers. the european commission is a supranational body appointed 
through common agreement between the member states, but which is independent 
from their respective governments. the commission represents the interests of 
the community, acts as ‘guardian of the treaties’ (by ensuring that treaties and 
community law are respected, even if this means bringing a member state before 
the ecJ), and remains the hub of the decision-making system (Mény 1998, 24). the 
council of Ministers is an intergovernmental body composed of representatives of 
the member states, which embodies their interests.
although these two bodies are termed executive organs, they also carry out 
legislative functions. the commission has a near monopoly on initiating legislative 
proposals within the community and is responsible for managing existing common 
policies and monitoring the application of community law. it can also make decisions 
(autonomously or upon delegation from the council), give its opinion and make 
recommendations. the council has broad decision-making powers: it may pass 
regulations and directives, conclude agreements and treaties (which are negotiated 
with the commission), and shares budgetary powers with the parliament.
the ep, like the national parliaments of all eU member states, is elected by 
universal suffrage; however, unlike most european parliamentary regimes, the 
‘european government’ does not emanate from any majority represented in the ep. 
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in other words, election to the ep is not intended as a reward or punishment for a 
‘european executive’, even if the ep has the right to dismiss the commission in a 
vote of censure by a two-thirds majority. the ep also has supervisory powers over 
eU bureaucrats and agencies, and decides on the adoption of legislation together 
with the council of Ministers by means of the co-decision procedure. the ep can 
install inquiry commissions, question commissioners on any issue relating to a 
common policy, pass resolutions, and hold hearings. however, limited legislative 
powers and the inability of voters to choose their european executive at the ballot 
box may partly explain the low turnout at european elections and the tendency of 
national parties to use these elections to test national incumbent majorities. to this 
complex institutional triangle, as it is called, one should add the ‘decisional power’ 
that emanates from the european court of Justice’s decisions (Mény 1998, 25). 
we should not forget that this decision-making structure operates within a complex 
and evolving balance between three sources of input legitimacy with competing 
interests: the interests and demands of the european people(s), represented in the 
ep by their Meps; the interests of member states, as represented in the council; and 
the community interests represented in the commission and expressed by treaties, 
community law and the jurisprudence of the ecJ.
The empowerment of the European Parliament
initially, the role of the ep was similar to that of the council of europe parliamentary 
assembly with regard to the scope of its competencies and its institutional design. 
the ep, known as ‘the assembly’ until 1962,3 was essentially a forum composed of 
delegations appointed from the national parliaments. it had a limited consultative 
function regarding a small number of issues and legislative proposals prior to their 
adoption by the council. the founding fathers did not provide the ep with a central 
role in the european integration process from the outset. instead, its competences 
evolved over time mostly due to institutional mimesis (costa 2001, 19).
the creation and institutional set-up of the ep was in line with a pattern of 
institutional design common to all post-1945 occidental regional and international 
organizations. the majority of these organizations had a similar decision-making 
structure: a council where decisions were made and a consultative assembly of a 
more or less representative nature (i.e. Un, weU, council of europe and nato). 
the symbolic dimension attached to this type of parliamentary institution was also 
crucial. these assemblies served not only as an interface between the organization 
and its national members, but they also made it possible for the political elites of 
countries that had been at war with each other to be in close contact, and hence the 
assembly helped to restore the mutual trust and cooperation between old adversaries. 
furthermore, in a cold war context they also sent out the message that the west 
‘does it better’.
however, there was another important factor involved: the pooling of sovereignty. 
the idea of building a political project beyond the nation-state, which both robert 
3  The 1986 Single European Act would finally formalize the denomination of ‘European 
parliament’.
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schuman and Jean Monnet had in mind, raised problems of legitimacy and 
accountability, since it challenged the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty. it 
was inevitable that the supranational political project would need to include some sort 
of plenary assembly where the different views, positions and ideas of its members 
could be expressed and where the decisions made on a much more restricted level 
for the totality of members could be subject to collective scrutiny and, possibly, 
majority deliberation. it was too early to talk about a parliament of european 
people(s) as part of a copy-paste version of national democracies transplanted to the 
regional level, an idea that had always displeased some european countries (such as 
the UK). instead, the founding fathers counted on the ability of such a parliamentary 
institution to ensure the efficacy and legitimacy of the activities of the supranational 
high authority created for the european coal and steel community.
which factors have contributed to the evolution of the ep from simply ‘another 
international parliamentary assembly’ into a unique supranational parliament with 
real decisional powers and a central role in the process of european integration? 
the answer is not straightforward, but three factors are worth mentioning: early 
supranationalism, extraordinary leadership and direct elections. let us develop these 
further.
first, the institutionalization of the eU evolved from a single objective and 
supranationally oriented organization – the European Coal and Steel Community – 
whereas other european international organizations, such as the council of europe, 
were created with the purpose of addressing multiple and diffuse objectives and 
were always kept intergovernmental. the latter organizations have affected the lives 
of europeans, but none of them have had enough strength or vocation to lead to the 
creation of a supranational structure. the supranational regulation of the production 
of coal and steel, the raw materials of war and industry and sources of energy, 
represented a small policy step to countries that had been at war with each other, but 
it would prove to be a giant leap in the european integration process.
second, the leaders behind the venture of european integration had common 
experiences and a common vision. Monnet, schuman and spaak had served 
the council of europe project, but later abandoned it in reaction to British euro-
scepticism and reluctance to move towards supranational forms of government, even 
though this only concerned the regulation of a single industrial or commercial sector. 
Their views were backed by a small number of countries – the Six – that had decided 
to expand the ‘community method’ into other economic and social policy areas. each 
of these countries had strong reasons to believe in the process of european economic 
integration: Benelux had already implemented a successful customs area; the running 
of the high authority had promoted a lasting franco-german understanding; and in 
italy an important federalist movement had been born.
third, the direct election of the european parliament in 1979 and the subsequent 
emergence of euro-party formations were the turning point for the role this body 
would play in the triangular institutional complex of the european community and 
in the integration process itself (corbett 1998). since then, the ep has been elected 
by the European peoples every five years, according to a distribution of seats that 
roughly reflects the demographic weight of each state. A system of proportional 
representation for ep elections, which had already been in place in most member 
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states since 1979, has been used by all member states since the 1999 elections. the 
electoral dynamics, together with the progressive empowerment granted by each 
successive treaty reform and the spillover effects of qualified majority voting in 
the council, transformed the ep into the only supranational parliamentary assembly 
in the world that enjoys simultaneously democratic legitimacy, decision-making 
competencies and the power to bring down a ‘government’ (the commission). in 
it, european parliamentarians have the chance of honing their political skills in an 
influential, supranational environment – even if they are frequently recruited from 
the ranks of elder politicians or party dissidents, either as a golden parachute for 
retirement or as a mutually convenient arrangement to take out internal opponents 
(Bardi 1996; Scarrow 1997). The evolution of the EP over fifty years is elegantly 
synthesized by Hix, Raunio and Scully (2003, 191–2):
for much of the half-century since its humble beginnings, the european parliament… 
was marginal to the development of european integration and the politics of the european 
Union. initially, the institution was essentially a consultative body composed of delegates 
of national parliaments. Fifty years on, the elected Parliament has significant legislative 
and executive investiture/removal powers and all the trappings of a democratic parliament 
that flow from such powers: powerful party organizations, highly-organized committees, 
a supporting bureaucracy and constant lobbying from private interest groups.
from a european perspective, the ep may still be a developing body which must 
negotiate many shortcomings; from the perspective of an outsider, however, the ep is 
the archetype to which every supranational parliament will be compared to for years 
to come. Moreover, it has become the standard model for those who undertake the 
mission of institutionalizing regional integration elsewhere. thus far, latin america 
is the region where its influence has proved the strongest.
The Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO)
the latin american parliament is a regional, unicameral assembly made up of 
members of twenty-two national parliaments of latin america and the caribbean.4 
founded in lima, peru, in december 1964, it was later institutionalized by an 
international treaty signed in lima in november 1987 and, since 1992, has been 
permanently located in the Brazilian city of sao paulo. its main goals, as stated in its 
charter, are the defence of democracy, the promotion of regional integration and the 
strengthening of cooperation among parliamentarians and parliaments across latin 
america. it has legal personality and a budget provided by the signatory states. its 
official languages are Spanish and Portuguese.
the parlatino assembly is composed of national delegations sent by 
the member parliaments. each national delegation may appoint up to twelve 
representatives in a proportion that reflects the weight of the national parliamentary 
4  the signatory countries are argentina, aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, chile, colombia, 
costa rica, cuba, the dominican republic, ecuador, el salvador, guatemala, honduras, 
Mexico, the netherlands antilles, nicaragua, panama, paraguay, peru, suriname, Uruguay 
and venezuela.
Andrés Malamud and Luís de Sousa 91
groupings. if a delegation has less than twelve members, each of them can cast 
up to four votes without exceeding the overall number of twelve; this disposition 
grants all countries the same voting power regardless of country size. a quorum is 
obtained when more than half of the national delegations are present, provided that 
their delegates represent at least one third of the overall votes. parlatino gathers 
once a year in its permanent location. it has no decisional authority and limits itself 
to passing agreements, recommendations and resolutions that are not binding upon 
any other body or organization.
one puzzling characteristic of parlatino is that its membership does not 
include haiti (only independent french-speaking state in the americas) or the french 
overseas departments (french guyana, guadeloupe and Martinique). however, 
despite the ‘latino’ component of its name, the organization does include three dutch-
speaking members: one independent country (suriname) and two dependencies of 
the Kingdom of the netherlands (aruba and the netherlands antilles).
due to its open, malleable and extended territorial scope, parlatino resembles 
the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe more than the european 
parliament; it is also similar to the former institution in its intergovernmental nature 
and lack of powers. however, as will be seen below, these are common characteristics 
for most regional assemblies in latin america. Unlike the other regional assemblies 
analyzed in this article, though, parlatino is not the representative, deliberative 
or decisional body of any regional organization, but has rather had an independent 
status since its very inception. this characteristic is unique, as parliaments are 
generally institutions which belong to some wider encompassing entity.
parlatino has gained a certain international recognition notwithstanding its 
limited influence and competencies. In 1972, it agreed with the European Parliament 
– which at that time was also indirectly elected – to establish permanent contacts 
and convene a regular Inter-parliamentary Conference. The first was held in Bogotá 
in 1974, and since 1975 it has taken place every two years without exception, the 
venue alternating between a latin american country and a european Union member 
state. to date, sixteen such events have been organized, making the conference the 
longest running bi-regional forum. the debates and resolutions produced as a result 
of the conferences have constituted a testimony to the dominant issues of  the trans-
atlantic agenda, as well as to the evolution and shortcomings of the conference. 
the salience of this forum decreased with the consolidation of democracy in latin 
america, as most national parliaments saw their continuity guaranteed. when the 
Inter-parliamentary Conference’s long fight for representative institutions and the 
defence of human rights had finally been won, the Conference failed to find another 
equally mobilizing issue and its prominence slowly declined. the new focus on 
institutional quality and the reform of public administration has proved less attractive, 
and the cause of regional integration has found better supporters in the sub-regional 
blocs that were created or relaunched in the early 1990s. 
despite a general agreement regarding the main issues on the common agenda, 
there have been some topics that have revealed persistent asymmetries between the 
two regions. In particular, significant consensus has never been reached on matters 
concerning international trade and foreign debt. in a different vein, cooperation for 
development is one area that brings to light the structural imbalances between the two 
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regions, but it has never evolved into a controversial matter since its management 
depends on the unilateral will of the wealthiest party – the European Union.
in sum, parlatino is a symbolic rather than an operative body, capable of 
hosting deliberation on regional and inter-regional affairs but with no prospect of ever 
becoming a decisional organ. It lacks both political significance and social roots. Its 
main historical merits have been to provide a beacon for democratic aspirations and 
parliamentary procedures during the dark era of latin american dictatorships; its 
main shortcomings have possibly originated in its not belonging to any significant, 
more encompassing organization.
The Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)
the central american parliament is the deliberative body of the central american 
integration system (sica). Building upon the central american common Market, 
founded in 1960, the sica was established in 1991 as a complex organization 
linking the central american countries on a variable geometry basis. hence, while 
sica brings together the seven central american countries (Belize, costa rica, el 
salvador, guatemala, honduras, nicaragua and panama), the parlacen excludes 
two of them (costa rica and Belize) but includes the spanish-speaking, caribbean 
state of the dominican republic. sica also features a supranational judicial branch, 
the central american court of Justice, and an intergovernmental supreme authority, 
the central american presidential Meetings. the secretary general coordinates the 
whole system. parlacen is broadly considered to be the parliamentary organ 
of sica, although, as will be seen below, it has not developed any legislative 
function.
PARLACEN was first envisaged in the Declaration of Esquipulas I, which 
was signed by the central american presidents with a view to putting an end to 
traditional rivalries and foster democracy and peace in the region. the presidential 
summit, strongly supported by the contadora group, its group of support5 and the 
then european community, took place in May 1986. in a later declaration known 
as Esquipulas II, made in 1987, the presidents agreed that the parliament should 
be the symbol of freedom, independence and reconciliation for the region, which 
had been devastated after years of bloodshed and political instability. Between the 
end of 1987 and early 1989, guatemala, el salvador, costa rica, nicaragua and 
Honduras successively signed and ratified the PARLACEN Constitutive Treaty. 
three additional protocols were signed afterwards in order to allow for the delay in 
the election of the national representatives and to facilitate the adhesion of panama 
to the Treaty – although its incorporation would only be fully complete in 1999. The 
Parliament was finally established in October 1991 when its assembly first met in 
5  the contadora group, founded in 1983, was made up of Mexico, colombia, venezuela 
and panama, whereas its group of support, established in 1985, was made up of argentina, 
Uruguay, Brazil and peru. the goals of both groups were to contribute to a negotiated solution 
to the Central American conflict, and their principles included self-determination, non-
intervention, demilitarization and democratization. in 1986 the two groups merged into what 
came to be known as Grupo de Rio.
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guatemala city, which would become its permanent location. costa rica eventually 
declined to participate, while the dominican republic joined the process in 1999.
since october 28, 1991, parlacen has grown from having a total membership 
of 65 deputies, representing four countries and 13 political parties, to the current total 
of 132 deputies, representing six countries and 42 parties. the deputies are directly 
elected every five years by the people of the member countries, each country having 
the right to elect 20 representatives. in addition, each country has the right to send 
two appointed deputies, namely their former presidents and vice-presidents. on top 
of the full member countries, other parliaments send representatives with observer 
status: among them, parlatino, the andean parliament and the european 
parliament have participated since the beginning of the process, whereas puerto 
rico, Mexico and taiwan entered at a later stage. the national representations are 
clustered in three broad parliamentary groups: the largest one represents the centre 
of the political spectrum, while the other two cover the left and right wings.
As acknowledged by the first article of its founding treaty, the legislative 
competencies of parlacen are limited to proposal, analysis and recommendation. 
however, the treaty also confers it with the ability to elect, appoint and remove the 
highest executive official of all the institutions that belong to the SICA. Strangely 
enough, this parliamentary organ is not able to pass laws but it is (formally) 
empowered to nominate and hold accountable a myriad of technical administrators 
(article 5c). it is also allowed to request information and reports from every sica 
organ and to make recommendations to them, but not to interfere in their functioning. 
as for voting procedures, parlacen makes decisions by absolute majority, except 
where establishing or amending internal statutes is concerned: in this case, a qualified 
majority is required. the country members provide for the parliamentary budget on 
an equal basis.
after more than a decade of operation, the record of parlacen is mixed: 
while it can boast sound achievements in enlarging its membership, it has made 
no progress regarding the deepening of its competencies. if, on the one hand, it 
has effectively contributed to pacification and growing interdependence among the 
societies it represents, it has at the same time failed to become a decisive actor in the 
feeble process of central american integration.
The Andean Parliament (PARLANDINO)
the andean parliament is the deliberative organ of the andean integration system 
(ais). the andean pact,6 precursor of the ais, was founded in 1969 with the goal of 
overcoming the shortcomings of the latin american free trade association (alalc), 
a wider regional project that had failed mainly because it had reproduced internally 
the division between more and less developed countries that it criticized in the world 
as a whole. the founders of the andean pact drew on the model of integration that 
was then being consolidated in europe, and so they decided to formalize the process 
6  the andean pact was signed by Bolivia, chile, colombia, ecuador and peru. during 
the mid-1970s, venezuela entered the process and chile left it.
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of integration by creating a network of institutions that included majority voting and 
binding supranational authorities. By the end of the 1980s, after years of turbulence 
and standstill due partly to domestic factors but also to the failure to foster economic 
interdependence, the national presidents decided to relaunch the process with more 
modest aspirations and a more frugal institutional design. however, the institutional 
structure of the organization still bears a great resemblance to that of the european 
Union: it features a commission, a parliament, a tribunal of Justice, a council of 
Ministers and a presidential council, as well as a set of technical institutions such as 
financial corporations, consultative forums of the civil society and even a university. 
nevertheless, the real competencies and performance of these regional institutions 
lag behind those of their european models.
within the institutional arrangement described above, parlandino is meant 
to represent the peoples of the andean community and enjoys a supranational nature. 
its founding treaty was signed in 1979, coming into force in 1984. its location was 
the colombian city of Bogotá, and in 1997 it was decided that parliamentarians 
would be elected by popular vote. the electoral process was supposed to take place 
within the following five years; yet, at the time of this writing only two countries 
(venezuela and ecuador) have completed this process. in the remaining countries, 
direct elections are either planned for the near future (colombia and peru) or subject 
to a previous constitutional review (Bolivia).
PARLANDINO is made up of twenty-five deputies, five from each member 
country. There are five standing committees composed of five members each, one of 
each nationality. parlandino is entitled to issue as many as four different kinds 
of acts (decisions, agreements, declarations and recommendations), all of which 
must be approved by an absolute majority. parlandino lacks any decision-
making competence. its competencies are vague and limited to the following areas: 
steering and fostering the integration process; promoting the harmonization of 
legislation between member countries; encouraging cooperation and coordination 
with the national parliaments, third countries and other integration associations; and 
formulating recommendations regarding the budget of the andean community.
In 2004, PARLANDINO celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. It is half the 
age of the european parliament, which has always been the model and source of 
inspiration for the founders of the andean community. the huge differences between 
the two assemblies, though, could not be more evident. considering the delayed 
and irregular popular election of national representatives, a composition that is not 
demographically proportional, and the absence of decision-making attributions, 
parlandino has evolved relatively little, just like the regional bloc to which it 
belongs (Bonilla 2001; Malamud 2004). contradictory national interests, institutional 
instability, economic turmoil and even political conflict among the member countries 
have, in fact, rendered the andean community a textbook example of what to avoid 
when crafting an integration project. as key actors in the process have emphasized, 
the first steps in the formation of Mercosur drew upon the experiences of the Andean 
region in order not to repeat the same mistakes (caputo 1999; pereira 2000).7
7  in 2006, while this book was being edited, venezuela left the andean community and 
applied to Mercosur, further eroding the former bloc and its common institutions.
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The Mercosur Parliament
Mercosur, a spanish acronym that stands for common Market of the south, was 
founded in 1991 by the treaty of asunción, and consolidated in 1994 by the protocol 
of ouro preto. it brings together four countries: argentina, Brazil, paraguay and 
Uruguay, with venezuela joining in 2007. it aims at creating a common market through 
the lifting of intra-regional obstacles to the circulation of goods, capital and services 
and has taken steps towards a freer circulation of people. although its founding fathers 
had in mind the successful experience of the european Union, they were also aware 
of the poor record of integration in latin america and attempted to minimize the 
risks of failure by avoiding premature institutionalization, while keeping the control 
of the process in the hands of the national presidents (Malamud 2003). henceforth, 
Mercosur developed as an exclusively intergovernmental organization: although 
its legal personality enables it to become involved in international negotiations on 
behalf of its members, internal unanimity is required in order to make any decision. 
national sovereignty has neither been delegated nor pooled, and all the decisional 
organs of Mercosur are exclusively composed of senior government officials from 
the member countries (peña 1998). however, there are also some non-decisional 
institutions worth considering, such as the Joint parliamentary commission.
the Joint parliamentary commission (Jpc) was, until 2007, the organ of 
Mercosur that brought together the delegations of the four national congresses. the 
treaty of asunción, signed in March 1991, foresaw the Jpc as a means of facilitating 
the creation of a common market. the means by which it would contribute to such an 
end was not clear, though, as the treaty did not give it any competencies; instead, it 
mentioned the national executives’ obligation to report to their respective congresses 
about the progress of the integration project.
it was the protocol of ouro preto, signed in december of 1994, which established 
a stable design for the JPC, while at the same time defining the overall institutional 
structure of Mercosur. the Jpc was transformed into the representative organ of the 
national parliaments – its main function, to contribute to the transposition of Mercosur 
procedures into the national legislation of the member countries. additionally, it was 
expected to assist with policy harmonization and perform the role of a consultative 
assistant to the common Market council, the supreme regional body made up of 
the foreign and economic ministers of the signatory countries (caetano and perina 
2000; caetano and perina 2003). the Jpc would accomplish its duty through the 
elaboration of recommendations, dispositions and declarations, none of which were 
binding; it was also assigned the mission of paving the way for the creation of a full 
parliament of Mercosur.
the protocol of ouro preto determined that the Jpc would be constituted by a 
maximum of 64 members. each country would elect up to sixteen representatives from 
active national lawmakers, including members of the two chambers (every Mercosur 
member country features a bicameral parliament). the representatives would be 
grouped into national sections that would comprise both deputies and senators. the 
moment and mechanism for election and the duration of the tenure would be defined 
by each national parliament, but the protocol suggested a minimum term limit of two 
years in order to grant some continuity to intra-parliamentary labour.
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the protocol also established that the Jpc would meet at least twice a year, 
but in order to be valid, a meeting would have to be attended by representatives 
from every state. Moreover, all the decisions of the Jpc would have to be made by 
consensus, the same rule that applies to every body of Mercosur. these requirements 
led to a fully intergovernmental institution and contributed to the blurring of party 
differences and the neutralization of one of the main activities usually performed 
within a parliament, that of voting. the presidency of the Jpc was not to be elected 
by the plenary but rotate among the member states every six months, just like the 
presidency of Mercosur as a whole. a permanent administrative secretariat existed, 
but its office-holder, who was not a parliamentarian, was also appointed on a 
mandatory rotating basis involving the four countries – although this tenure lasted 
two years instead of six months.
the internal statute of the Jpc addressed the possibility of creating committees, 
as long as they were not standing but ad hoc. this regulation did nothing to promote 
specialization among the parliamentarians or to provide them with a stable career 
path or progressive training. as a rule, the Jpc met in the country that held the 
temporary presidency. the budget of the Jpc was provided for in equal parts by 
Mercosur member countries.
Since the mid-1990s or even earlier, an increasing number of voices – from 
both politicians and academics – have demanded the creation and empowerment 
of a Mercosur parliament (caetano and pérez antón 2003; cefir 1998; sM 2004; 
vazquez 2001). however, only modest results have been achieved regarding a 
composition and a set of competences that are acceptable for all member countries. 
Given the marked demographic asymmetries within the bloc, this is a difficult 
puzzle to solve. Brazil has roughly 80 percent of the population of Mercosur, so 
any distribution under which it is allocated less than 50 percent of the seats could be 
perceived as undemocratically biased and would face resistance. on the other hand, 
giving Brazil more than 50 percent of seats would mean that it alone would hold a 
permanent majority. a compromise could be reached by conceding a majority to 
either party but, simultaneously, stripping that majority of any real power – either 
by requiring decisions to be made by ‘super majority’ or by denying the parliament 
any significant competences at all. The former option would diminish democratic 
legitimacy, while the latter would neutralize effective decision making (Malamud 
2005b).
An agreement was finally struck in December 2005, when the Mercosur Council 
decided to set up the parliament of Mercosur. it was located in Montevideo and 
its installation should proceed following two transitional periods. During the first 
stage, a body similar to the Jpc (the only difference being that every country would 
send 18 instead of 16 parliamentarians) replaced its institutional ancestor. during the 
second stage, direct elections were mandated to take place in 2011. The first regular 
elections after the transition are to be held simultaneously in all member countries 
in 2014. The decision, however, stopped short of prescribing the final composition 
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of the body. its competences, on the other hand, were clearly determined: legislating 
was not among them.8
Comparative Analysis
of all the international institutions either known as parliaments or designed in such a 
way as to resemble them closely, only the european parliament has developed a truly 
supranational character and been allowed to hold effective power thus far. the others 
lag far behind in all respects (see also vieira posada 2000). the history, structure, 
competencies and functions of these institutions vary widely, as does the degree of 
legitimacy they enjoy. this chapter has presented an analysis of regional parliaments 
in order, on the one hand, to homogenize the conceptual field and, on the other, to 
present a comparative state of the art. After examining five regional parliamentary 
bodies in two continents, the differences between the european parliament and the 
four Latin American proto-parliaments are striking – whatever the characteristic 
considered. Table 5.1 presents a stylized comparison of the five cases. 
as far as representation is concerned, only one latin american parliament, 
parlacen, appoints the majority of its members through popular, direct elections. 
however, there is no demographic proportionality among the constituencies (that is, 
the member countries). input legitimacy is poorly served by any parliament that is 
neither elected by nor accountable before the citizens. with regard to decision making, 
no parliament in latin america has been endowed with any kind of legislative power. 
output legitimacy, insofar as this exists, is certainly not a product of any of these 
regional parliamentary institutions. as for control legitimacy, parlacen stands 
out again as the only assembly to possess any – albeit very weak – powers regarding 
the monitoring of other regional bodies. in stark contrast to all the latin american 
cases, the ep enjoys ever stronger capacities concerning all of the relevant four 
dimensions. there are many factors that account for such a difference; we outline 
five of them below and suggest an agenda to promote further research.
The first factor that distinguishes the evolution of regional parliaments across 
the atlantic is time: the process of european integration started between two 
and four decades before the latin american processes, so differences regarding 
institutional development may be due to maturity gaps. the second factor is 
sequence: the current structure of the eU was set up according to the ‘Monnet-
method’, meaning that function should precede form and that incrementalism is 
preferred to early institutionalization. some latin american groupings, by contrast, 
have unsuccessfully attempted to skip phases, admiring the outcome of the european 
process but overlooking how this had been achieved. third, there is a wide disparity 
regarding the level of integration: while the eU is already a common market and 
is consolidating into an economic union, none of its latin american counterparts 
have yet reached the level of a customs union; logically, the institutional structure 
8  an exhaustive list of competences includes: to watch over, to elaborate (reports), to 
request (information), to invite, to receive, to hold (meetings), to examine, to convey, to issue 
(declarations and recommendations), to propose (studies and projects), to develop (actions), 
to maintain (institutional relations), to celebrate (agreements) and to foment (values).
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needed for one type of organization does not necessarily satisfy the requirements 
of others. fourth, the degree of success in the creation of regional institutions 
cannot be dissociated from the effectiveness with which institutions work at home; 
in other words, weak or unstable domestic institutions are not a good foundation 
upon which to build international institutions. fifth, most european countries 
feature parliamentary or semi-parliamentary regimes, whereas all latin american 
countries have presidential ones. an important consequence of such a difference 
is that a ‘parliament’ does not mean the same thing on both sides of the atlantic: 
if, in europe, it is conceived of as the supreme institution where government is 
ultimately made and undone, in latin america the election, authority and survival 
of the government are independent of parliamentary will. it would be unreasonable 
to assume that chief executives of presidential regimes would not replicate, on the 
regional level, a feature that fits them well on the domestic level (Malamud 2005a).
the main implication derived from the last argument is that, also within processes 
of regional integration, presidential or parliamentary domestic regimes do make a 
difference – especially regarding the settlement of regional parliaments. As a related 
consequence, political parties also matter in different ways and for different reasons 
from one regional setting to another. political reformers would do well to take these 
conclusions into consideration, as it has even been argued that a parliamentary system 
may not be the most appropriate solution for governing a multi-state democracy 
(fabbrini 2004; hix 2002; McKay 2001). the implications of this statement regard 
the future of regional parliaments not only in Latin America but also elsewhere – 
including europe. Bi-regional forums such as the euro-latin american parliamentary 
assembly (eUrolat)9 could play a role in helping regional parliaments to prevent 
failure by avoiding the creation of unrealistic expectations.
apart from the classical functions considered in this chapter, regional parliaments 
may help to accomplish complementary goals such as nurturing a common regional 
identity among political elites, strengthening the symbolic presence of the regional 
organization in the minds of the public and third countries, and facilitating intra-
regional communication. they may also promote unexpected spill-over. however, 
these functions are neither exclusive to nor characteristic of parliamentary institutions. 
if regional parliaments are to be enhanced, the distinction between their constitutive 
and complementary functions should not be neglected. entertaining unrealistic 
proposals, whether based on ingenuous emulation or on insufficient understanding, 
will most likely doom the enterprise to failure or – at best – irrelevance.
9  eUrolat brings together 120 parliamentarians from the european parliament, the 
andean parliament, the central american parliament and the latin american parliament, as 
well as national representatives from the Mexican and chilean legislatures, and members of 
the joint parliamentary committee of MercosUr. since november 2006 eUrolat is the 
successor to a previous forum, the euro-latin american inter-parliamentary conference.
Andrés Malamud and Luís de Sousa 101
References
Bardi, l. (1996), ‘report: transnational trends in european parties and the 1994 
elections of the european parliament’, Party Politics 2:1, 99–114.
Bonilla, a. (2001), ‘entre el deseo y la ficción. interdependencia e integración en 
la región andina’, XXiii lasa world congress, washington d.c., september 
6–8.
caetano, g. and pérez antón, r. (2003), ‘hacia un parlamento del MercosUr’, 
in caetano and perina (eds).
caetano, g. and perina, r. (eds) (2000), MERCOSUR y Parlamentos. El Rol de los 
Congresos en la Democracia y la Integración (Montevideo: claeh-oea).
— (2003), La Encrucijada Política del MERCOSUR. Parlamentos y Nueva 
Institucionalidad (Montevideo: claeh-oea).
caputo, d. (1999), personal interview, former argentine foreign Minister, Buenos 
aires, september.
cefir (1998), ‘la comisión parlamentaria conjunta. Una visión de su 
funcionamiento. documento de síntesis’, presented at Perspectivas Institucionales 
del MERCOSUR: Organización y Funcionamiento de la Comisión Parlamentaria 
Conjunta, workshop organized by cefir and the Jpc of MercosUr, Buenos 
Aires, June 2–4.
costa, o. (2001), Le Parlement Européen, Assemblée Délibérante (Brussels: institut 
d’Études européennes).
corbett, r. (1998), The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Integration 
(Basingstoke: palgrave).
fabbrini, s. (2004), ‘transatlantic constitutionalism: comparing the United states 
and the european Union’, European Journal of Political Research 43:4, 547–69.
hix, s. (2002), ‘why the eU should have a single president and how she should 
be elected’, available at <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/working_papers/why%20
the%20eU%20should%20have%20a%20single%20president.pdf>.
—, raunio, t. and scully, r. (2003), ‘fifty Years on: research on the european 
parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:2, 191–202.
Malamud, a. (2003), ‘presidentialism and Mercosur: a hidden cause for a successful 
experience’, in f. laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical 
Perspectives (london: ashgate).
— (2004), ‘regional integration in latin america. comparative theories and 
institutions’, Sociologia. Problemas e Práticas, Nº 44, 135–54.
—  (2005a), ‘presidential diplomacy and the institutional Underpinnings of 
Mercosur. an empirical examination’, Latin American Research Review, 40:1, 
138–64.
— (2005b), ‘Mercosur turns 15: Between rising talk and declining achievement’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:3, 421–36.
McKay, d. (2001), Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal 
Experience (oxford: oxford University press).
Mény, Y. (1998), The French Political System (paris: la documentation 
française).
orlandi, h. (1998), ‘parlamentos y congresos’, in h. orlandi (ed.), Las instituciones 
Closing or Widening the Gap?102
políticas de gobierno (Buenos aires: eUdeBa).
peña, f. (1998), ‘el desarrollo institucional del Mercosur’, in Comunidad Andina 
y Mercosur. Desafíos Pendientes de la Integración en América Latina (Bogotá: 
Ministerio de relaciones exteriores de colombia y corporación andina de 
fomento).
pereira, c. (2000), personal interview, Brazilian diplomat, Brasilia, december.
rittberger, B. (2003), ‘the creation and empowerment of the european parliament’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 41:2, 203–25.
scarrow, s. (1997), ‘political career paths and the european parliament’, Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 22:2, 253–62.
SM – Secretaría del Mercosur (2004), Un Foco para el Proceso de Integración 
Regional. Primer Informe Semestral de la Secretaría del Mercosur (Montevideo: 
secretaría del Mercosur).
Urwin, d.w. (1997), A Political History of Western Europe Since 1945 (london: 
longman).
vazquez, M. (2001), ‘la comisión parlamentaria conjunta del MercosUr. 
Reflexiones sobre su Trayectoria Político-Institucional’, paper delivered at the 
XXIII LASA World Congress, Washington D.C., September 6–8.
vieira posada, e. (2000), ‘perspectivas de la integración: el rol de los parlamentos 
regionales’, in a. delgado, r. rodríguez and M. alvarez (eds), El Poder 
Legislativo en la Democracia y la Integración Andina (Bogotá: Upd/oea and 
Universidad Javeriana).
weber, M. (1994), ‘parliament and government in germany under a new political 
order’, in M. weber, Political Writings (cambridge: cambridge University 
press).
Parliaments’ websites
andean parliament: http://www.parlamentoandino.org/
central american parliament: http://www.parlacen.org.gt/
european parliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int/
international parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm
latin american parliament: http://www.parlatino.org.br/
Mercosur parliament: http://www.mercosurparlamentario.org/
chapter 6
subnational state actors and their roles 
in regional governance
Marcelo a. Medeiros
this chapter explores the complex and overlapping relations between the regional, 
national and subnational levels within regional integration organizations (rios). 
it focuses on the case of Mercosur, taking the european Union as a comparative 
parameter. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first part will place subnational 
state actors in the context of the debate on the legitimacy and democracy of rios; 
the second will analyze the role of subnational state actors in Mercosur. 
Legitimacy, Democracy and Subnational state actors
the eU is often accused of suffering from a democratic deficit. these accusations 
are usually based on a comparative exercise which takes the classic nation-state as 
its point of reference: 
comparisons are drawn between eU and an ancient, westminster-style, or frankly utopian 
form of deliberative democracy. while perhaps useful for philosophical purposes, the use 
of idealistic standards no modern governments can meet obscures the social context of 
contemporary european policy making (Moravcsik 2002, 605).  
this comparative fallacy, which is discussed by erthal (chapter 3 of this volume), 
has also characterized the analysis of other instances of regional integration – among 
them Mercosur. in addition to this, for processes of regional integration subsequent 
to the treaty of rome, the point of comparative reference has ceased to be the nation 
state alone, and has come to include the political system of the european Union (eU) 
itself, with all the complexity of institutional mimesis this implies (Mény 1993, 7–
38). this chapter begins with the premise that to analyze legitimacy and democracy 
in the Mercosur framework, our reference point must be the contemporary nation 
state of an increasingly administrative type (Bresser pereira and cunill grau 1999, 
15–50), as opposed to the classical Westminster style nation state, as well as the 
political system of the EU – while bearing in mind the problem of mimesis. The 
question which then arises is the extent to which subnational actors might contribute 
to the legitimacy of rios and vice versa. 
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Conceptualization 
subnational state actors are, as duchacek puts it, ‘non-central governments (which) 
presupposes that the local officials and their staffs possess a considerable degree 
of jurisdictional autonomy in domestic affairs, which they now tend to expand to 
include closely connected international issues’ (duchacek 2001, 2). the participation 
of subnational state actors in regional decision making has been formalized in the 
committee of the regions in the european Union, for instance, which was created by 
the treaty of Maastricht (1992). we will argue that this mobilization has also resulted 
in the exercise of paradiplomacy or constituent diplomacy (see next section).
from the superposition of the subnational, national and supranational (regional) 
levels results the notion of multilevel governance, defined by Banchoff and Smith 
as ‘a fluid polity outside the statist mould, a constellation of institutions embedded 
in a dense and evolving network of informal interactions that brings together 
supranational, national and subnational actors’ (Banchoff and smith 1999, 12). 
Despite the fact that this definition is linked to the European Union, it can also 
be used in the interpretation of other regional integration organizations, such as 
Mercosur, as long as certain precautions are taken.
technical complexity and the need for prompt decision making seem to 
promote forms of input legitimacy other than those grounded exclusively in direct 
democratic mechanisms (such as referenda) or indirect democratic mechanisms 
(via representation). if we assume that legitimacy is based solely on recognition 
and representation, then rios cannot be seen as legitimate. the most advanced of 
these, the European Union, reveals very low indices of identification among citizens, 
whose loyalties are indisputably with the nation state, where there is a demos with 
a historical basis. in the same way, despite the systematic advances of the european 
parliament (ep) and the creation of consultative organs such as the committee of the 
regions and the economic and social committee, representation has been limited 
by the secondary role of these institutions in the decision-making process in the 
strict sense, and these institutions have been poorly legitimized by low electoral 
participation. the situation is still more problematic in less politically active rios 
which contain fewer representative elements, such as Mercosur.
nevertheless, although the classical pattern of recognition and representation is 
lacking, it can be argued that rios are a meaningful space for contestation. in fact, for 
social actors and economic agents of all types, the regional arena has become a place 
for the exercise of demands previously confined to the national level. As Banchoff 
and Smith state, ‘These more informal, fluid forms of representation do not meet the 
standards of popular sovereignty set by traditional democratic theory. nonetheless, 
they reflect the reality of the EU as polity composed of multiple identities embedded 
at multiple levels of governance’ (Banchoff and smith 1999, 15). 
Control legitimacy or accountability is defined here as the situation in which 
‘some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to 
impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met’ 
(grant and Keohane 2005, 29; see tholen, chapter 2). we start from the premise 
that there are two basic models of control legitimacy: delegation and representation. 
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‘in the participation model, those affected hold power-wielders accountable directly 
through participation, whereas in the delegation model, those delegating power 
hold power-wielders accountable through a variety of mechanisms for judgment 
after fact’ (Grant and Keohane 2005, 32–33). Grant and Keohane identify seven 
mechanisms of control legitimacy, or accountability as they call it, which can be 
observed in RIOs. These are labelled hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, 
peer and public reputational mechanisms (grant and Keohane 2005, 36). the idea is 
that these mechanisms create checks and balances to help prevent abuses of power in 
a regional system characterized by a wide variety of power-wielders and an absence 
of centralized power. control legitimacy in rios has been increasingly practised not 
in the form of direct participation in decision-making processes based on a majority 
principle, but rather through complex systems of representation, the selection of 
delegates, professional socialization, ex-post review and checks and balances 
between government sectors (Majone 1996). and this is the reason for ‘the need 
for greater attention, efficiency and expertise in areas where most citizens remain 
“rationally ignorant” or non-participatory’ (Moravcsik 2002, 614).  
to summarize, by freeing oneself from the analytical constraints imposed by the 
classical nation state, it is possible to conceive of regional international organizations 
as legitimate even in the absence of democratic representation. this is possible 
because of the involvement of other actors in the decision-making process. in this 
context, it is relevant to make a more general assessment of the role of subnational 
state actors in regional governance.
Subnational state actors
in the search for legitimacy in the eU, one of the principles which has been introduced 
is that of subsidiarity.1 according to this principle, decisions must be taken as 
closely to citizens as possible. although subsidiarity was not intended to strengthen 
subnational state actors, it opened up a window of opportunity for them, offering 
access to national and supranational levels of multi-level governance. the creation 
of the Committee of the Regions was the institutional affirmation of this principle 
(Medeiros 2004). even though the committee of the regions has no decisional 
power, its opinions contribute to input legitimacy. Yet, this is only the tip of the 
iceberg. subnational state actors have also been mobilizing in other, perhaps less 
formal, arenas within the nation state, and also directly in the supranational sphere. 
the treaty of Maastricht established the possibility of subnational entities taking 
the nation state’s seat at the council of Ministers and this practice has been used 
by german and austrian Länder and Belgian regions. Regional officials have also 
frequently participated in the administration of structural funds, and the formation 
of sectoral networks between subnational state actors has been another consistent 
factor. 
1  preamble to the teU and article 5 of the tec concluded in nice in 2002; title iii, 
article I–11 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (this Treaty was rejected by 
referendum in france and the netherlands in June 2005).
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it is in this context that the notions of paradiplomacy and constituent diplomacy 
have emerged. Keating (1999, 1) argues that ‘globalization and the rise of 
transnational regimes, especially regional trading areas, have eroded the distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs and by the same token have transformed the 
division of responsibilities between state and subnational governments’, in the sense 
that subnational, national, and international arenas are now more interconnected 
than before and as a result, an event at one level influences the others. The actual 
conflict in Mercosur concerning the cellulose plants in the border region between 
Uruguay and Argentina is an example of the way in which a conflict at the local 
level concerning an environmental issue may have repercussions at the national and 
regional levels.2
the increased permeability of national borders leaves subnational state actors 
exposed to their external environment more than before. and even though the ‘end 
of the territory’ (Badie 1995) is not evident, it is undeniable that the concept has 
changed. it seems that territory is no longer necessarily associated with the nation 
state as it had been in the past, and the idea of a hermetic and univocal sovereignty 
has disappeared along with this association. today, territory has taken on the role of 
catalyst between society and the global market, and at the same time it presents itself 
as locus for political debate and collective action. subnational state actors present 
themselves, therefore, as territorial alternatives in a functional approach. they act 
as a third tier of power, besides the national and the regional tiers, and, given the 
reduction of the nation state’s capacity for mediation, subnational actors compete 
with the state for the prerogatives of public character. these actions of subnational 
state actors have been termed paradiplomacy. for Keating, 
paradiplomacy is not the same as conventional state diplomacy, which is about pursuing 
a defined state interest in the international arena. It is more functionally specific and 
targeted, often opportunistic and experimental. … paradiplomacy is also characterized by 
a high degree of involvement of civil society and the private sector (Keating 1999, 11). 
paradiplomacy is not incompatible with diplomacy. in fact, it also acts internally, 
attempting to shape diplomacy according to the specific interests of each subnational 
state actor. considering this last aspect as essential, and remembering that the para- 
2  The cellulose plant conflict between Argentina and Uruguay started in 2005, when 
argentineans blocked a bridge connecting the two countries. they protested against the 
permission given by the Uruguayan authorities for the installation of two cellulose factories on 
the Uruguay river, claiming that the plants would pollute the river. argentinean subnational 
authorities, such as the governor of entre rios (the border province) and the municipality 
of gualeguaychú (the city nearby), supported the protest of their citizens who felt menaced 
by the permissive action of a foreign state. the symbiosis between civil society and local 
power may be explained by the pays-offs for the latter. locally, this popular and ecological 
movement could yield votes and, therefore, increase its term in office. Furthermore, this event 
could enable a sub-national actor to take the lead in developing the national and regional 
consciousness and strengthen its power, on the one hand, vis-à-vis Buenos aires, which 
actually comes into view as a secondary actor despite its political weight; and, on the other 
hand, with regard to Mercosur, which is asked to mediate and to deal with this question of 
paradiplomacy.
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prefix refers to the idea of hierarchy, Kincaid introduces the notion of constituent 
diplomacy, ‘intended to be a neutral descriptor, one that avoids the implication 
that the activities of constituent governments are necessarily inferior, ancillary, or 
supplemental to the high politics of nation-state diplomacy’ (2001, 74). this rationale 
itself is often founded on a federative pact.3 what is new is that, while in the past this 
pact was established at an external level, a domain reserved for central authorities, 
today we discuss the pertinence of the extension of this domain to subnational state 
actors. Conflict and competition are intrinsic characteristics of domestic politics, so 
why might they not also be present in foreign policy? one element which remains is 
the myth of the hermetic and univocal sovereignty mentioned above, which is used 
by national governments to legitimize the suppression of such extension. as Kincaid 
reminds us, 
whatever competition may exist, and exist legitimately, within other policy fields, in 
foreign affairs the seemingly instinctual reaction of national elites is to try to suppress 
competition and shield foreign-policy-making behind a veil of state secrecy. the nation, 
it is said, must speak with a single voice (Kincaid 2001, 61). 
it is argued that subnational state actors would not necessarily act under the 
‘veil of state secrecy’,4 which would inspire the defence of individual as opposed 
to general interests, thereby reducing the degree of legitimacy of their actions. 
however, the temps mondial of democracy and market (laïdi 1993) established at 
the end of the 20th century is distinct from that which characterized the westphalian 
design of the international system. in it, control mechanisms coexist with complex 
interdependence (Keohane and nye 1987), providing new mechanisms of external 
accountability through constituent diplomacy.
in a seminal article published in International Organization as early as 1988, 
putnam indicated this internal trend of constituent diplomacy imagining the 
relationship between diplomacy and domestic politics according to a two-level game 
rationale: 
at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government 
to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among 
those groups. at the international level, national governments seek to maximize their 
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences 
of foreign developments. neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision 
makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign (putnam 1988, 
434).  
3  Despite not being a specificity of federal democratic Nation-states or their peers, it is 
in them that constituent diplomacy has been most practiced.
4  this notion is explored by rawls: ‘somehow we must nullify the effects of 
specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural 
circumstances to their own advantage. now in order to do this i assume that the parties are 
situated behind a veil of ignorance. they do not know how the various alternatives will affect 
their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of 
general considerations’ (rawls 1999, 118).
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this rationale, however, did not emphasize, strictly speaking, the action of 
subnational state actors to the same extent as the concept of constituent diplomacy. 
let us now turn to an exploration of the subnational actors, especially those acting 
within Mercosur, the Common Market of the South. 
Participation of Subnational State Actors in Mercosur
The potential role of subnational state actors is influenced by two sets of institutions: 
those which make up the domestic political system, and the institutional set-up of 
the regional integration organization. in the case of Mercosur, both the domestic 
political system of the member states and the original institutional design of this rio 
have discouraged the participation of subnational state actors in regional governance. 
recent developments at both levels, however, may have had a positive effect upon 
the opportunities for subnational state actors to participate in decision making and 
thus enhanced the legitimacy of regional governance. these two dimensions are 
analyzed in the following section, focusing on argentina and Brazil.
Member State Political Systems: Argentina and Brazil
Argentina   argentina was a confederation until 1860, but the formal hegemony of 
Buenos aires increased until the re-democratization of the country in the 1980s. the 
constitutional reforms of 1994 had both internal and external repercussions on the 
distribution of competences between the levels of government. article 24 of this new 
argentinean constitution permits the approval of treaties ‘that delegate competences 
and jurisdiction to supra-state organizations in conditions of reciprocity and equality, 
and which respect the democratic order and human rights. the norms dictated in 
their consequence possess hierarchy superior to the laws’.  
this innovation makes clear the possibility for the predominance of international 
law over national law in the classic vision foreseen by monist theory (Kelsen 1992). 
on the other hand, article 124 establishes that the provinces may ‘sign international 
conventions as long as they are not incompatible with the foreign policy of the 
nation and do not affect the faculties delegated to the federal government or the 
public credit of the nation; with the knowledge of the national congress’. this last 
article increases the margin of action of argentinean subnational state actors.
Brazil Unlike argentina, Brazil was a centralized monarchy until 1889, when it 
became a federation. it can be considered to be a system of inverted federalism, in 
which the central power transfers competences to its parts, rather than a traditional 
federalist system, in which the parts renounce competences in favour of the center 
(abrucio 1998). as in the case of argentina, it was only after re-democratization in 
the 1980s that centralization began to be challenged. 
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution has a decentralizing character – a counter-
reaction to two decades of centralization during which the federal units, as well 
as the municipalities, had only a narrow margin for manoeuvre. in article 18, the 
constitution states that: ‘the political-administrative organization of the federal 
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republic of Brazil comprises the Union, the states, the federal district and the 
Municipalities, all autonomous, in the terms of this constitution’. this implies 
that the 1988 constitution not only extends, up to a certain point, the legislative 
competence of the states, but that it equally benefits the municipal authorities with 
this extension (frazão 1994, 318). Brazilian subnational state actors acquired the 
potential for more national and, in principle at least, international action, as the 1988 
constitution also attests in article 4 that: ‘the federal republic of Brazil will seek 
economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of latin america, 
aiming at the formation of a latin american community of nations’. 
the elements for the practice of constituent diplomacy were therefore in 
place and, indeed, in 1997, fernando henrique cardoso created the assessorship 
for federal relations (afr) in the cabinet of the Minister for foreign affairs to 
stimulate the approximation of States and Municipalities through regional offices. As 
early as 1996, the then Brazilian Minister of foreign affairs luiz felipe lampreia 
said that ‘new themes, new forms of interaction between ministries and between 
these and other government organs and civil society, the imperatives of public and 
federative diplomacy, the imperatives of heads of state and government diplomacy, 
exponential mark of our times, the informatization, the search for efficiency and 
economy in the management of the  federal administrative machinery – this is a 
complex reality which indicates the necessity for constantly updating itamaraty 
[the Ministry of foreign affairs], the diplomatic career and our methods of work’.5 
in 2002, the lula government transformed afr into the special assessorship for 
federative and parliamentary affairs (safpa) and an Undersecretary of federal 
affairs was created with the objective of coordinating the actions of the executive 
with those of the states and Municipalities. these states and municipalities, then, 
took on a pro-active role in foreign relations within their respective constitutional 
competences. in this way they are now able to include public policies in, for instance, 
the sectors of health, education, environment and transportation.
to sum up, in both argentina and Brazil decentralization and an increased 
role for subnational actors are associated with democratization. at the same time, 
decentralization relates to the idea of efficiency. Yet, those relationships between 
decentralization, democratization and efficiency have not been simple, as strong 
clientelism is still present at the local level and inadequate preparation of the 
bureaucracy has hampered the implementation of new mechanisms of governance. 
at the domestic level, some mechanisms of accountability have had to be created to 
stem the private appropriation of public goods and acts of corruption – mechanisms 
such as the law of fiscal responsibility in Brazil.6  it is possible to say, therefore, that 
5  speech delivered by lampreia on the occasion of the graduation of class ‘florestan 
fernandes’ from the rio Branco institute on 30 april 1996.
6  the law of fiscal responsibility (complimentary law no. 101 from 4 May 2000) 
‘establishes norms for public finances directed at responsibility in fiscal administration, through 
actions in which risks are prevented and deviations capable of affecting the equilibrium of 
public accounts corrected, highlighting planning, control, transparency and responsibility as 
basic premises’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs, official website, http://www.tesouro.fazenda.
gov.br/hp/lei_responsabilidade_fiscal.asp, accessed 3 April 2006). 
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the increased role of subnational state actors in argentina and Brazil can contribute 
to the legitimacy of the national political process if, and only if, it is combined 
with strict mechanisms of control. legitimacy would thus be established by a mixed 
accountability mechanism, combining, pari passu, participation and delegation. 
The Institutional Design of Mercosur
the intergovernmentalist design of Mercosur is a consequence of the importance 
that its member states attribute to sovereignty. sovereignty is so important partly 
because independence was achieved much more recently than most european states, 
after the decolonization processes in the first quarter of the 19th century, and partly 
because of a near absence of military conflicts among the member states, which could 
have stimulated, as was the case in europe, an acceptance of limitations on their 
sovereignty.7 the presence of the United states on the continent also contributed to 
the strength of the principle of non-intervention in latin american countries, both at 
the bilateral and multilateral level. Moreover, in view of the blighted experience of 
the andean pact (see Malamud and de sousa, chapter 5), Mercosur member states 
have hesitated to launch institutional projects which did not correspond to their true 
capacities for commitments, especially those of a supranational nature. 
despite this unfavourable institutional design, Mercosur has, since its inception, 
stimulated discussion over the re-establishment of the federative pacts of argentina 
and Brazil, allowing dialogue between its subnational state actors to intensify. 
This intensification has been conducted through two main channels: participation 
in formal Mercosur institutions, and the development of regional networks. this 
process can be defined as a two-track positive feedback path. Democracy and 
economic liberalization among the nation states promote decentralization with 
accountability internally and regional integration externally; this regional integration, 
in turn, reinforces decentralization and enhances the accountability of the multilevel 
governance of the system as a whole.
In 2004, subnational state actors obtained, finally, de jure right of participation 
within the formal Mercosur institutions when in Belo horizonte, the common 
Market council (cMc) decided to: 
create the consultative forum for Municipalities, federal states, provinces and 
departments of Mercosur, with the intent of stimulating dialog and cooperation between 
the authorities of the municipal, state, provincial and departmental levels of the member-
states of Mercosur.8  
7  the only exception would be the paraguay war from 1865-70 between paraguay, on 
the one side, and argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on the other, and its nefarious consequences, 
above all for the guarani people in paraguay (chiavenato 1979). for a literary-philosophical 
reflection on dictatorial power in Latin America, on the controversial figure of José Gaspar de 
francia and his importance to paraguayan development see rosa Bastos 1974.
8  MercosUr/cMc/dec. n° 41/04, art. 1, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/, 
accessed 14 february 2005.
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this forum succeeded the specialized Municipalities and Intendencias 
[provinces] Meeting (sMiM) which had been created in 2000 by a common Market 
group (cMg) resolution.9 the new forum was broader, however, embracing 
provinces, federal states and departments. the fact that the sMiM had been created 
by a resolution of the cMg and that the forum was created by a cMc decision is 
very significant.  The political impact of a CMC decision is much greater than of a 
cMg resolution, since it expresses the direct will of the heads of state. Moreover, 
one may note that the forum has the status of a Mercosur institution, and is therefore 
permanent, while the sMiM had only been a meeting. the forum is formed by 
a committee of municipalities and a committee of federated states, provinces and 
departments. the forum may propose measures to the cMg designed to promote 
political coordination, citizens’ well-being and quality of life. 
the formal participation of subnational state actors in the Mercosur institutional 
framework was preceded by cross-border activities at the heart of the networks: 
Crecena/Codesul and Mercocidades (‘Mercocities’). twice a year, the network 
composed by the regional commission for foreign commerce of the argentine 
northeast (Crecena) and the southern council for development and integration 
(Codesul) brings together in a summit, since June 1995, the governors of the north-
eastern argentinean provinces and of the southern and centre-western Brazilian 
states. the summit goes well beyond purely administrative issues, and constitutes a 
political forum in which subnational state actors affirm the importance of their roles 
in the process of regional governance. they claim to be the major link in the chain of 
public policies and holders of competences, in areas of integration such as education, 
culture, the environment and transportation. 
the network of Mercocities was established in november 1995 by nineteen 
cities in Mercosur and chile. similar to crecena/codesul, this network considers 
citizen participation to be the prime objective of integration and consequently cities 
must, then, be included in the decision-making processes of Mercosur in areas 
where they have decision-making competencies. to this end, ‘Mercocities’ created 
nine thematic commissions which try to develop cooperation projects to encourage 
closer coordination of industrial, mercantile and service activities (local productive 
arrangements, clusters, etc.) at the heart of the southern common Market.
an important instrument which may strengthen the role of subnational state 
actors in Mercosur is the Fund for the Structural Convergence of Mercosur 
(FOCEM). Created by Decision CMC Nº 45/04, its objective is the financing of 
programmes to promote structural convergence, develop competitiveness, promote 
the social cohesion of smaller economies and less developed regions, and support 
the functioning of the institutional structure and the strengthening of the integration 
process. foceM is funded by annual contributions by member states, totalling 
a hundred million dollars: argentina contributes 27 percent, Brazil 70 percent, 
paraguay 1 percent and Uruguay 2 percent. Unlike the structural funds of the 
european Union, contributions to foceM depend directly on the member states, 
meaning that the fund’s autonomy is limited. it can, however, promote the effective 
9  MercosUr/gMc/res. nº 90/00,   http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/, accessed 1 
May 2006.
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participation of subnational state actors in its management, as it operates in those 
areas constitutionally attributed to them.  
Conclusion
this chapter has shown that despite unfavourable initial conditions, due to the 
political systems of Mercosur member states and its original institutional design, 
subnational state actors are increasingly participating, both formally and informally, 
in Mercosur regional governance. central powers hesitate to delegate any more of 
their original competences: Keating (1999, 7) argues regarding the european Union 
that ‘... opportunities for regions to act in europe remain limited and states are still 
the dominant actors’. in Mercosur, the opportunities are even more limited. the 
influence of subnational state actors is exercised through constituent diplomacy, 
which is restricted to action in cooperation with the federal executive government. 
despite this, one cannot deny the existence of increasing interconnectivity between 
different political levels, which is contributing to the development of a multi-level 
governance system in which subnational state actors are playing a role. these actors 
are recognized by the nation states as central entities for democratic practice within 
their borders as well as in regional governance. in these modest ways, they are 
contributing to the input and control legitimacy of regional governance.  
References
abrucio, f.l. (1998), Os barões da Federação (são paulo: Usp/hucitec).
almeida, p.r. (1998), Mercosul: Fundamentos e Perspectivas (são paulo: ltr).
Badie, B. (1995) La fin des territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et sur 
l’utilité social du respect (paris: fayard).
Banchoff, th. and smith, M.p. (1999), Legitimacy and the European Union (london: 
routledge). 
Barbosa, r.a. (1996), ‘o Brasil e a integração regional: a alalc e a aladi (1960-
1990)’, in J. albuquerque (ed.), Sessenta anos de política externa brasileira 
(1930-1990): diplomacia para o desenvolvimento (v.2) (são paulo: cultura 
editores associados/nupri-Usp/fapesp).
Bresser pereira, l.c. and cunill grau, n. (1999), O Público Não-Estatal na Reforma 
do Estado (rio de Janeiro: fundação getúlio vargas).
Brown, c., nardin, t. and rengger, n. (2002), International Relations in Political 
Thought (cambridge: cambridge University press).
campbell, J. l. (2004), Institutional Change and Globalization (princeton: princeton 
University press).
chiavenato, J.J. (1979), Genocídio Americano: A Guerra do Paraguai (são paulo: 
Brasiliense).
deutsch, K.w. (1981), ‘the crisis of the state’, Government and Opposition, 16:3, 
331–43.
duchacek, i.d. (2001), ‘perforated sovereinty’, in Michelmann and soldatos (eds). 
frazão, a.s. (1994), ‘Brésil’, in d. rougemont (ed.), Dictionnaire International du 
Marcelo A. Medeiros 113
Fédéralisme (Brussel : Bruylant).
grant, r.w. and Keohane, r.o. (2005), ‘accountability and abuses of power in 
world politics’, American Political Science Review 99:1, 29–43.
Keating, M. (1999), ‘regions and international affairs: Motives, opportunities and 
strategies’, in f. aldecoa and M. Keating (eds), Paradiplomacy in Action: The 
Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments (london: frank cass).
Kelsen, h. (1992), Teoria Geral do Direito e do Estado (são paulo: Martins 
fontes).
Keohane, r.o. and nye, J.s. (1987), ‘power and interdependence revisited’, 
International Organization 41:331–434, 725–53.
Kincaid, J. (2001), ‘constituent diplomacy in federal polities and the nation-state: 
Conflict and Co-operation’, in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds).
Kulgemas, e. and Branco, M.s. (2005), ‘os governos subnacionais e a nova realidade 
do federalismo’, in t. vigevani et al., Governos subnacionais e sociedade civil 
– Integração regional e Mercosul (são paulo: pUc-sp/Unesp/fapesp).
Laïdi, Z. (1993), ‘Sens et Puissance dans le Système International’, in Z. Laïdi, 
L’Ordre Mondial Relâché: Sens et Puissance après la Guerre Froide (paris: 
presses de la fondation nationale de sciences politiques).
Majone, g. (1996), Regulating Europe (london: routledge).
Medeiros, M.a. (2000), La genèse du Mercosud (paris: l’harmattan). 
— (2003), ‘prerrogativas estatais, integração regional e lógica distributiva’, Lua 
Nova, no. 58.
— (2004), ‘Unidades subnacionais e integração européia: o caso do comitê 
das regiões’, in t. vigevani et al., Governos subnacionais e sociedade civil – 
Integração regional e Mercosul (são paulo: pUc-sp/Unesp/fapesp).
Mény, Y. (1993), Les Politiques du Mimétisme Institutionnel: La greffe et le rejet 
(paris: l’harmattan).
Michelmann, h. and soldatos, p. (eds), Federalism and International Relations – 
The Role of Subnational Units (oxford: oxford University press).
Moravcsik, A. (2002), ‘In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy 
in the european Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40:44, 603–24.
putnam, r. (1988), ‘diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level 
games’, International Organization 42:3, 427–60.
rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts: Belknap). 
rosa Bastos, a. (1974), Yo el Supremo (Buenos aires: siglo XXi).

part 4
rios, legitimacy and 
non-state actors

chapter 7
is there any room for input and 
control legitimacy by civil society in 
Mercosur?
Michelle ratton sanchez
Introduction 
The Mercosur 1995–2000 Action Program (Decision No. 09/95 of the Mercosur 
common Market council (cMc)) stated that the strengthening of the integration 
process required more intensive participation on the part of society. the guidelines 
based on that action program were elaborated by the Mercosur relaunching 
project (2000)1 and the institutional strengthening project (2001).2 interestingly, 
in this context of reform, it was only in 2003, in the 2004–2006 Mercosur Work 
program3, that for the first time the participation of ‘civil society’ was mentioned. 
along with the institutional strengthening project, with the support of the inter-
american Bank, the Mercosur secretariat launched regional bids, hiring experts to 
analyze ‘democratic governance’ in the bloc’s institutions in June 2005. one of 
the bids was for the issue of ‘civil society and subnational entities participation in 
Mercosur’ (sM/Bid/04/05 and sM/Bid/05/05).4 Until then, different terminologies 
had been applied to designate non-state actors’ participation in Mercosur (as will be 
elaborated below). this chapter addresses the question of what can be considered 
as ‘civil society’ in Mercosur, and also, what role is ‘civil society’ assigned in the 
bloc.
this chapter argues that the decisions and norms in Mercosur which aim to 
increase participation in civil society require a revision of the integration process, 
and the concepts elaborated by tholen and erthal (chapters 2 and 3) may be of help 
in this respect. i will apply the indicators of input, control and output legitimacy in 
rios developed by these authors. My objective is, therefore, to evaluate the role 
assigned to civil society in the participatory mechanisms available in Mercosur, 
focusing on the potential in such mechanisms to confer input and control legitimacy 
to the regional decision-making process. 
1  Mercosur cMc decisions: cMc/dec/22/00, cMc/dec/23/00, cMc/dec/24/00, 
cMc/dec/25/00, cMc/dec/26/00, cMc/dec/27/00, cMc/dec/28/00, cMc/dec/30/00, 
cMc/dec/31/00 and cMc/dec/32/00. 
2  cMc/dec/01/02; cMc/dec/16/02. 
3  cMc/dec/26/03.
4  none of the reports has been published yet (July 2006); the supposed evaluation and 
approval by the common Market group was not either.
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the main argument is that, if there is a consensus that ‘civil society’ participation 
is one of the components for input and control legitimacy in Mercosur, it is important 
to have non-restrictive and transparent definitions of norms and procedures for 
such participation. this argument is based upon previous research showing that the 
regulation of civil society participation – either by defining which actors are eligible 
to participate or defining procedures for participation – has negatively affected 
civil society participation during the last decade (ratton sanchez 2005). the main 
problems identified were the restrictive and inflexible definition of eligible actors 
and the lack of detailed procedures for participation.
In the next section, I will briefly present the institutional structure of Mercosur and 
the participatory mechanisms available for civil society’s actors. the third section 
offers a stocktaking of civil society actors’ participation in Mercosur. the fourth 
section investigates the potential for input and control legitimacy in the participatory 
mechanisms; in the concluding section, I will evaluate to what extent the deficiencies 
which I pointed out influence input and control legitimacy. Not only will the legal 
provisions be analyzed, but also the empirical data regarding the relation between 
civil society actors and Mercosur institutions.
Participatory Mechanisms in the Institutional Structure of Mercosur
The institutional structure of Mercosur was defined in 1994 by the Additional 
protocol to the treaty of asunción, known as the Ouro Preto Protocol (opp).5 its 
current institutional structure is organized around 250 bodies, some of a permanent 
character and others ad hoc.6 the main bodies relevant to our analysis of civil society 
participation are presented in figure 7.1. 
in this institutional structure, representation prevails, especially with respect to 
the bodies that have deliberative power7 – namely the Common Market Council 
(cMc), the common Market group (cMg) and the Mercosur trade commission 
(Mtc). this ‘deliberative axis’ is basically composed of representatives of the 
state bureaucracy.8 since the establishment of Mercosur, there have been few 
opportunities 
5  The structure of Mercosur is defined in the first article of the OPP, but over the 
past years, the basic organization has been extended with working and ad hoc groups, as 
provided for by the protocol itself. the following documents amend the provisions on the 
Mercosur institutional structure: cMc/dec/30/02 (Mercosur secretariat); gMc/res/54/03 
(administrative labour court); cMc/dec/41/04 (consultation forum for city departments, 
federal states provinces and departments within Mercosur); cMc/dec/23/05 (Mercosur 
parliament); cMc/dec/30/05 (permanent review court).
6  for a complete list of bodies existing up to 2003, see ventura 2003. Updated 
information on <http://www.mercosur.int> and the COMISEC – Comisión Sectorial para el 
Mercosur – website  <http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy> (accessed July 2006).
7  ‘deliberative power’ means here the right to vote on the adoption of binding rules 
(see article 41 opp).
8  the only exception to this rule until now has been the guaranteed participation of 
the presidents of the member states in the cMc meetings every six months (article 6 opp). 
the Joint parliamentary commission (Jpc) is composed of directly elected representatives 
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for the participation of civil society. the most regulated of the mechanisms for 
participation is the economic and social advisory forum (esaf). this forum 
represents the ‘economic and social sectors’ of all member states (article 28 opp) 
and has the right to make recommendations to the cMg. according to the opp, the 
esaf is the only mechanism for the exclusive and direct participation of non-state 
actors. 
other opportunities for direct participation in Mercosur are through bodies not 
exclusively for civil society actors. among these are preparatory meetings for the 
working subgroups (wsgs) and their respective commissions,9 the specialized 
Meetings and the ad hoc groups.10 another route for civil society participation is 
from the national parliaments, but it has a mere advisory role. as from december 2006, the 
Jpc was replaced by the Mercosur parliament (cMc/dec/23/05), which assumes other tasks 
(including some mechanisms for civil society’s actors’ direct participation). after a period 
of transition the parliament will have directly elected members as from January 2011. the 
mechanisms for direct participation through the parliament are not analysed any further here, 
as they are not yet in force.
9  the wsgs are linked to the cMg (cMc/dec/04/91). currently, there are 14 wsgs 
and 45 Commissions. Each WSG covers a specific domain, such as Institutional Aspects 
(wsg2); financial aspects (wsg4); transportation (wsg5); environment (wsg6); 
industry (wsg7); agriculture (wsg8); energy and Mining (wsg9); labour, employment 
and social security Questions (wsg10); health (wsg11); investments (wsg12); electronic 
commerce (wsg13); and economic Monitoring (wsg14) (Mercosur website; ventura 2003, 
681 ff.).
10  the specialized Meetings and the ad hoc groups are linked to the cMg as well. 
the minutes of meetings of such bodies record the participation of non-state actors; although 
this is not an explicit requirement of Mercosur regulations, a broad interpretation of the cMg 
Figure 7.1 Mercosur Organization Chart
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the procedure allowing the technical committees to request, at any time, advice 
from experts and consult representatives from the ‘private sector’.11 
from this brief description, it may be concluded that each mechanism for 
participation in the Mercosur institutional structure has one specific rationale: in the 
esaf, consultations between the cMg and this forum are at its core; in wsgs (their 
commissions), specialized Meetings and ad hoc groups, the role of civil society 
groups seems to be more as observers (though oral or written manifestation is not 
forbidden); and in the technical committees, the interaction with the ‘private sector’ 
seems to be restricted to technical advice. in the next section, the formal provisions 
for and the effective participation by civil society are discussed.
Stocktaking of Civil Society Participation in Mercosur
the question of who is allowed to participate is inventoried here by examining the 
treaties and protocols of Mercosur, as well as its soft regulation (all rules created by 
Mercosur bodies). legal provisions have limited the development of civil society 
participation in Mercosur in two ways: the legal definition of civil society actors 
influences the eligibility of non-state actors and defines who may participate; and the 
lack of regulation on transparency and procedures (ratton sanchez 2005).  . 
Who may participate?
Concerning the definition of ‘who is allowed to participate’, the following legal 
limitations in Mercosur rules are relevant: confusion concerning the eligibility 
of actors to participate, the number of participants per country, lack of a regional 
perspective, and a non-alternate system. as esaf is the most institutionalized 
mechanism for civil society participation in Mercosur, these problems occur 
primarily in relation to this body.
Ambiguous concepts   the ambiguity of references to non-state actors is due mainly 
to the terms of Mercosur’s rules regarding eligible actors. four expressions are used: 
‘private sector’, ‘economic and social sectors’, ‘other economic and social sectors’, 
and ‘private party’. The most frequent expression applied in official Mercosur 
documents is ‘private sector’. this expression is found in the treaty of asunción 
(article 14) and in some working procedures of Mercosur bodies (cMg, article 
26 ff.; Mtc article 18; esaf article 3). the cMg working procedure is the only 
document that describes the meaning of the term: ‘which has a direct interest in 
any of the stages of the production, distribution and consumption processes’ (article 
29). such a description is ambiguous enough to allow for varying interpretations. a 
working procedures accepts that the provisions of chapter vii concerning the participation of 
the private sector are valid for all the bodies of the bloc. 
11  Mtc working procedures (ccM/dir/05/96, article 18). the technical committees 
are: Tariffs, Nomenclature and Classification of Merchandise (CT-1); Customs Issues (CT-2); 
trade norms and regulations (ct-3); public policies distorting competitiveness (ct-4); 
competition (ct-5); and consumer rights (ct-7) (ventura 2003, 687 ff.).
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restrictive interpretation may consider groups directly related to the economic chain 
– that is, ‘production’ for industry, ‘distribution’  for retail and ‘consumption’ for 
consumers – as ‘private sector’. A broader interpretation may consider a vast array 
of any interest group related to production, distribution or consumption processes, 
and is open to the possibility of including any individual or group.12
the use of the term ‘private sector’ in 1991 was coherent with the objectives of 
Mercosur at the time, which was mainly to create a customs union. nevertheless, 
in 1994, when the organizational structure was defined and the first steps toward 
forming a common market were laid down, the term ‘private sector’ was still being 
used, and regulations passed by the Mtc (1996) and esaf (1996) reiterated the 
term. this concept is thus applicable to all mechanisms for direct participation in 
Mercosur. the term ‘private sector’ in these documents does not seem to be the 
result of thorough reflection; rather, it seems merely to repeat an expression already 
employed in earlier documents. this has had a clear impact on the daily activities of 
Mercosur institutions (see next section).
the use of the term ‘private sector’ in 1994 contrasted with the expression 
‘economic and social sectors’ introduced into Mercosur regulation at that stage 
(article 28 opp; article 1ff. esaf working procedure; gMc/res/68/96). the esaf 
working procedure illustrates the use of this expression: entrepreneurs, workers and 
other economic and social sectors (article 12.2). it is important to highlight that 
this illustration prevented a more restrictive interpretation of the first two groups 
of actors. in principle, this new concept could allow for the recognition of a wider 
range of interests related to the integration process than the restricted interpretation 
of the ‘private sector’, but only esaf regulations use it.
another term used in formal Mercosur documents which may refer to the 
concept of ‘civil society’ is ‘private party’: persons and companies with an interest 
in defending themselves under the Mercosur dispute settlement system (article 25, 
Brasilia protocol; article 40, olivos protocol). the use of the term ‘private party’ is 
not very helpful for terminological precision either, since requesting a consultation 
may involve a person or a company, either individually or collectively.13
Number of actors   Besides the terminology used to identify the eligible groups 
of actors, there are limits to the number of participants from civil society in all 
bodies, except for the technical committees. it is reasonable to limit the number 
of participants (vigevani 1998), but combined with other restrictive conditions for 
participation, this may create an undesirable bias in the system. 
there is a limit of three representatives from the ‘private sector’ for the meetings 
of the wsgs, their commissions, the specialized Meetings and the ad hoc 
12  added to this broad interpretation, not coincidentally, is the understanding that the 
term ‘private sector’ is composed of everything that does not have a state component. 
13  this mechanism will not be further examined here since the participation of ‘private 
party’ occurs through the national section of the cMg and the presentation of the demand 
is made on behalf of the state. so far, no form of direct participation has been applied for or 
requested before the Mercosur dispute settlement system (an example of this could be the 
practice of amicus curiae).
Closing or Widening the Gap?122
groups.14 Yet, in none of these cases are there additional requirements, such as the 
type of organization, representativeness or parity. additional rules are formulated 
for participation in esaf, alongside the numerical limitation of 36 representatives, 
with nine seats reserved for each member state (it is not compulsory to appoint 
representatives for all nine seats). the national section of each member state is to 
select the ‘economic and social sectors’ that will compose the esaf (article 3, esaf 
working procedures). the following conditions must be met by all national sections: 
(i) the actors enrolled must be the most representative of the sector at the domestic 
level, (ii) parity for labour and business organizations and (iii) a maximum of nine 
delegates for each section (esaf working procedures, articles 3.1 and 6.2). 
these criteria, in combination with the additional criteria created by each 
national section, strongly reduces the potential for viable civil society participation 
in esaf. for example, the criteria for the selection of esaf representatives exclude 
the possibility of joint representation by regional alliances of civil society groups 
(the non-regional perspective critic).15 combined with the criterion of national 
representation, esaf excludes the participation of important actors whose power 
base is mainly local. the esaf structure, based on national sections, has also 
favoured the consolidation of a non-alternate system – that is to say, organizations 
and associations are part of a fixed group that participates in that system – a notion 
which is incompatible with the idea of civil society participation. the criterion of 
national representativeness defined by each National Section also favours elitist 
representation, and may be too inflexible to allow for the recognition of new actors 
(ratton sanchez 2005).
Which actors have participated?
taking into account the limitations outlined above, a complementary exercise is the 
analysis of how the Mercosur bodies have applied these legal definitions, so that 
we may identify which actors have in fact made use of the available mechanisms 
for direct participation.16 examining the minutes of the meetings of the wsgs, 
their commissions, the technical committees, the specialized Meetings and the 
14  if we accept the broad interpretation mentioned in fn. 12.
15  in the composition of all Mercosur bodies, there is always a concern for maintaining 
parity among the number of participants from each of the member states. so far, there has 
been no institute in the bloc that reflects a ‘regional logic’. A regional logic would be identified 
either (i) in the case of representative(s) named on behalf of the entire bloc or (ii) in the case 
of proportional representation for each member state taking into account economic or social 
differences and particularities. the commission of permanent Mercosur representatives 
(cpMr), established in 2003, includes representatives from each member state and a president 
(Decision IV CMC EXT/DEC11/03). The position of president reflects a certain regional 
logic. however, the cpMr president has a purely symbolic function without any deliberative 
power or even the competence to participate in the decision-making process. another example 
of a regional logic will be the parliament, once it becomes directly elected (see fn 8).
16  This stocktaking is based on the official documents filed in Mercosur headquarters. 
Unfortunately, the absence of minutes for all meetings from 1991 to 1994 and the incomplete 
record of meetings taking place since 1994 makes the exercise incomplete and less reliable.
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Table 7.1 Members of the ESAF National Sections
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Business (3)
cámara 
argentina 
del comercio 
(cac); sociedad 
rural argentina 
(sra); Unión 
industrial 
argentina (Uia) 
(4)
confederação 
nacional da 
agricultura (cna)/ 
confederação 
nacional do comércio 
(cnc)/ confederação 
nacional da indústria 
(cni)/
confederação 
nacional do 
transporte (cnt)
(5)
asociación rural 
del paragua 
(arp); 
Unión industrial 
paraguaya (Uip); 
federación de 
la producción, 
la industria y 
el comercio 
(feprinco); 
cámara nacional 
de comercio 
y servicios 
de paraguay 
(cncsp); centro 
de importadores 
(cip)
(1)
consejo 
superior 
empresarial 
(cosupem)
Workers (1)
confederación 
general del 
trabajo (cgt)
(3)
central Única dos 
trabalhadores (cUt); 
confederação geral 
dos trabalhadores 
(cgt); 
força sindical (fs)
(3)
central Unitaria 
de trabajadores 
(cUt); central 
nacional de 
trabajadores 
(cnt); 
confederación 
paraguaya de 
trabajadores 
(cpt)
(1)
plenario 
intersindical 
de 
trabajadores 
- 
convención 
nacional de 
trabajadores 
(pit-cnt)
Other 
economic 
and 
social 
sectors
(1)
acción del 
consumidor 
(adelco)
(1)
instituto Brasileiro 
de defesa do 
consumidor (idec)
(1)
confederación 
paraguaya de 
cooperativas 
(conpacoop)
–
Source: elaborated by author based on the working procedures of the national sections in 
force.
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ad hoc groups, has enabled us to identify the participation of certain civil society 
actors in those meetings since their creation in 1994. Actors with varied profiles 
have participated, such as isolated companies, associations of companies, industrial 
and agricultural confederations and union representatives. these actors may have 
participated due to their interest or expertise and the objectives of the body. as a 
result of the lack of criteria and explicit procedures for participation combined with 
the unreliable minutes and records of participants, i have decided to limit the analysis 
below to the documented history of esaf.
esaf started its activities in 1996. in the beginning, predominantly 
representatives of the ‘economic and social sectors’ were registered at its meetings: 
national business associations (industrial and agricultural) and labour unions (ratton 
sanchez 2005, table 1; seixas et al. 2000, 21 ff.). the national sections have neither 
defined uniform procedures for selecting the national actors, nor for their decision-
making process.17 parity was not foreseen for the national sections, resulting in 
disproportionate representation for employers as compared to workers, as table 7.1 
clearly shows. only Uruguay has a balanced representation. 
in addition, there are no minimum quotas for the representation of ‘other 
economic and social sectors’, and no further criteria. the national sections have 
accepted the participation of other business actors (such as associations for insurance 
companies, cooperatives and the agricultural sector) under this category. it further 
increases the distorted representation mentioned, again favouring employers (see 
ratton sanchez 2005 for full lists of participants admitted by each national section, 
in all esaf meetings from 1996 to 2004). the system of registering entitled actors 
favours a non-rotating system of participation in esaf, especially since there is no 
provision for any periodical review of the working procedures (including the list of 
entitled participants). in addition, the bias in favour of business associations (with 
the exception of the Uruguayan representatives), is in breech of the requirement 
of parity by esaf working procedures. this could be a result of the confusing 
terminology concerning the civil society actors eligible to participate, which is still 
highly focused on the idea of ‘private sector’ as shown in the previous section.
as esaf activities and Mercosur itself developed, other non-state actors began 
to have an interest in participating, which has resulted in better representation of 
‘other economic and social sector’, though participation remains unbalanced. table 
7.2 below shows the participation in an esaf meeting that took place in March 
2004. this demonstrates the slight changes in the composition of esaf since its 
creation.
an analysis of the esaf registers (table 7.2 shows an example) shows that some 
actors which were not on the initial list for the national sections later demanded 
the right to participate. among them are actors representing cooperatives, insurance 
17  the national section for argentina in esaf is composed of a plenary session, 
coordinating Bench and advisory Bodies. Brazil has a plenary session, an international 
representation committee, coordinating Bench and advisory Bodies. paraguay’s section 
is composed of a plenary session and coordinating Bench, while Uruguay has a plenary 
session, executive council, deliberative Board and advisory and administrative support 
Bodies (ratton sanchez 2005, table 2).
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Table 7.2  Participation in an ESAF meeting (2004)
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Business (3)
cámara 
argentina 
del comercio 
(cac)/ 
sociedad rural 
argentina 
– (SRA)/ 
Unión industrial 
argentina (Uia)
(2)
confederação 
nacional do 
comércio- (cnc)/ 
confederação 
nacional da 
indústria (cni)
(1)
cámara 
nacional de 
comercio 
y servicios 
de paraguay 
(cncsp)
(1)
consejo 
superior 
empresarial 
(cosupem)
Workers (2)
confederación 
general del 
trabajo (cgt)/ 
Central 
Trabajadores 
Argentina 
(CTA)
(4)
confederação 
geral dos 
trabalhadores 
(cgt)/ central 
Única dos 
trabalhadores 
(cUt)/ 
confederação 
geral dos 
trabalhadores 
(cgt)/ força 
sindical (fs)
Central 
Autônoma dos 
Trabalhadores 
(CAT)
(2)
central 
Unitaria de 
trabajadores 
(cUt)/ central 
nacional de 
trabajadores 
(cnt)
(1)
plenario 
intersindical de 
trabajadores 
- convención 
nacional de 
trabajadores 
(pit-cnt)
Other 
economic 
and 
social 
sectors
(1)
acción del 
consumidor 
(adelco) 
(1) 
Organização das 
Cooperativas 
Brasileiras (OCB)
(1)
confederación 
paraguaya de 
cooperativas 
– (Conpacoop)
(1)
Confederación 
Uruguaya de 
Entidades 
Cooperativas 
(Cudecoop)
Source: Based on the minutes of esaf meetings on 30 and 31 March 2004, as registered 
at the Mercosur secretariat. in bold, the changes in comparison to the national section 
working procedures (table 7.1).
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companies and insurance brokers, and some universities (for more details, see 
Ratton Sanchez 2005). For the latter, it is possible that specific interests with respect 
to negotiation themes or research projects provided the impetus for such demands. 
in the case of cooperative associations, the interest demonstrated does not seem to 
be related to a specific theme but rather to the feeling that the previously registered 
producers’ associations lacked representativeness. there are further pending 
demands such as from stakeholders for environmental and gender issues (aBong 
1998; Mello 2001).18
national representation is another problematic criterion. it is remarkable how 
sensitive the concept is among member states. the population of all four member 
states19 is concentrated in a few urban centres. in the case of argentina, 7.6 percent 
of its population lives in Buenos aires. in Brazil, of the almost 170 million citizens, 
over 24 million (14.3 percent) are concentrated in são paulo and rio de Janeiro, 
two metropolitan areas both located in the south-east of the country. in paraguay, 
9.8 percent of the population lives in asunción; and in Uruguay, 42.5 percent of its 
population resides in Montevideo.20 those regions and cities are the main economic 
centres of the member states, but actors representing the ‘economic and social sectors’ 
may be distributed over those countries’ territories. thus, it is unclear to what extent 
these actors represent the complexity, the diversity and scope of the sectors that may 
exist in those states beyond those main population centres, and this must negatively 
affect any potential for the concept of regional civil society in Mercosur.
Transparency and procedures for direct participation
there are few provisions on transparency and procedures for direct participation in 
Mercosur. this section presents these regulations and evaluates how civil society 
actors have participated during the last years.
Transparency – defined here as access to information – can be seen as a precondition 
for participation, and a main factor influencing how civil society participates. The 
data collected points at significant deficiencies in Mercosur in that regard, such as 
(i) a non-systematized database; (ii) incomplete publication of Mercosur documents; 
and (iii) difficulties to get access to documents. All these deficiencies restrain the 
capacity of civil society as a whole – including those actors that are eligible to 
participate in the institutional structure of Mercosur – to follow and understand the 
decisions made and, consequently, the significance of their participation.21
18 According to Fátima Mello, advisor for FASE and a member of REBRIP – a Brazilian 
movement with growing interest and participation in international negotiations – the initiatives 
presented so far by these movements are still in the formative stage. she expects that, in the 
near future, some Brazilian ngos will obtain approval for a seat on esaf (Mello 2001).
19  venezuela has not been included as it does not yet fully participate in all institutions.
20  Websites of the official statistical agencies: INDEC, Argentina, <http://www.indec.
gov.ar>; iBge, Brazil, <http://www.ibge.gov.br>; dgeec, paraguay, <http://www.dgeec.
gov.py>; and, ine, Uruguay, <http://www.ine.gub.uy>, accessed January 2005. 
21  An example of such deficiencies is the information available at <http://www.mercosur.
int> (July 2006), which does not include all official documents produced by Mercosur 
institutions and provides only partial information. Minutes of the meetings and their annexes 
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Besides transparency, the lack of procedures is also frequently criticized as an 
obstacle to civil society participation. with reference to the wsgs, their commissions, 
the specialized Meetings and the ad hoc groups procedures, representatives from 
the ‘private sector’ can be consulted in preparatory meetings (limited to three 
representatives per meeting). the representatives that may be consulted by those 
bodies shall be put on a list of ‘representatives of the private sector’, drawn up 
by each national section of the cMg. the wordings of chapter vii of the cMg 
Working Procedures do not clearly define how ‘private sector’ representatives are 
to behave. its provisions do not explain the criteria for selecting the actors to be 
invited, whether such actors can issue oral or written opinions, or how and to what 
extent opinions have to be incorporated (or not) into the final decision of those 
Mercosur bodies. I have therefore classified civil society participation in such bodies 
as observer. given the limitations, it is impossible to evaluate how the private sector 
participates in the meetings of Mercosur bodies based on an analysis of the available 
minutes.
technical committees may request advice from experts and consult representatives 
from the ‘private sector’. no criteria or procedures are stipulated with respect to 
how and under what circumstances these consultations can or should take place. 
as can be seen from the minutes of these committees, some actors have indeed 
participated in their meetings, but it is not known how they were selected or what 
their contribution to the meeting was. 
With regard to ESAF there are specific rules as to how its activities are to be 
organized and how civil society constituencies are to participate. according to the 
esaf working procedures the forum holds a plenary session at least once every six 
months. in principle, some of the activities are prepared in the national sections and 
should be presented in a report to the esaf before each joint meeting. the practice 
of recent years, however, shows that not all sections communicate their activities and 
when they do, they rarely follow minimum standards for describing their activities22 
required to permit monitoring of the dynamics of the work and influence of each 
national section in esaf deliberations. it can also be seen from the minutes that 
in all national sections there is an internal work division according to thematic and 
sub-sector interests. 
Before each esaf plenary session, the coordinating national section must 
notify the other sections of the planned agenda (at least fifteen days beforehand). 
esaf decisions are to be adopted by consensus; should this prove impossible, all 
the divergent positions are subsequently forwarded to the cMg (esaf working 
Procedures, articles 15–16). Through a decision by the Plenary Session, the ESAF 
can also allow observers selected by the national sections to express themselves 
are partially restricted by the member states and no public justification is given for these 
restrictions. see cMg regulation on this (gMc/res/08/05).
22  there is a certain lack of continuity in the provision of information on the part of each 
National Section. The first communication was presented in writing by Argentina at a meeting 
in december 1997; during the following years, one or another section presented a report and 
only in 2002 and 2004 did all of the Sections fulfil the commitment to present reports on their 
activities.
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orally at its meetings (esaf working procedures, articles 6.5 and 8.v). this form 
of participation can also be considered as consultation by esaf with other non-state 
actors. 
Based on their deliberations, esaf members may formulate recommendations to 
the cMg. in principle, a strict interpretation of its mandate as established in article 
29 of the opp would lead to the conclusion that the forum may only formulate 
written opinions when consulted by the cMg. however, article 2.i of the esaf 
working procedures says that the forum can express itself on any subject within its 
competence,23 be it on its own initiative, consultations with the cMg, or any other 
Mercosur body. 
Since this broad interpretation of its mandate was defined by the ESAF itself in 
its working procedures and through its practices, nothing in the current regulation 
of Mercosur guarantees that such voluntary recommendations to the cMg are taken 
into account; in fact, the cMg need not even justify its acceptance (total or partial) or 
rejection of an esaf proposal. even concerning the two consultations of esaf by 
the common Market group (see table 7.3) which resulted in the recommendations 
01/00 and 02/00, there are no published comments on the part of the cMg (see table 
7.4). thus a black hole has been created in Mercosur whereby the esaf cannot rely 
on any well-founded evaluation or consideration of its recommendations. 
Mercosur regulations do not ensure that there is external transparency for esaf 
recommendations (cf. cMg/res/08/05) and, consequently, there is no way to 
monitor its recommendations and opinions. this has led to the questioning of the 
credibility and usefulness of ESAF, as well as the difficulty in correlating its dialogue 
with other bodies in the Mercosur structure. although the esaf is considered the 
most objective and most clearly organized participation mechanism in Mercosur, 
a recurring criticism is that it is an empty mechanism within the dynamics of the 
decision-making process in Mercosur. for instance, during the reform of the dispute 
settlement system in 2002 (the olivos protocol), no consultation took place with 
esaf or Jpc (ventura 2003). 
23  according to article 2 of the working procedures, esaf recommendations can 
cover internal Mercosur questions as well as its relations with other states, international 
organizations and other rios.
Table 7.3 Recommendations versus Consultation
Recommendations and Consultations 24 (approx) 100%
esaf/cMg 22 recommendations 91.6%
cMg/esaf (01/98; 04/99) 2 consultations 8.4%
Source: elaborated by the author based on the minutes of cMg and esaf meetings (1996-
2004).
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to summarize, the analysis of how civil society actors can participate, and 
how they have done so hitherto, reveals that there are improvements to be made, 
particularly in developing detailed procedures for participation. there are also 
other issues that need to be addressed, such as the lack of information and registers 
concerning civil society participation. these obstacles also hampered the evaluation 
carried out in the following section.
Looking for input and control legitimacy in Mercosur: contrasting regulations 
and practices 
the purpose of this section is to evaluate Mercosur regulation governing direct 
participation and its practices, according to the concepts of input and control 
legitimacy. the mechanisms for direct participation in Mercosur are evaluated only 
in relation to their capacity to contribute to input and control legitimacy of Mercosur 
decision making; hence, their own legitimacy is only marginally examined here.
as far as input legitimacy is concerned, the following questions are addressed 
concerning the mechanisms for direct participation in Mercosur:
is it possible for these mechanisms to contribute to more rational decisions in 
the Mercosur decision-making process?
are there institutional tools for social inclusion in such mechanisms?
concerning control legitimacy, meanwhile, the question is the following:
does the dynamic of direct participation in the mechanisms examined enable 
the control of power in that bodies’ role in the decision-making process?
input and control legitimacy contributions, generally speaking, vary according 
to the role granted by such mechanisms to civil society actors. the prevailing roles 
•
•
•
Table 7.4 ESAF Recommendations versus CMG Comments
ESAF Recommendations CMG Comments
5 recommendations 02/99; 01/00; 
02/00; 04/00; ?/03
not published.
5 recommendations: 01/97; 03/97; 
04/97; 05/97; 03/99
In a first moment, it only accused the receipt. 
further comments were informed but not 
published for the large public.
4 recommendations: 01/97; 02/97; 
06/98; ?/98 
comments by the cMg were informed to esaf, 
thought their contents were restricted to the large 
public.
6 recommendations: 04/99; 05/99; 
01/01; 01/02; 02/02; 01/03
positive evaluation. no procedures for 
implementation defined.
2 recommendations: 03/00; 01/99 comments postponed.
Source: elaborated by the author based on the minutes of cMg and esaf meetings (1996-
2004).
Closing or Widening the Gap?130
in the examined mechanisms are classified in Table 7.5 according to their potential 
contribution to input and control legitimacy in Mercosur.
the scores attributed to input and control legitimacy of Mercosur decision-
making processes listed in Table 7.5 reflect both the regulation and practice of each 
of these roles, as they both influence the effective capacity of the body in question 
to promote legitimacy.
Technical opinions  
the contribution of the technical opinions of the technical committees to input 
legitimacy is ranked as medium because it may influence the analysis of the member 
states and thereby influence the decision-making process. It is possible to infer the 
potential for input legitimacy of Mercosur regulation from the description in the 
previous section, though an accurate analysis of how this potential has been brought 
into play would require a detailed examination of the technical opinions submitted 
and their influence on the process of decision making.
the lack of procedures for the request of technical opinions and revision by the 
technical committees, however, might impair their potential for input legitimacy. if 
it is impossible to obtain information on who can participate, and when and how an 
actor has participated, the (non-transparent) request of such opinions can easily be 
biased. Furthermore, such lack of regulation will also limit any affirmative action or 
program to promote social inclusion within such a mechanism.
the contribution of technical opinions to control legitimacy, on the other hand, 
is relatively low because of the nature of such opinions: clarifications of thematic 
disciplines or instructions for their application. Technical opinions can influence 
decisions – in a secondary manner – but not actually control the exercise of power 
in the technical committees. the case of Mercosur follows the general pattern: the 
regulation of technical opinions is extremely undemanding. in addition, in the case of 
Mercosur, the major obstacle to making any evaluation of the potential contribution 
to control legitimacy by technical opinions is the lack of registered practices, which 
does not reveal the real role that technical opinions have had in the decision-making 
process.
Table 7.5 Input and control legitimacy potential level
Role assigned to civil society Input legitimacy Control legitimacy 
technical opinion Medium low
observer Medium Medium
consultation high high
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Observers  
Regarding the role of observers – which is mainly exercised, as explained in the 
previous section, by civil society actors in the wsgs, their commissions, the 
Specialized Meetings and the Ad Hoc Groups – its input legitimacy potential is 
medium due to the non-obligation of Mercosur institutions to formally react to the 
presence of civil society actors in the meetings (which is in any case limited to the 
preparatory meetings), even though they have the right to oral or written expression 
before the institution concerned. in the case of Mercosur, it is not possible to evaluate 
the potential for input legitimacy since the regulation is not clear enough in respect 
to the way in which civil society actors can participate – the regulation of the timing 
of this participation being the sole exception.
as with technical opinions, an analysis of the role of observers in conferring 
input legitimacy would require a study of the cases in which such participation 
was allowed or invoked, and the influence of this participation in the process of 
decision making. the poor registration of direct participation in meetings of the 
wsgs, the commissions, the specialized Meetings and the ad hoc groups all make 
it impossible to identify (i) which actors participated; (ii) how they participated; and 
(iii) their contribution to the decision-making process.
Besides the proceedings, the selection of the actors that may participate in the 
wsgs, their commissions, the specialized Meetings and the ad hoc groups must 
be based on the lists of names suggested by the national sections. firstly, based on 
the collection of empirical data, it was impossible to verify if these lists really exist. 
secondly, there is no indication of the criteria for the selection of civil society actors. 
For these reasons, it is difficult to evaluate the possibilities for social inclusion in 
such mechanisms. the fact is that in principle regional regulation leaves room for 
internal regulations by the national sections and for the practices of all those bodies 
to promote the inclusion of those often excluded by the process. however, no action 
in that sense was identified during the research conducted. 
the medium degree of potential for control legitimacy by observers is based on 
the fact that the participation of civil society actors in an interstate body can enable 
them to check power in that body. again, the lack of regulation in Mercosur, both 
on which actors can participate and how they can participate, may encourage biased 
contribution.
Consultation  
as regards consultation, the potential for input and control legitimacy is high due 
to its closer connection to the decision-making process. during the consultations 
Mercosur institutions may require the opinion of civil society actors and in theory, 
at least, they also have to react to it. accordingly, consultation becomes a sort of 
cooperative mechanism within the rio structure. consultation, therefore, should be 
based on clear objectives and rules, and be completed within a reasonable space of 
time so that the participating actor can understand how to cooperate. 
as for the consultation provisions for Mercosur bodies, the esaf being the body 
with most comprehensive provisions, it can be concluded that the objectives and rules 
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are still fragmented (tables 7.1 and 7.2). in addition, the consultation procedures 
in Mercosur fail to take into account the need for accountability concerning the 
employment of the results, and their importance to the decision-making process 
(Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Such deficits influence both the input and control aspects of 
legitimacy, which could be fulfilled by direct participation in the ESAF. Moreover, 
particularly for input legitimacy, the inflexible rules of the ESAF for the selection 
of the participants (emphasis on fixed members of the ESAF National Sections, 
the non-regional character, and the non-rotating character) distort any potential for 
social inclusion in the mechanism.
finally, in all institutions, the ‘inclusion requirement’ for input legitimacy is 
restrained also by the confusing terminology applied in Mercosur regulation and the 
restricted character of the predominant terminology (‘private sector’), as well as the 
way in which it has influenced the activities of the institutions.
Conclusion
given the analysis presented in this chapter, we may observe that Mercosur regulation 
concerning the participation of civil society actors could, in principle, strengthen 
the input and control legitimacy of decision making. however, this does not mean 
that legitimacy is, in practice, strengthened. apart from the confusing and restrictive 
terminology for the identification of the eligible actors, other mechanisms also fail 
to fulfil the potential to enhance input and control legitimacy. There is a lack of 
procedures mainly concerning participation and mechanisms for inclusion. neither 
the soft regulation (the institutional norms) nor the practices of Mercosur institutions, 
as described in this chapter, were able to improve the regulation in order to limit 
the discretionary power of interstate bodies in the Mercosur institutional structure 
(especially concerning the participation of civil society actors). Main Mercosur 
institutions presently define when, where, how and who they will consult for almost 
all mechanisms for participation. as seen in the conclusions of the preceding section, 
such discretionary power may bias contributions from civil society actors.
last, but not least, it should be stressed that part of the analysis conducted in this 
chapter was limited due to the lack of information – either information not generally 
available, or it was simply absent from Mercosur records. consequently, as a 
precondition for direct participation, transparency becomes the most important issue 
within Mercosur today. in order to improve the participation of civil society and 
its capacity to bring about a legitimate decision-making process within Mercosur, 
transparency surely has to be on Mercosur’s institutional reform project agenda.
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chapter 8
the contribution of non-state actors to 
the legitimacy of the caricom1
gerda van roozendaal
over the past decade, caricom has been paying increased attention to the need to 
intensify its interaction with non-state actors. this chapter argues that, thus far, this 
has not led to a strong institutional framework to ensure the participation of these 
actors. the reasons for this include a lack of funds and capacity, both on the part 
of the state as well as the non-state actors, a lack of political will, a lack of public 
understanding of the nature of caricom, and caricom’s emphasis on sovereignty. 
this line of argumentation is illustrated by the case of Barbados, which is not only a 
prominent member of caricom, but is also host to a high number of active non-state 
organizations.
Conceptual Considerations
in chapter 2 of this volume, three related aspects (input, control and output) of 
legitimacy were highlighted, which need to be addressed in order for a regional 
integration organization (rio) to gain legitimacy. the legitimacy of a rio depends 
on ‘the extent to which it contributes to the realization of the common good’ (tholen 
see p. 000). this chapter investigates the case of caricom, a regional organization in 
the caribbean which currently includes 15 member states and 5 associate members.2 
the question posed is: during the past ten years, have non-state actors contributed to 
the legitimacy of caricom? answering this question should provide insight into the 
conditions under which non-state actors can contribute to the legitimacy of rios and 
thereby, amongst others, contribute to the development of well-informed policies, 
(tholen, see page 28 of  this volume).
the concept of non-state actors covers various categories of organizations. for 
the purposes of this chapter, the term non-state actors refers to national and regional 
civil society organizations whose purpose is public in nature, and to private purpose 
1  The fieldwork conducted for this article took place in May 2006 and was financially 
supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the University 
of groningen.
2  the members of caricom are antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
dominica, grenada, guyana, haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, st. Kitts and nevis, saint lucia, 
st. vincent and the grenadines, suriname, trinidad and tobago. the associate members are 
anguilla, Bermuda, British virgin islands, cayman islands, turks and caicos islands.
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groups such as employers’ organizations and business organizations, being interest 
groups with a mix of public and private purposes (Arts 2003/4, 5–7).3
in this chapter, i will not only investigate the contribution of non-state actors to 
input and control legitimacy, but will also address the conditions which have impeded 
or facilitated such contributions.4 input legitimacy concerns the extent to which 
they participate in agenda setting and decision making in rios. control legitimacy 
concerns the question of to what extent the arrangements provide checks and 
balances, for example through creating parliaments (see tholen, chapter 2). scholte 
emphasizes the legitimacy-enhancing role of non-state actors5 in (1) developing 
public education activities; (2) giving the opportunity to stakeholders to represent 
their interests by providing information to public agencies; (3) stimulating the 
formation of an informed public opinion on (regional) governance; (4) increasing the 
transparency of (regional) decision-making; and (5) increasing public accountability 
of the organizations involved (Scholte 2001, 16-19). Fulfilling the first three roles 
contributes to input legitimacy, the others to control legitimacy. 
Categorizing conditions
the conditions under which non-state actors are able to play such roles and which 
influence their impact on the legitimacy of a RIO may be divided into three categories: 
the characteristics of the political process, of the selection process and of the non-
state actors themselves (huberts 1988).6
The first category concerns the characteristics of the political process and refers 
to the institutional environment in which non-state actors operate and select their 
strategies (huberts 1988, 75-7). this environment will enable them to assume (or 
prevent them from assuming) a certain role (streeck 1992, 105). it concerns the 
question of whether and how non-state actors gain access to a rio. they may access 
rios through national representatives (indirect) or directly at the regional level. 
particularly in less-developed parts of the world such as the caribbean region, 
non-state actors may not deal directly with rios, owing to the high costs involved. 
instead, non-state actors provide input to rios through national routes, in which 
national representatives consult non-state actors at the national level and act as a 
relay between the sub-national and the regional level. the strategies non-state actors 
3  When I use the term non-governmental organization (NGO), I refer to non-profit 
groups with public goals. trade unions will also be included in this group. when i refer to 
private sector groups, i refer to private interest groups such as business organizations (see also 
arts 2003/4, 5-7).
4  occasionally i refer to matters concerning output legitimacy (realization of outcomes, 
see tholen, p. 23 of this volume), for example concerning the functioning of the caribbean 
parliament. however, output legitimacy is not the main focus of this chapter.
5  scholte actually uses the broader term civil society, but for consistency reasons i will 
refer to non-state actors.
6  Huberts makes use of four categories to explain influence of protest and pressure 
groups: characteristics of the protest/pressure group, of the collective action, of the political 
process and of the context (Huberts 1988, 69–79). His categorization has been adapted to 
serve the purpose of this study.
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choose will depend on the opportunities and constraints of the political process. a 
number of strategies can be distinguished (arts 2003/4). lobbying and protesting, 
both efforts to influence decision-making without being granted formal access to 
the decision-making process, are informal strategies. the latter is mainly about 
publicity, while the former tends to take place behind closed doors. formal strategies 
concern advocacy and participation in decision-making, enabling non-state actors 
to promote their ideas. Monitoring can take place in formal and informal settings, 
and aims at keeping a close watch on whether promises are kept (arts 2003/4, 18). 
different strategies have different consequences on the contribution that non-state 
actors are likely to make to the legitimacy of regional policy making. formal access 
for non-state actors is a precondition for an increase in input legitimacy. in addition, 
it is assumed that direct access for non-state actors will increase the transparency 
of a RIO, providing that the material conditions – such as available funding – are 
fulfilled in order for full use to be made of this access. 
the second category concerns the characteristics of the selection process. if non-
state actors are granted access, either through the national level or directly at the 
regional level, the question is how non-state actors are selected and accredited. in 
other words, on what grounds is it decided which non-state actors are granted formal 
or informal access, and who do these non-state actors represent?
the third category refers to the characteristics of the non-state actors, which 
concern both the nature of the non-state actors involved and the resources at their 
disposal. it deals with the question of whether non-state actors can contribute to 
legitimacy in only a limited way because of a lack of resources. resources relevant in 
this context are finances, stakeholders, information, expertise, and contacts (Huberts 
1988, 71-2). these determine whether a non-state actor will be able to collect new 
and broadly-supported information and inform the public and policy makers. the 
above conceptual considerations are summarized by figure 8.1, which will guide 
our analysis of caricom.
Integration and the Participation of Non-state Actors in the Caribbean
since its establishment in 1973, caricom has matured into a regional organization with 
activities in three main areas: stimulating functional cooperation in the field of human 
and social development and in areas such as air transport and disaster cooperation, 
increasing economic integration in the caribbean, and coordinating the foreign policy 
of the member states (caricom 2006; Bravo 2005, fn 23). a decade ago, the integration 
process received new impetus from the decision of the caricom member states to begin 
negotiations on the caribbean single Market and economy (csMe). 
like many countries in the world, caribbean countries see regional integration 
as a way to shield themselves against global market forces and at the same time take 
advantage of the expanding world economy. While during the first years the CSME’s 
focus was limited to the establishment of a common external tariff, common rules 
of origin and a regional stock exchange, during the 1990s the removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers on the movements of goods and the free movement of limited 
categories of skilled people was added to the list of tasks. to these basically single 
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market aspects were added single economy aspects such as the coordination of 
policies in the field of for instance macroeconomics. The single economy is to be 
implemented by 2008 (Girvan 2005). The ratification of this single market section of 
the csMe, the csM, took place in January 2006.7
in order to facilitate cooperation within the caricom, several organs and institutions 
have been created.8 first of all, caricom has established a cabinet-like system in the 
form of a conference of heads of government, in which each head is responsible 
for a specific portfolio. The Conference is the most important organ and determines 
the policy of the Caricom. It takes decisions by affirmative voting. The Conference 
is assisted by the community council of Ministers, in which the member countries 
are represented by their Minister responsible for community affairs. the council 
votes by qualified majority, and in the case of critical decision making it falls back 
on unanimous voting. in addition, several community councils were established 
during the 1990s; among these are the council or trade and economic development 
(coted) and the council for human and social development (cohsod), which 
both consist of ministers of the member states which hold the relevant portfolio plus 
additional national representatives. these organs are all supported by the secretariat 
7  the Bahamas, Montserrat and haiti are not currently participating in the csMe 
(girvan 2005, 6).
8  in 1997 the structure of the caricom and the voting system were adapted through the 
first Protocol of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (Caricom 2006).
Figure 8.1  Determinants and Results of the Roles of Non-state Actors
Source: ‘conditions’ inspired by huberts (1988), ‘roles’ based on scholte (2001), ‘results’ 
based on tholen (chapter 2 of this volume).
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of the community, which is located in guyana (caricom 2004, 9-19; caricom 2006; 
Bravo 2005, 176–81). 
in addition, there are a number of bodies, institutions and associate institutions. 
one of these institutions is the assembly of caribbean community parliamentarians 
(accp). the accp, created in 1994, was established to increase public involvement 
in the caricom. however, its powers are limited to functioning as a consultative 
institution consisting of a small number of parliamentarians originating from 
the parliaments of member states and associate member states. there is no right 
to consultation, the accp has no right to initiate proposals with respect to the 
implementation of integration, and is not required to give its approval to decisions 
being made by the organs (IDB 2005, 42; Bravo 2005, 197–8). Due to its specific 
nature and limitations, coupled with other matters such as financial constraints, 
the ACCP functions poorly. Specific proposals to rectify this have, thus far, been 
unsuccessful (IDB 2005, 42–3). Consequently, the ACCP hardly contributes to 
caricom’s legitimacy, which in turn makes the need to increase legitimacy in other 
ways more urgent. 
as argued in the previous section, involvement in regional decision-making can 
take place following an indirect track (through national decision-making processes) 
or through direct involvement at a regional level. these two ‘tracks’ will be discussed 
below, using Barbados to illustrate the national level.
Barbados: non-state actors and the national track
Barbados was one of the first and most active members of Caricom, and at the same 
time is home to a high number of non-state organizations. according to the 2005 
index of the Barbados association of non-governmental organisations (Bango), 
there are 845 organizations active on the island in a wide variety of sectors, including 
sports clubs, health care and religious organizations (Bango 2006). Most of these 
organizations are charitable, and as such not regulated, expect for tax purposes 
(interview csMe focal point government of Barbados 2006). 
the traditional social partners (labour and employers’ organizations) are 
consulted on a regular basis to inform policy-making. while this social partnership 
in Barbados goes back a long way, over the past 15 years in particular Barbados has 
developed a formal system of social dialogue between government, employers’ and 
workers’ organizations. this system, established during the economic crisis of the 
early 1990s, is considered successful in many respects (Fashoyin 2001, 19–20). There 
is, according to an ilo study, ‘… hardly any doubt that the tripartite agreements 
have contributed not only to the reversal of economic decline, but also to the path of 
sustained growth for eight consecutive years’ (fashoyin 2001, 58). this experience, 
however, is by no means representative for the Caribbean. Even though five Caricom 
member states have created formal advisory committees that include business and 
labour representatives (idB 2005, 43), it has been argued that ‘… most governments 
and social partners in the caribbean have yet to fully utilize the potential of social 
dialogue for sustainable growth and development’ (fashoyin 2001, 51). this means 
that any observations about the contribution of the social partners in Barbados to 
caricom decision making should be regarded as ‘best practise’ in the region. 
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trade unions are relatively well-organized in Barbados. the around 25 trade 
unions registered, plus a further 10 staff associations unregistered in Barbados, are 
organized under the umbrella of the congress of trade Unions and staff associations 
of Barbados (ctUsaB), in which Barbados workers’ Unions (BwU) forms the 
largest one. it is estimated that union density is around 52 per cent (fashoyin 
2001, 8–9). The Barbados Employer’s Federation (BEC) organizes more than 200 
companies in a wide range of areas such as tourism, agriculture and finances (BEC 
2004). according to statistics provided by Bec, these companies employ 26,098 
employees. this equals around 20 per cent of the labour force (Ministry of labour 
and social security 2005). Just as the unions formed the ctUsaB to coordinate their 
response, the private sector formed the Barbados private sector agency (Bpsa) in 
1993, which includes, amongst others, the Barbados chamber of commerce and 
Industry (BCoC) and BEC (Fashoyin 2001, 11–12). Given these organizational 
structures, there does not seem to be a representational problem at the national level 
(fashoyin 2001, 17).
the institutional tripartite framework in Barbados currently includes a monthly 
social partnership meeting (the sub-committee of the social partners) and a 
quarterly senior-level meeting, chaired by the prime Minister. here, the government, 
the ctUsaB and the Bpsa meet to discuss a wide range of issues and focus not 
only on resolving existing conflicts, but also preventing potential future conflicts 
(fashoyin 2001, 26). in addition, there is an annual private-public sector forum, in 
which organizations are consulted and informed on specific issues, such as financial 
services and trade (interview Bcoc/pstt 2006; interview Bec 2006). only since 
recently have organizations other than the social partners been able to participate in 
this forum under their own name, instead of under the umbrella of one of the social 
partners (interview Bango 2006).
This institutional set-up is, first and foremost, a framework to address national 
issues and to solve national problems (dunlop, szepesi and van hove 2004, 12). to 
the extent that regional issues such as caricom are discussed, the role of the sub-
committee seems to be limited to creating support for caricom through educational 
activities for workers and discussing the impact of migrant labour on local labour 
markets (sub-committee of the social partners 2005; sub-committee of the social 
partners 2004). also, the 2003 private-public sector meeting concerning the csMe 
illustrates that creating support for the csMe and addressing the possible negative 
consequences of opening up the regional labour market are amongst the most 
important issues. during this meeting leroy trotman, president of the congress 
of trade Unions and staff associations of Barbados (ctUsaB), reminded the 
Barbadian prime Minister of an earlier promise to provide assistance to the trade 
unions movement to help it adjust to the csMe. at the same time, trotman pointed 
out that the labour movement was instrumental in creating support for csMe 
(trotman 2003, 21). that this support was welcome was illustrated through the 
words of the head of the csMe unit of caricom who pointed out during this annual 
meeting that the ngos were expected to ‘provide necessary support’ (field-ridley 
2003, 8).
while it seems that the current institutional social framework is neither a forum 
for heated discussions on Caricom in general or its specific policies, nor instrumental 
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in policy making on matters pertaining caricom, there are also other ways of 
trying to influence national positions on regional and international matters, such as 
through formal ad hoc meetings with ministries and through participation in trade 
delegations (interview Bcoc/pstt 2006; interview Bec 2006; interview csMe 
focal point of the Barbados government 2006).9 however, as far as participation 
in trade delegations is concerned, many only accept the invitation to participate in a 
delegation if this is financially supported, which is seldom the case (Dunlop, Szepesi 
and van hove 2004, 13).
in sum, while an elaborate social dialogue system has been developed in 
Barbados, this is unrepresentative of the caribbean as a whole. Besides that, contrary 
to what might be expected, this system does not seem to play an important role in 
involving non-state actors in caricom policy. Unlike in europe, where developments 
within the european Union have given rise to a heated debate between opponents 
and proponents of further integration, caricom does not seem to evoke a similar 
discussion or critical stance on the part of the non-state actors in the caribbean. 
in addition, it seems likely that to the extent that caricom invites debate, evokes 
differences of opinion or creates a need for information, this is addressed through ad 
hoc meetings with the ministers responsible. 
Caricom: non-state actors and the regional track
since its establishment, public participation in caricom decision making has been 
limited in terms of the frequency of meetings, the consequences of these meetings 
and the variety of non-state actors involved. for over a decade, caricom has 
expressed commitment to strengthening the involvement of non-state actors in 
policy making. this commitment began in the early 1990s, when the west indian 
commission recommended that the caricom stimulate the participation of civil 
society organizations (caricom no date). still, today the formal regional ways in 
which non-state actors are able to express their views on certain subjects are limited 
to the following:
the caribbean congress of labour (ccl), the caribbean policy development 
centre (cpdc, which counts amongst its members numerous ngos from 
different caribbean states) and the caribbean association of industry and 
commerce (caic) are invited to address the annual meetings of the heads 
of state of caricom (interview cec 2006a; interview cpdc 2006; interview 
caricom/csMe 2006; interview caic 2006). 
Meetings are organized on a regular basis between ministers, regional 
employers’, workers’ and business’ organizations and organizations 
representing the ngo community such as cpdc. these often take place within 
the specific councils or task forces. The most ‘open’ council in this respect is 
cohsod (interview cpdc 2006; interview caricom/csMe 2006).10
9  the importance of the ad hoc meetings could not be determined.
10  Before cohsod came into existence in 1997, there was a tripartite system in place. 
the social partners were invited to the meetings of the heads of state and to meetings with 
•
•
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other non-state actors are consulted on an ad hoc basis, as for instance during 
the formation of the caribbean court of Justice or to set priorities in the anti-
hiv/aids programmes (carrington 2002). 
Charter attempts to increase the involvement of non-state actors led to the adoption 
of a charter of civil society in 1997 (caricom 2006; caricom no date). the aims 
of this charter were, amongst others, ‘to create a truly participatory political 
environment within the caribbean community which will be propitious to genuine 
consultation in the process of governance’ (charter 1997). the charter, though 
non-binding, refers to the need to strengthen the fundamental elements of a civil 
society. By accepting this charter, states have agreed to establish effective systems 
of consultations between governments and people on a national level: 
the states undertake to establish within their respective states a framework for genuine 
consultations among the social partners in order to reach common understandings on and 
support for the objectives, contents and implementation of national economic and social 
programmes and their respective roles and responsibilities in good governance (charter 
of civil society for the caribbean community 1997).11
there is, however, no mention that such a process should also take place at the 
level of caricom. the charter does, however, determine that all states are required 
to report periodically to caricom concerning the progress made on the issue areas 
described in the charter. it is stipulated that these reports should be prepared in 
consultation with the social partners. in addition, every state is expected to establish 
a national committee, consisting of state representatives, social partners and ‘such 
other persons of high moral character and recognised competence in their respective 
fields of endeavour’ (Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community 1997). 
this committee should monitor and ensure the implementation of the charter’s 
provisions. it seems, however, that the implementation of the charter thus far leaves 
much to be desired (interview cpdc 2006; interview Bec 2006).12 the fact that 
the charter is non-binding has prompted an initiative at the level of the heads of 
states to transform it into a legally binding human rights charter (interview caricom/
cohsod 2006).
Revised Treaty While in specific terms the Charter is directed towards the members 
and associate members of caricom, it has been an inspiration to consider formalizing 
the involvement of non-state actors in regional policy making. this renewed 
attention to the involvement of non-state actors was illustrated in the revised treaty 
of chaguarames of 2001, the preamble of which notes the desire to restructure ‘… 
the organs and institutions of the caribbean community and common Market and 
redefining their functional relationships so as to enhance the participation of their 
the Ministers of labour (interview cec 2006a; interview caricom/cohsod 2006).
11  note that the terms civil society and social partners are not always clearly 
distinguished.
12  the charter did provide a basis for the member states to exclude haiti from the 
caricom following the 2004 coup (council on hemispheric affairs 2005).
•
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peoples, and in particular the social partners, in the integration movement’ (revised 
treaty 2004, 1). 
article 26 urges consultation systems to be established at the national and 
regional level.13 Moreover, article 52 under 1(f) and article 57 under 2(d) mention 
the necessity of collaborating with social partners in the field of industrial policy and 
agriculture respectively (Revised Treaty 2004, 34–40). In the original Treaty, the social 
partners were not mentioned. while the understanding of the term ‘social partners’ 
can be limited to trade unions and private sector organizations, caricom seems to 
understand this term as including  ‘… the government of a state, associations of 
employers, workers organisations and such non-governmental organisations as the 
state may recognise’ (charter of civil society for the caribbean community 1997). 
in addition, under the new treaty, the cohsod is designated as the focal point for 
civil society specifically (Caricom Press Release 28 February 2003). With respect 
to the csMe, a technical advisory council is in place in which civil society, private 
sector and trade unions participate (IDB 2005, 37). In fact, Caricom specifically 
recognizes ccl, cpdc and caic as ‘key partners’ (caricom 2006). interestingly 
enough, since 1995 the caribbean employers’ confederation (cec) has not been 
invited to speak during the heads of state summits. instead, its position has been 
taken over by the chambers of commerce (interview cec 2006b), which represent 
general commercial interests rather than being an organization dealing specifically 
with labour market and social policies.
Forward Together Conference in 1999, the member states of caricom called 
for a regional meeting of non-state organizations – later to be known as the ‘Forward 
Together’ conference – to involve civil society in the broadest sense, and thereby 
include the private sector and labour in the caricom (caricom press release 1 
october 2001; caricom no date). the initiative for the encounter should not be seen, 
however, as an isolated process. girvan (former secretary general of the acs) goes 
as far as calling the increased involvement of civil society in the greater caribbean 
policy-making processes ‘the quiet revolution’, illustrating this revolution with 
examples such as the involvement of non-state actors within the summit of the 
americas, the acp-eU Joint assembly and within the acs (girvan 2001).14 in 
the case of caricom, this ‘quiet revolution’ is however still in its very early stages, 
often lacks substance, and depends on the willingness of external donors to pay for 
the expenses of the meetings when caricom is unwilling or unable to do so. the 
Forward Together Conference was financed by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (idB), the canadian international development agency (cida) and the 
caribbean development Bank (carrington 2002), for example. 
the conference took place in 2002 in guyana. the main aims were to identify 
strategies for creating developmental funds and to develop new approaches to 
13  according to the idB, article 26 has resulted in the implementation of national 
consultation frameworks (idB 2005, 43).
14  Also, Girvan argues that ‘(o)fficial commitments to involve NGOs in policy making 
often lack specific provisions to give them effect, leading to charges of tokenism’ (girvan 
2001).
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increase cooperation and consultation between non-state actors and the states, 
especially within the context of the csMe (caricom no date). the conference was 
preceded by a series of national consultations in the caricom countries (caricom 
press release 2001). these consultations took place under the auspices of the 
national governments,15 or in some cases national consultations were organized or 
supported by donors such as the interamerican development Bank (idB). 
the results of the conference have been modest. the forward together conference 
led to a joint statement, the liliendaal statement. the liliendaal statement again 
emphasized the importance of the role of civil society in policy development and 
agreed on the need to institutionalize the participation of civil society while at the 
same time improve the participation already existing within caricom councils such as 
coted and cohsod and establish a task force, including regional organizations 
such as ccl and caic and national representatives of civil organizations, to monitor 
the implementation of these recommendations (caricom 2002; interview Bango 
2006).16 
thus far, the result of this task force seems to have been limited to preparing a 
report proposing the follow-up action of non-state actors involvement in caricom. 
This report – which was according to BANGO submitted to COHSOD – concentrates 
on three areas of interest to non-state actors: csMe, human development and 
governance (interview Bango 2006). with respect to the csMe, the task force 
recommendations focussed on improving access to information concerning the 
possible benefits of the CSME especially with respect to the needs of marginalized 
groups. Also, the task force advised taking steps in the field of consumer protection 
and the environment. in the area of human development, hiv-aids elimination 
programmes and youth employment were emphasized (task force report, no 
date).
 
A Caricom Civil Society Council?  Specifically relevant for this study were the 
proposals in the area of governance, which aimed to make the participation of non-
state actors more effective in development at national and regional levels, as this 
would serve as an enabling framework for success in the other fields. The Task Force 
advised to strengthen consultative processes between government and non-state 
actors at the national level. at the regional level, it recommended identifying ways 
to improve communication between non-state actors and the secretariat of caricom 
and, in addition, create a caricom civil society council, which would organize 
both national civil society networks and regional civil society organizations (task 
force report no date). this council would be able to represent the civil society on 
the caricom councils of Ministers meetings and would include a wide range of 
15  for instance, in Barbados, Bango was invited by the government to take the 
responsibility for organizing this effort (report summary of Barbados national consultation 
of civil society, no date).
16  however, caricom did not invite the regional social partners to the conference, which 
led to a non-acceptance of the declaration by cec (interview cec 2006b).
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non-state actors (including all kinds of actors, such as business as well as ngos) 
(interview Bango 2006).17
to date, no such council is in place. even if the idea is realized, the challenge 
will be to create a council which is able to represent all the major interest groups 
in the region and which is effectively involved in policy making. currently, quite 
apart from the lack of a strong framework to participate in caricom, the selection of 
representative organizations to be consulted by caricom creates problems in itself. 
For instance, the CPDC – appointed by Caricom as a key partner – is, according to 
some of the interviewees, not a legitimate representative of civil society interests 
in caricom (interviews Bango 2006; caricom/cohsod 2006; caricom/csMe 
2006; csMe focal point of the Barbados government 2006).18 the cpdc is 
regarded as a research ngo which helps to inform ngos on policy issues, rather 
than as a regional representative. While the CPDC was at times able to fill a gap left 
by the lack of regional ngo representation at caricom level, this was not always 
appreciated by others (interview caricom/cohsod 2006). 
these problems between the cpdc and some of the national ngos stem not 
only from the question of legitimate representation, but also from having to share the 
limited funds donated by international agencies (interview csMe focal point of the 
Barbados government 2006). however, there seems to be no alternative available, 
which illustrates the weakness of ngo organization at the regional level.
Private interests a similar problem concerns the representation of private interests. 
as indicated earlier, caricom recognizes the ccl, cpdc and caic as ‘key partners’ 
(caricom 2006). consequently, since 1995, cec has been excluded from meetings 
with the heads of state in favour of the caic, which does not emphasize employers’ 
interests but commercial interests. effectively, then, a social dialogue structure at the 
level of caricom is absent while caricom’s structures are meant to incorporate the 
interests of social partners (workers and employers) and not of commercial interests 
as such (interview cec 2006a). 
it is clear, then, that while the increased pace of the integration process has been 
accompanied by a declared commitment to involve non-state actors in caricom 
decision making, efforts made thus far have been significantly lacking in substance. 
consequently, caricom policy making remains a top-down process (idB 2005, 13). 
it seems that this has created a situation which may be more advantageous to the more 
powerful and relatively rich non-state actors (those representing business interests), 
leaving the weaker struggling. Yet this does not mean that business is satisfied with 
the way in which their interests are represented in caricom. for instance, they feel 
that the time reserved for the caic to address the heads of state is very limited 
(interview Bcoc & pstt 2006). on the other hand, their interest in other ways 
17  A copy of this report was provided by BANGO. An official copy could not be 
obtained.
18  for this reason, some have proposed a regional ngo forum. representation issues 
were also problematic at the national level. in the case of Barbados, Bango has tried to 
function as an umbrella-organization for the ngo community, but failed (address by r.o. 
King  2005, 2–3).
Closing or Widening the Gap?146
of participating in initiatives, as presented by the civil society conference, is weak 
(interview Bcoc & pstt 2006; interview Bas 2006). this reluctance has led to the 
consideration of alternative ways to communicate with caricom and other regional 
and international bodies. recently, the prime Minister owen arthur of Barbados 
(responsible for csMe within caricom) has put forward proposals to organize 
business separately from other non-state actors in the form of a caribbean Business 
council (cBc). according to his proposal, this council would become an associated 
institution of caricom through the amendment of article 22 of the revised treaty. 
in addition, the cBc would be rewarded with ‘(…) powers and responsibilities as 
a decision-making partner in csMe’ (arthur 2005). the aim of creating the cBc 
is to involve commercial (business) interests in policy making, business interests 
being seen as the key in developing the region (interview caricom/csMe 2006). 
Such a CBC would act as an interface between regional private interests for specific 
sectors and organizations such as the caic and cec and the rest of the world 
(including caricom). funding of the cBc would be provided by external donors 
and membership fees (interview caic 2006). however, the issue of representation 
has again interfered with the enthusiasm of potential members. the cec argues that 
the diverse membership of the cBc creates representation problems, since larger 
firms will tend to dominate (interview CEC 2006b).
Explaining the Limited Impact of Non-state Involvement
there are a number of explanations for this reluctant development towards the 
institutional integration of non-state actors within caricom. these will be discussed 
in this section.
Lack of funds and capacity
All parties involved – Caricom, national governments, regional and national non-state 
actors – are lacking the necessary funds to integrate non-state actors, which makes 
them dependent on funding from outside donors (interview csMe focal point of 
the Barbados government 2006). the idB concludes that caricom is experiencing 
severe financial problems as member states are themselves in financial dire straits. 
payments may therefore lag behind, meaning that the institutions of caricom remain 
heavily dependent on donor money, which in turn endangers the sustainability of 
caricom institutions (idB 2005, 15). for caricom itself, the most pressing current 
problem is the lack of economic competition in the region, not the exclusion of 
non-state actors (interview caricom/csMe 2006). thus, with the limited funds 
available to finance its operations, priority is not likely to be given to improving 
public involvement.
Insufficient funds among non-state actors affect their capacity to develop strong 
and representative regional organizations. to coordinate their policies, organizations 
need the opportunity to meet on a regular interregional basis, but here the financial 
problems are aggravated by the unfavourable geographic circumstances (caricom 
being an integration effort amongst mainly island nations). also, if creating a 
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regional organization means the transfer of donor funding from national to regional 
non-state actors’ organizations, this would probably lead to conflicts between non-
state actors. in addition, while most organizations will be confronted with the same 
kind of limitations to their operations, the support of arthur for a cBc illustrates that 
the private sector has a greater chance of being heard in caricom than the other non-
state actors. this, in turn, will provide no stimulus for private sector organizations to 
put too much effort in cooperation with other non-state actors.
Lack of political will
according to some of the interviewees, the limited impact is the result of a lack 
of political will on the part of most governments, aggravated by the weakness of 
non-state actors domestically (interview BANGO 2006) and by conflicts that Heads 
of state have with certain non-state actors in their country (interview cpdc 2006; 
interview Caricom/CSME 2006). Conflicts between governments and non-state 
actors can be the result of a number of factors, among which are representation/
transparency issues (girvan 2001), the under-regulation of civil society (interview 
csMe focal point of the Barbados government) and, in some cases, the ties between 
political parties and some of the ngos (interview caricom/csMe 2006; interview 
csMe focal point of the Barbados government 2006).19
Emphasis on sovereignty
caricom member states have chosen a strong emphasis on sovereignty,20 which means 
there is no stimulus to share power with other actors (interview csMe focal point 
of the Barbados government 2006). Bravo argues that this emphasis on sovereignty 
is responsible for slow progress within caricom (Bravo 2005, 167) and maintains 
that ‘(…) the minor role provided for caribbean citizens, illustrates the reluctance 
of Member states and their political leaders to relinquish the sovereign powers they 
hold dear to effect the economic integration to which they avowedly aspire’ (Bravo 
2005, 195). the important role of sovereignty is also emphasized by the idB, which 
argues that: 
(n)onetheless, sovereignty remains a fiercely guarded asset among countries in the 
region, perhaps understandably so given their relatively recent independence and status 
as sovereign nations. this insistence on sovereignty has put severe strains on the regional 
integration process and has greatly affected its pace, not least  through its influence on the 
governance and institutional structure of the community (idB 2005, 14).
19  see for a theoretical discussion of the possible problems related to civil society in 
global governance, see Scholte 2001, 19–22.
20  despite the high value caricom Member states allocate to sovereignty, the revised 
treaty has weakened this emphasis. see for discussion of the changes Bravo (2005) and idB 
(2005).
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Lack of public understanding 
while the limited research available has indicated that there is strong support for 
caribbean integration (for example, Barrow-giles found that in Barbados, st. lucia, 
St. Vincent and Antigua, 50 per cent of the population is in favour of intensified 
integration) (anonymous, no date), the idB claims that actual public knowledge 
about caricom is extremely limited. a recent study in Jamaica found that 35 per 
cent of those questioned had ever heard of the csMe, and of this percentage more 
than two-thirds were unable to produce knowledge about its content (idB 2005, 43). 
while efforts have been created to rectify this lack of knowledge, the situation as it 
stands will not put high pressure on the caricom to increase public involvement.
Conclusion
this chapter has presented an explorative overview of the nature of the participation 
of non-state actors in caricom decision making. on basis of this research the 
following preliminary conclusions can be drawn concerning the conditions (see 
figure 8.1) for non-state actors’ participation and the effects on legitimacy. 
the characteristics of the political process do not seem to allow a strong role 
for non-state actors. the political processes within the member states increasingly 
use a system of social dialogue, but this does not mean that the actors involved in 
such systems will necessarily be enabled to play an influential role in policy at the 
national level, let alone at the regional (caricom) level. the case study of Barbados 
shows that within the two forums of social dialogue, matters concerning caricom do 
not play a significant role. Nevertheless, the fact that dialogue is taking place may 
help to foster a relationship between the state and non-state actors, and this may 
constitute a favourable condition for exercizing influence on other matters. 
the weakness of non-state actors at the national level does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that more should be expected from the regional track as an alternative 
means of influencing Caricom policy. As this chapter has shown, the regional track 
is also limited to occasional meetings and declarations of good intentions, many of 
which have yet to be implemented. this means that the political process remains 
weak when it comes to enabling non-state actors, especially NGOs, to gain influence. 
however, more research in specialized areas of caricom policy is needed if we are 
to understand the impact of the current forms of consultation taking place within 
caricom.
the selection of non-state actors at both the national and caricom level is also 
problematic. in the case of Barbados, Bango has made unsuccessful attempts to 
function as an umbrella-organization for the ngo community, while at the regional 
level the ngo community will also be very hard to organize under one single 
umbrella, even though caricom has appointed the cpdc as a key partner. replacing 
employers’ interests with business interests has not been received well either. it 
seems that in the near future, non-state actors representing business interests will be 
granted a more important role in caricom than other non-state actors. for that reason 
they seem to be less willing to participate in a broad non-state actors forum, since 
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this would limit their ability to express their distinctive interests. thus, as the case 
of Barbados illustrates, it is highly likely that the non-state actors originating from 
the ngos-circles will participate much more actively in the national consultation 
processes and the process leading to a civil society council than, for example, 
chambers of commerce. 
the characteristics of the non-state actors themselves need to be studied in 
greater detail, but this research suggests that the pressure on resources, and the 
subsequent competition for resources, make it very difficult to reach a consensus 
amongst groups of non-state actors or contribute to the development of expertise. 
the case of Barbados also illustrates a problem that most small societies have, that 
is the connections between non-state actors and political parties. this negatively 
affects the legitimacy of the organizations involved, and consequently often affects 
the extent to which they can contribute to the legitimacy of a rio.
thus, while the attention given within caricom to the role of non-state actors 
has strengthened their political role at the national and regional levels, a formal 
framework which provides direct and meaningful access to caricom’s political 
process remains absent. It seems, therefore, not too far-fetched to define the impact 
of non-state actors on the input and control legitimacy of caricom policy making 
as limited. this is unfortunate, in view of the potential impact of the csMe on the 
region’s economy in the near future. 
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part 5
rios and the Member states:
legitimacy and democracy

chapter 9
contrasting cases: explaining 
interventions by sadc and asean
anna van der vleuten
regional integration organizations (rios) sometimes intervene to preserve and 
promote democracy in their member states: Mercosur intervened in paraguay 
(see ribeiro hoffmann, chapter 10), eU member states agreed sanctions against 
austria, caricom intervened in haiti and ecowas intervened in sierra leone to 
restore an overthrown democratic government. nonetheless, rios also sometimes 
accept member states’ violations of democratic principles. the southern african 
Development Community (SADC) has intervened in Lesotho, but not in Zimbabwe. 
asean intervenes in Myanmar,1 but not in thailand. this chapter explores the 
conditions under which a rio is willing to intervene if democratic principles are 
threatened in its member states, as an aspect contributing to the output legitimacy 
of a rio.
RIOs, Interventions and Democracy
For our purposes, an intervention is defined as the interference in the domestic affairs 
of a member state with the aim of preserving democracy – for instance, ensuring 
that the outcome of an election is respected or defending a democratically elected 
government against an actual or imminent military coup. such interventions may 
range from verbal condemnation to economic sanctions or military invasion (nye 
2005, 158). there is a large body of literature on interventions, primarily focusing on 
the humanitarian interventions of the United nations (see wheeler 2000). however, 
these Un interventions differ in both aim and scope from the interventions made 
on the part of rios. the aim of the Un interventions is the protection of civilians 
against genocide and large-scale killing, rather than the protection of democracy. in 
terms of scope, meanwhile, Un interventions have an out-of-area character, while 
the interventions by rios studied here take place within the borders of their region. 
for that reason, decision making concerning ‘regional interventions’ may follow a 
different logic to out-of-area interventions, due to the perceived consequences on 
regional and domestic stability. in addition, it is argued that rios play a special role 
in the promotion of democracy. 
1  Myanmar is also called Burma, notably by western states and international non-state 
actors.    
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Jon pevehouse (2005) shows how RIOs influence democratization and 
democratic consolidation: by changing the costs and benefits of democracy to 
important societal groups such as business elites and the military. Membership of a 
rio confers legitimacy to young democratic regimes. rios can be used by domestic 
elites to socialize other elite groups, such as the military, and to teach them how to 
behave in a democratic society. Using sanctions, rios can pressure member states 
to democratize or redemocratize. the observation that rios are able to promote 
democracy begs the question of whether a rio will use this ability. in the following 
section, four potential explanations are elaborated for the behaviour of rios in 
cases where democracy is under threat in a member state. next, the validity of these 
explanations will be explored investigating sadc and asean, two rios which 
have, on occasion, intervened and, on other occasions, refrained from intervention. 
Both lack a democratic clause, unlike the eU and Mercosur (see ribeiro hoffmann, 
chapter 10), but they both claim to be more than a purely economic organization (see 
reinalda, chapter 4). 
one caveat should be added. Just as states do not always intervene for primarily 
humanitarian reasons, the question arises of whether a regional intervention really 
concerns the preservation of democracy per se, or rather the preservation of the 
status quo. interventions may also aim to keep a government in power, even if the 
democratic credentials of that government are unconvincing. söderbaum has termed 
the actions of political leaders who behave ‘as promoters of the goals and values 
of regionalism which enables them to raise the profile and image of their often 
authoritarian regimes’ as regime-boosting (söderbaum 2004, 96). this chapter will 
show that political leaders not only ‘boost’ their own regime but also the domestic 
regimes of fellow member states. a rio is used ‘as an image-boosting arena whereby 
the leaders show support for each other, regardless of the character of their regimes’ 
(söderbaum 2004, 98). the label ‘promotion of status quo legitimized by referring 
to democracy’ may well cover some interventions better than the label ‘promotion 
of democracy’. 
Explaining Interventions
one potential explanation of rio behaviour is rooted in social-constructivist 
thinking. according to Margaret Keck and Kathryn sikkink (1998), identities, 
norms and interests are mutually constitutive. if a rio has internalized democratic 
values and acquired a democratic identity, non-intervention in case of violation 
of democratic principles by one of its member states will no longer constitute an 
appropriate course of action. Keck and sikkink argue that in the realm of human 
rights violations, the vulnerability of the target country not only varies according to its 
material capabilities. Even significant material pressure will be ineffective as long as 
leaders are unconcerned with the normative message. ‘pressures are eventually most 
effective against states that have internalized the norms of the human rights regime 
and resist being characterized as pariahs. […] certain aspects of national identity or 
discourse may make some states vulnerable to pressures’ (Keck and sikkink 1998, 
118–9). If we take this argument to the regional level, this may explain both the 
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differences between rios, as well as changes in the behaviour of rios over the 
years. a rio which has internalized norms of democracy and legitimate governance 
will feel compelled to act if these values are violated by one of its member states. 
a democratic identity, which is produced by and reproduced in the interactions 
of its member states, presupposes a rather homogeneous membership of democratic 
states. If member states perceive each other as democracies, they will define the 
rio as a ‘club’ where democracy is one of the constitutive norms to be respected 
and reproduced. the probability that a rio will intervene to promote or preserve 
democracy will therefore be higher when democratic values are perceived as part of 
its identity and when its member states are themselves more democratic. if democratic 
identity is weak, a rio will be more reluctant to intervene as its member states will 
fear that this creates a precedent and may highlight their own weaknesses in this 
respect. in order to explore the value of this argument, i will assess the strength of 
the regional democratic identity based on the founding documents of the rio and on 
the member states’ democracy ratings.2
a second argument focuses on the role of domestic and transnational pressure. 
a rio may offer non-state actors new points of access to the political process. as 
societal groups gain political access and resources, they are able to put pressure on 
their own government as well as on other governments (Keck and sikkink 1998). a 
rio would then offer the option of simultaneous action ‘from above’ (transnationally) 
and ‘from below’ (subnationally), putting a government ‘in pincers’ (van der 
Vleuten 2005). The effectiveness of their action is also influenced by the identity 
of the rio, because ‘the more homogeneously democratic a regional organization’s 
membership…, the more likely the regional io will be used by domestic groups 
to encourage and cement democracy’ (Pevehouse 2005, 3–4). If non-state actors 
mobilize nationally and transnationally in favour of democracy and the rio does 
not act, its credibility as ‘safeguard for democracy’ will be damaged in the eyes of 
member-state citizens. Non-intervention will confirm the idea that a RIO is an elite 
project which does not serve the interests of society. i will investigate the access of 
non-state actors to regional policy making and the link with (non-)intervention.
a third argument is rooted in realist thinking about the role of power. rios are 
sometimes considered to be the servants of the interests of major powers. here, we 
should distinguish between the interests of regional major powers – the hegemon 
within the RIO – and the interests of ‘external’ major powers (see next section). A 
rio is expected to intervene in a member state if it is in the interest of the regional 
hegemon to do so. the interest of the regional hegemon has several dimensions: 
a geopolitical dimension, aimed at preserving or strengthening its relative power 
position; a material dimension, aimed at controlling wealth and resources; and an 
immaterial dimension, aimed at safeguarding its prestige. following this argument, 
a rio primarily legitimizes an intervention in the interest of the regional hegemon 
(pevehouse 2005, 132). to test this proposition, i will try to establish which state is 
the major regional power in the examples studied, and what its interests are.
2  democracy ratings are based on freedom house and polity iv data. i am aware of 
the limitations and possible bias of these ratings, but they enable a simple comparison across 
time, between countries and even between rios.
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the distribution of power and ideas in the wider international system offers a 
fourth potential explanation for rio interventions. an ‘external’ major power or 
another rio may exert pressure on a rio to undertake action in order to stop the 
violation of democratic values in one of its member states. the effectiveness of 
this pressure will depend on the material capability of the external actor to threaten 
the rio with credible sanctions. however, i contend that this also depends on the 
match between the identity of the rio ‘in the dock’ and the identity of the external 
‘other’. a rio with a regional identity which differs from the identity of the ‘other’ 
will be less sensitive to external pressure than a rio which shares the same identity. 
the former will consider such pressure as illegitimate interference with ‘domestic’ 
regional affairs and will be able to legitimize its non-intervention by referring to 
its own identity, as opposed to the other’s identity. i will thus seek to establish the 
nature of this regional identity and its compatibility with external actors’ identities.
in the following sections, guided by these propositions i will analyse interventions 
and non-interventions by sadc and asean. 
Exploring Interventions and Non-interventions by the SADC
the history of the southern african development community (sadc) is rooted in 
the democratization processes of the region. its predecessors, the frontline states 
and the southern african development coordination conference (sadcc) were 
created to resist apartheid south africa, to coordinate development aid and foster 
economic integration (Bauer and taylor 2005). in 1992, sadcc was renamed and 
reorganized as sadc. it welcomed south africa as member state in 1994. since 
1997, the organization has had 14 member states.3 it has so far intervened only once 
to safeguard democracy in one of its member states.4 this happened in september 
1998, in lesotho (operation Boleas). 
in May 1998, the lesotho congress of democrats (lcd) party, under the 
leadership of prime Minister pakalitha Mosisili, had won all but one seat in the 
parliamentary elections. observers from domestic and international organizations 
(including sadc) agreed that the elections had been conducted in a manner ‘which 
should be considered acceptable according to international standards’ (southall and 
Fox 1999, 678). The LCD owed its massive victory to the structure of the first-
past-the-post electoral system, not to fraud (polity iv 2004). the opposition parties, 
however, rejected the results, engaging in violent street protests and turning to the 
army for support.
fear of a military coup prompted sadc to act. the sadc summit of heads of 
state or government appointed a commission headed by Judge pius langa of south 
africa to investigate the conduct of the elections. the langa report argued that the 
3  Member states: angola, Botswana, democratic republic of congo (since 1997), 
lesotho, Madagascar (since 2005), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, namibia, south africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The Seychelles left in 2003 for financial reasons.
4  the sadc intervention in the congo war in 1998 was aimed at peace enforcement, 
not at promoting or preserving democracy (president laurent Kabila came to power through 
victory in a civil war, the drc had no constitution and democratic debate was non-existent).
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electoral process showed irregularities but that: ‘we cannot however postulate that 
the result does not reflect the will of the Lesotho electorate’ (cited by Southall and 
fox 1999, 681). Meanwhile tensions in the military had mounted and the lesotho 
government had lost control of the domestic situation. Mosisili appealed to the sadc 
for military intervention. On 22 September, a SADC force – made up of troops from 
South Africa and Botswana – entered Lesotho to prevent an ‘unconstitutional change 
of government’ and restore the democratic process (de coning 1998, 8). a disastrous 
start, leading to many casualties in the first two days and widespread rioting and 
looting, provoked widespread criticism of this ‘invasion’ (de coning 1998). Yet, 
in the end, the intervention had a positive outcome since the sadc troops, later 
joined by Zimbabwe, succeeded in securing military restructuring in Lesotho and 
in promoting inter-party negotiations that led to the adoption of a more appropriate 
electoral system (southall 2003). the troops left lesotho in 2000, and elections held 
in 2002 and 2007 were considered free and fair by all observers.
the success that the sadc enjoyed in promoting democracy in lesotho contrasts 
sharply with its reluctance to intervene in Zimbabwe. Since its independence in 1980 
Zimbabwe has been a democracy in the sense that parliamentary and presidential 
elections are held regularly. however, the increasingly authoritarian and violent 
behaviour of the regime led by President Robert Mugabe has turned Zimbabwe into 
an international pariah (Bauer and taylor 2005, 171). the 2002 presidential elections 
were heavily criticized by the sadc parliamentary forum and international election 
monitors alike. the 2005 parliamentary elections were considered ‘one of the most 
cynical frauds perpetrated on the international community in electoral history’ 
(afrol News 2005), but the sadc endorsed the elections as free and fair. in March 
2007, the Zimbabwean police killed an opposition supporter and severely battered 
the leader of the Movement for democratic change, Morgan tsvangirai, and other 
members of the opposition. individual sadc leaders, such as the president of 
Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, have started to express their discomfort with the political 
situation in Zimbabwe (IRIN News 2007), but the SADC has decided against an 
explicit condemnation of the Mugabe government. they prefer ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
and mediation by South African president Thabo Mbeki between the Zimbabwean 
government and opposition. in the remainder of this section, we investigate possible 
explanations for sadc decisions concerning (non-)intervention.
Democratic Identity
the promotion and consolidation of democracy is stated as an explicit goal of  sadc. 
one of its objectives is to ‘promote common political values, systems and other shared 
values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate 
and effective’ (art. 5). the protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation 
(2001) includes the objective to ‘promote the development of democratic institutions 
and practices within the territories of state parties and encourage the observance of 
universal human rights’ (protocol, art. 2) and entitles intervention by sadc in case 
of ‘a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a state’ (protocol, 
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art. 11).5 in 2004, the sadc approved the Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections and a Code of Conduct for Election Observers. Missions were 
deployed to elections in Botswana, lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, namibia, 
and Zimbabwe, which were all considered to be a ‘testimony of the consolidation 
of democracy in the region’ (sadc homepage). furthermore, the sadc has 
included gender equality in its vision of democracy. it has set targets for achieving 
equal representation of women in its member states’ parliaments (50 percent) and 
governments (30 percent). although targets and deadlines have only been met by a 
small minority of member states, progress is being made in the region in this regard 
(nduru 2007). the preservation and promotion of democracy is presented clearly 
as an important objective of the sadc and of the wider african Union of which 
5  The Protocol was tabled for signature on 14 August 2001; it has been ratified by nine 
member states (including South Africa and Zimbabwe) and has entered into force on 2 March 
2004 (sadc website).
Table 9.1 SADC Member States and Democracy
Member states freedom house status, 1995* freedom house status, 2006*
south africa 1–2 1–2, Free
Mauritius 1–2 1–1, Free
Botswana 2–2 2–2, Free
namibia 2–3 2–2, Free
Malawi 2–3 4–4, Partially Free
Madagascar 2–4 3–3, Partially Free
Mozambique 3–4 3–4, Partially Free 
Zambia 3–4 4–4, Partially Free 
Lesotho 4–4 2–3, Free 
Tanzania 5–5 4–3, Partially Free
Zimbabwe 5–5 7–6, Not Free
swaziland 6–5 7–5, Not Free
angola 6–6 6–5, Not Free
drc (congo) 7–6 6–6, Not Free
SADC Average 3.7 3.5
* rating depends on the assessment of political and civil rights between 1 
(positive) and 7 (negative). first score indicates political rights, second indicates 
civil liberties; source: freedom house.
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all sadc member states are also members. Yet there is no ‘democratic clause’ for 
candidate member states, unlike the eU and Mercosur, and judging by the level of 
democracy of its member states, the sadc is not homogeneously democratic (see 
table 9.1). 
Between 1995 and 2006, major positive changes were recorded for lesotho and 
Tanzania while in Malawi and Zimbabwe, the rating has declined (shown in bold 
in table 9.1). this decline indicates that an intervention to safeguard democracy 
could have been justified.6 the average rating for the sadc improved only 
slightly between 1995 and 2006, so in spite of its verbal support for democracy, 
the democratic identity of the sadc remains relatively weak and does not lead 
to expectations of any increasingly pro-active stance in the case of violations of 
democratic values. Member states fear that a more interventionist line ‘could set an 
uncomfortable precedent and scrutiny of their own systems of government’ (Mills 
2002, 150; nathan 2005, 367).
Double pressure by non-state actors
the sadc is a purely intergovernmental organization. in the region, civil society is 
well developed, including strong women’s movements, churches and human rights 
organizations (Bauer and taylor 2005). at the transnational level, in July 1996 the 
sadc parliamentary forum was launched. this forum is an autonomous institution, 
composed of members from the national parliaments. it sends observers to elections, 
whose conclusions are generally more in line with those of international observers than 
of the official SADC missions, as was the case with the 2005 elections in Zimbabwe. 
the forum has no access to sadc summit meetings and lacks the instruments to 
influence regional decision making. Other transnational organizations, such as the 
sadc regional women’s parliamentary caucus, sadc Youth Movement and the 
southern african people’s solidarity network (sapsn), also promote democracy, 
empowerment and human rights (Mavela 2004; Bauer and taylor 2005, 322). they 
have not managed to establish ties with sadc structures. the sapsn has criticized 
sadc member state governments for ‘using sadc as a self-serving old boys club’ 
(söderbaum 2004, 98). Both the forum and transnational organizations receive 
support from the european parliament and europe-based non-state actors such as 
oxfam. as they have no access to regional-level decision making, they have not 
been able to put effective pressure on the sadc to intervene for the preservation of 
democracy or even disapprove of rigged election results. 
6  Malawi’s rating declined due to serious irregularities at the 2004 presidential elections 
which were deemed ‘free but not fair’ by foreign observers (freedom house 2006) but were 
not criticized by sadc observers (sadc homepage). after one month of rioting, the political 
situation stabilized as the main opposition leader accepted a post in the government (Bauer 
and taylor 2005, 21). 
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The interests of the regional hegemon
from the start, the sadc suffered from the rivalry between south africa and 
Zimbabwe. Until 1992, Zimbabwe was the uncontested leader of the Frontline 
States. When South Africa joined the SADC, Mugabe felt that Zimbabwe had a 
right to a commanding position equivalent to its former leadership of the frontline 
states. other member states, however, preferred south african leadership because of 
Nelson Mandela’s international prestige. As a compromise, Zimbabwe was granted 
the chairmanship of the organ for politics, defence and security, the forum for 
security and defence cooperation, preventive diplomacy and regional peacekeeping 
(neethling 2004). 
in terms of its economic capacity, south africa ranks easily as the regional 
hegemon (hammerstad 2005, 83). its gdp is four times that of the other 13 sadc 
countries combined (Bauer and taylor 2005, 334). south africa had a geopolitical 
interest in intervention in lesotho, a landlocked enclave within south african 
territory: a military coup and political violence in its ‘backyard’ would have 
damaged the political climate in the region and could have invited other coups. the 
same argument, however, applies to neighbouring Zimbabwe where there is a risk of 
instability and insecurity spilling over. south africa had no clear material interests 
in Lesotho, whereas in Zimbabwe it may well fear an economic meltdown. The 
Zimbabwean crisis cost South Africa an estimated US$1.9 billion between 2000 and 
2003 alone; South African public and private firms face huge losses of investments 
in the mining industry, telecom and energy; and millions of refugees from Zimbabwe 
have ended up in south africa (Bauer and taylor 2005, 349; hammerstad 2005, 
74). 
Yet, south africa is reluctant to assume its role of hegemon and take the lead 
in regional intervention. the hegemon is a gulliver (Kwasi tieku 2004), because 
‘given the history of apartheid destabilization, south africa is acutely sensitive 
to being perceived by other african countries as a bully’ (nathan 2005, 365). its 
vanguard role in the intervention in lesotho, for instance, was not appreciated by 
other sadc members (de coning 1998).
Regional identity and external pressure
there has been strong international pressure on the sadc to withdraw its support 
from Mugabe, but this has failed due to clashing identities. the identity of the sadc 
is rooted in anti-colonialism and its anti-apartheid past, as well as in the concept of 
African renaissance, or Ubuntu in Zulu, which was launched by Mandela in 1994 
and is now being championed by current south-african president thabo Mbeki. the 
vision of african renaissance refers to the ‘emergence of the continent from a long 
period of darkness and fear into one of light and a dream fulfilled’ in which ‘through 
our personal efforts we have redefined ourselves … and succeeded to create a new 
world of peace, democracy, development, and prosperity’ (thabo Mbeki, cited in 
nathan 2005, 363). this africanist, anti-colonial identity undermines the legitimacy 
of southern african critics of authoritarian regimes in general, and of Mugabe in 
particular, as they are accused of siding with the former colonial powers. Mbeki’s 
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open condemnation of undemocratic governments in africa in the 1990s angered 
some african leaders, many of whom had supported the anc during the liberation 
struggle; they accused him of ‘pursuing a western project’ and of being ‘little more 
than the west’s lackey on the southern tip of africa’ (landsberg 2000, 107). 
Mugabe has skilfully used international pressure to undermine the credibility 
of Zimbabwean opposition leader Tsvangirai by repeatedly referring to him as 
‘tony Blair’s pet dog’ (NRC 2005, 18 october, p. 4), and claiming that ‘a vote 
for the opposition is a vote for a return to colonial rule’ (australian Broadcasting 
corporation 2005). he has also undermined sadc credibility, branding the human 
rights debate as ‘western’ (irin news 2007) and arguing that african countries’ 
interest in Zimbabwe ‘was more to do with pressure from Western governments’ 
than with their own convictions (afrol News 2006). Zimbabwe considers itself to 
be ‘under assault from western countries (…). this is a moment for sadc to show 
solidarity with Zimbabwe’ (BBC News 2007, 29 March). This solidarity, ‘forged 
in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid’ (nathan 2005, 367), 
is referred to every time the region is criticized by former colonial powers. Many 
SADC leaders still see Mugabe as a hero of the fight against colonial rule. Mugabe 
has succeeded in cornering them: they cannot criticize him without being accused of 
serving ‘colonial’ interests. 
thus, the sadc has condemned international criticisms of Mugabe as an 
‘intervention in african affairs’ (söderbaum 2004, 99) and sadc observers found 
that the parliamentary elections in april 2005 ‘were credible, legitimate, free and 
fair’. in July 2005, tanzania, the then sadc president, cast one of the no-votes 
blocking the adoption by the Un security council of a critical report concerning the 
situation in Zimbabwe (NRC 2005, 28 July, 4). Mbeki has accused western powers 
of using Zimbabwe as a smokescreen in order to avoid facing Africa’s real problems 
(neethling 2004), and the commonwealth of using ‘megaphone diplomacy’ when 
Mugabe was banned from the commonwealth heads of government Meeting in 
nigeria in december 2003 (australian Broadcasting corporation 2003). he has 
stated that the largest single obstacle to free and fair elections in Zimbabwe was ‘the 
intensive international “campaign” to firmly establish the view that these elections 
were irredeemably unfree and unfair’ (afrol News 2005). in March 2007, south 
Africa is reported to have ‘thwarted a British-sponsored motion to put Zimbabwe 
on the UN Security Council agenda’ because Zimbabwe does not ‘pose any threat 
to international peace and security and that its political problems did not, therefore, 
belong to the security council’ (The Herald 2007, 29 March).
Yet, soccer – a factor usually not considered in IR theories – has intervened in 
the situation. South Africa will host the Soccer World Cup in 2010, the first ever on 
african soil. for that reason, Mbeki does not support Mugabe’s plan to postpone 
the Zimbabwean presidential elections, scheduled for 2008, until 2010 to have more 
time in office. Mbeki does not want to see the World Cup disrupted by controversial 
presidential elections in Zimbabwe and concomitant Western sanctions, as he has 
told Mugabe (plaut 2007). african prestige is at stake, and this might contribute to a 
change in the southern african attitude towards Mugabe.
from this exploration, we can conclude that sadc decisions for or against 
intervention cannot be explained by strong regional democratic identity or pressure 
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from non-state actors. the geopolitical interests of south africa as regional hegemon, 
on the other hand, play an important role, while external pressure for intervention 
has been counterproductive due to the anti-colonial identity of the sadc.
Exploring Intervention and Non-intervention by ASEAN
the association of southeast asian nations (asean) was set up in 1967 by 
Malaysia, thailand, indonesia, the philippines and singapore. Brunei joined in 
1984, followed by vietnam in 1995, laos and Myanmar in 1997 and cambodia in 
1999. the fundamental goals of the association are: 
(i) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
… and (ii) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule of law in the relationship among the countries in the region and adherence to the 
principles of the United nations charter (the Bangkok declaration of 8 august 1967, 
asean 2005).
stability is a key word in asean documents and non-intervention is its 
corollary. all member countries except thailand were subjected to colonial rule and 
are very keen on preserving their sovereignty. the treaty of amity and cooperation 
in Southeast Asia (1976) confirms that the member states should be guided in their 
mutual relations by ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of one another’ (asean 
2005). in general, this rule has been strictly respected. Upon closer examination, 
there have been some interventions, but they have all been done ‘the asean 
way’ – through quiet, discreet bilateral diplomacy rather than multilateral action. 
since the 1970s, for instance, indonesia and Malaysia have facilitated negotiations 
between Muslim rebels and the philippine government. in 1987, asean supported 
philippines’ president corazon aquino when her regime was under pressure from 
these rebel groups (Beng 2003a). Most explicitly, Myanmar has been the target of 
asean interference. in 2003, asean foreign ministers openly departed from the 
non-intervention principle for the first time, because the military junta in Myanmar 
had detained democracy activist aung san suu Kyi. at their meeting in phnom penh 
on 16–17 June, the ministers issued a joint statement saying that they ‘discussed the 
recent political developments in Myanmar, particularly the incident of 30 May’, 
and ‘looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on daw aung san 
suu Kyi’ (asean 2003). at the 9th asean summit in october 2003, asean 
endorsed a seven-step roadmap to democracy in Myanmar, thus making Myanmar’s 
democratization a regional concern (areethamsirikul 2007, 13). in november 
2004, Myanmar released 400 political activists and dissidents, a move interpreted 
as an attempt ‘to win good publicity ahead of the asean summit’ and to create 
‘some room to argue at asean that the junta remains genuinely committed to 
democratic reform’ (cheng 2004). some months later, in July 2005 at the asean 
summit in vientiane (laos), Myanmar announced that it was renouncing its turn at 
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chairmanship.7 it explained that the government was too busy building democracy 
and it ‘wanted to focus on its ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation 
process’ (BBc news 2005). in March 2006, asean sent a special envoy, the 
Malaysian foreign Minister syed hamid albar, to Yangon to monitor progress of 
the roadmap to democracy. the visit was a failure: syed hamid was denied entry to 
pyinmana, the new capital, and was unable to meet either general than shwe, the 
head of state, or aung san suu Kyi. asean is increasingly frustrated with the lack 
of progress in Myanmar, and has implicitly threatened that Myanmar membership 
could be suspended if there is no improvement (Areethamsirikul 2007, 14–15).   
these interventions contrast with the silence of asean vis-à-vis the september 
2006 military coup in thailand which ousted prime Minister thaksin sinhawatra. 
western countries emphasized that they were very concerned, whereas the asean 
members ‘gave encouraging words, light words of disappointment, or “no comment”’ 
(Areethamsirikul 2007, 19–20). How can we account for ASEAN’s intervention in 
Myanmar and non-intervention in thailand? 
7  asean has a yearly alphabetically rotating chairmanship, which in July 2006 was to 
go to Myanmar.
Table 9.2  ASEAN Member States and Democracy
Member states freedom house status, 1995* freedom house status, 2006*
philippines 2–4 3–3, Partially Free
thailand 3–4 3–3, Partially Free
Malaysia 4–5 4–4, Partially Free
singapore 5–5 5–4, Partially Free
cambodia 6–6 6–5, Not Free
Brunei 7–5 6–5, Not Free 
laos 7–6 7–6, Not Free
indonesia 7–6 2–3, Free 
vietnam 7–7 7–5, Not Free
Myanmar 7–7 7–7, Not Free
ASEAN average 5.5 4.75
* Rating depending on the assessment of political rights (1–7) and civil liberties 
(1–7); first score indicates political rights, second indicates civil liberties; source: 
freedom house.
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Democratic Identity 
asean political and security cooperation aims at ensuring that ‘countries in the 
region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic 
and harmonious environment’ (asean 2005). at the summit in 1997, the heads of 
state and government envisioned ‘our nations being governed with the consent and 
greater participation of the people’ (asean 1997), but most member states have a 
poor record with regard to democracy. on average, the situation improved slightly 
between 1995 and 2006, though only indonesia made a complete and successful 
transition from ‘not free’ to ‘free’ (see table 9.2).
Among the ten member states, we find only three countries that respect political 
rights relatively well – Thailand (until September 2006), the Philippines, and 
indonesia. Malaysia and singapore have improved but still show shortcomings, 
whereas the remaining five countries have a very bad rating. Colonialism has 
left almost all southeast-asian countries with powerful state apparatuses, state 
intervention in the market and strong social and political control (case 2004, 77). 
only since the end of the 1990s has a concern for democracy been evident among 
the newly democratizing countries (the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and – until 
recently – Thailand) which want to emphasize democratization and a greater respect 
for human rights (stubbs 2004, 226). Yet, the weakness of domestic democracy in 
all member states helps to explain why any intervention is done ‘the asean way’. 
the indo-chinese countries in particular fear being subjected to similar pressure if 
they accept interference in the domestic affairs of Myanmar. 
Double pressure from non-state actors 
in 2000, the asean peoples’ assembly (apa) was established, a transnational civil 
society organization, and initiatives have been taken to allow for greater civil society 
participation in ASEAN (Caballero-Anthony 2005, 232–47). APA has been drawing 
up a human rights and democracy scorecard to assess the state of democracy in 
southeast asia. there is no ‘pincer mechanism’ in asean, however, as asean 
has no parliamentary assembly and its institutional structure offers no formal 
access to non-state actors. fifty-eight non-state actors are accredited by asean 
(asean homepage); however, these are predominantly business associations and 
representatives of professional groups and sports associations which do not promote 
democracy. non-state actors which criticize regimes for violations of democratic 
values are not admitted to asean structures and are predominantly based in the Us. 
the asean inter-parliamentary Myanmar caucus, uniting members of parliament 
from several asean and neighbouring countries and from china and europe, 
tries to put issues of good governance on the agenda. they have urged asean 
governments to put more pressure on Myanmar (BBc news 2005). 
experts play a prominent role in asean through a process known as track-two 
diplomacy. These are unofficial meetings of think tanks, academics, members of 
the ‘unofficial’ policy community and government officials acting in their private 
capacities. asean-isis (institutes of strategic international studies in nine member 
states), which has been registered with the asean secretariat since 1988, is the 
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most important academic network. it has published policy papers, for instance on 
the establishment of human rights mechanisms, and it participates in ‘closed door’ 
dialogues with Burmese exiles, experts and officials from Myanmar and ASEAN 
government representatives (Caballero-Anthony 2005, 157–72).
The interests of the regional hegemon
indonesia is considered the regional hegemon, based on its relative size (in terms 
of both population and gdp) and on its role as a ‘proud member of international 
society’ and leader of the non-aligned world (haacke 2003, 66). its geopolitical 
interest is, broadly formulated, to find regional solutions to regional problems 
without interference from major powers such as Us, Japan or china. its attitude 
towards Myanmar has changed considerably, from supporting its membership 
in the 1990s to insisting on progress being made on democratization after 1998. 
domestic change accounts for this change in attitude. Until 1998, suharto supported 
Myanmar’s membership, in spite of widespread criticism of the military junta, 
because he was afraid that otherwise China would extend its sphere of its influence. 
after his departure, indonesia went through a political transformation, and now 
plays the role of the moral leader, supporting democratization, proposing an asean 
human rights commission and stating that ‘no country can claim that gross human 
rights violations are its own internal affairs’ (areethamsirikul 2007, 14). at the same 
time, however, it is not in indonesia’s interest to criticize thailand, the second major 
power in asean and with its central position on the indo-chinese continent. after 
the coup in thailand, indonesia simply expressed its hope that ‘thailand would 
resolve the crisis and return to the principles of democracy’ (areethamsirikul 2007, 
20).        
Regional identity and external pressure
the eU and the Us have put considerable pressure on asean to take action against 
the government of Myanmar. this pressure seems to have been effective. the timing 
of the two asean interventions in 2003 and 2005 is telling in this respect. in 2003, 
the asean regional forum, including the Us, was due to meet after the asean 
summit and an asia-europe meeting was to take place in Bali. american secretary 
of state, colin powell, urged Myanmar to release suu Kyi. some mild criticism of 
Myanmar was felt to be necessary by asean members, so that they would be in a 
better position to meet powell subsequently (The Jakarta Post 2003). when the eU 
insisted on the inclusion of the Myanmar issue on the agenda of the asia-europe 
meeting, asean preferred to deal with the issue on its own initiative (Beng 2003b). 
in 2005, the eU and the Us said ‘that they might boycott meetings with asean if 
the meetings take place under the junta’s chairmanship’ (The International Herald 
Tribune 2005; Morris 2005). the question is then whether asean is sensitive 
to pressure because of a ‘shared identity’ or because of the potential economic 
consequences. 
in its dealings with the Us and the eU, asean accentuates its own, very 
different identity. ‘western style intervention’ is associated with sanctions such as 
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those experienced by vietnam until 1994, and asean does not want to subject its 
members to the same kind of treatment (Beng 2003b):
 
We told them [the US] that Asean does things in a quiet way – that is the meaning of 
constructive engagement. we’ve spoken to Myanmar leaders and we always express to 
them “that we look to you as a friend, member of Asean”… we take the approach of a 
concerned friend rather than the approach of someone who’s ready to condemn them 
(hashim 2005).
The ‘Asean way’ of dealing with difficult issues is characterized by three sets of 
norms: consensus, informality and non-use of force. it refers to a style of decision 
making that focuses on building consensus (Muafakat) through a process of extensive 
consultations (Musyawarah, an old Javanese practice) (Acharya 1998, 211–12; 
Caballero-Anthony 2005, 72–76). If consensus is not reached, the issue is shelved. In 
addition, Southeast Asian diplomacy is based on informal, non-official and bilateral 
relationships; there is an aversion to eU-style institutionalism and multilateralism 
(Bellamy 2004, 170). as the spokesman of the thai foreign Ministry said, ‘it has 
always been asean’s stand that domestic issues were not to be discussed during 
the 10-nation meetings… this is in keeping with asian tradition. we don’t discuss 
domestic matters… such matters are always not on the agenda’ (rajoo 2005b). 
asean not only insists upon doing things differently, it also cherishes its regional 
identity and displays its determination to find ‘Asian solutions to Asian problems’ 
(caballero-anthony 2005, 62). negotiations take place ‘not as between opponents 
but as between friends and brothers’ (acharya 1998, 212). the idea of a ‘family’ is 
often accentuated, as in ‘cambodia wants to be part of the family’ (asean 1998). 
the theme of the november 2004 summit in vientiane was ‘advancing a secure and 
dynamic asean family’ (asean 2004). 
the decision to admit Myanmar as a member, defying the criticism of the Us 
and eU at the time, is testament to the stubborn defence of asian autonomy against 
foreign interference. to avoid looking like a servant of foreign interests and alienating 
Myanmar, asean did not proudly proclaim its victory concerning Myanmar 
renouncing the chair (rajoo 2005b; Beng 2003a). on the contrary, asean foreign 
ministers insisted that it had been Myanmar’s own decision to renounce its turn as 
chair of asean, and that Myanmar would take over the chairmanship once it felt 
ready to do so. Malaysian foreign Minister syed hamid explained that: ‘we are not 
interfering in their affairs but we can give our views as part of the asean process’ 
(Morris 2005; rajoo 2005a). in this way, asean was able to uphold the principle 
of non-interference and the idea of ‘the asean way’ and ‘asean autonomy’, while at 
the same time avoiding the risk of precedence.
for those reasons, ‘intervention’ in Myanmar cannot be explained by a shared 
identity between asean, the Us and the eU. vulnerability to the material 
consequences of international pressure offers a better explanation. asean’s prestige 
as an area of ‘peace, progress and prosperity’ where investments are secure is highly 
important for all its member states as they depend substantially on international trade 
for trade revenue and economic growth. Between 1995 and 2004, about 60 percent 
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of foreign direct investment in asean came from the Us, the eU and Japan, 
20 percent of which was in the form of development assistance (areethamsirikul 
2007, 25–7). ASEAN is, therefore, sensitive to threats by donors to cut development 
assistance and aware of the risk that continuing protection of Myanmar could damage 
asean’s standing among foreign investors. no such international pressure exists 
concerning thailand. 
Conclusion: Regional Interventions, When and Why 
to answer the question of under which conditions a rio intervenes to promote or 
preserve democracy, four propositions were advanced:
its member states are democratic and it perceives democratic values as part 
of its identity; 
non-state actors which promote democracy have access to the regional 
decision-making process; 
intervention serves the interest of the regional hegemon; 
external pressure is strong and the identity of the rio matches the identity of 
the external actor.
 
As regards the first proposition, by calculating the ratings on political rights and 
civil liberties of their respective member states, we found that the sadc performs 
slightly better than asean and that ‘promotion and preservation of democracy’ is 
mentioned more explicitly and more frequently in sadc documents than in asean 
documents. Yet, in neither rio is democratic identity strong or homogeneous. this 
would explain non-intervention; it cannot explain, however, why there have been 
some interventions at all.
concerning the second proposition, the sadc and asean are purely 
intergovernmental organizations, where decisions are taken by consensus in a 
council of Ministers and in summits of heads of state and government. in both 
rios, there has been pressure from non-state actors in favour of democratization of 
the organization which has not met with any success. a sadc parliamentary forum 
has been created, but it has no formal status within the SADC and has no influence 
on the decision making process; in fact, its election observer reports have not even 
been recognized by sadc. asean, meanwhile, has accredited only non-state actors 
without political aims. they have not been offered formal access to decision making. 
academics are able to put forward policy proposals concerning human rights issues, 
though until now they have not met with success. pressure in favour of intervention 
is, therefore, not strong enough to put member state governments ‘in pincers’. 
the third proposition concerns the role of the major powers in these regions: 
south africa and indonesia, respectively. their interests seem to help to explain 
why the sadc intervened in lesotho and asean intervened in Myanmar. it also 
explains why no intervention has so far taken place in thailand, being a major 
regional power itself. still, this explanation is not fully satisfying: why does south 
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Africa not support an intervention in neighbouring Zimbabwe, in view of the fact 
that Mugabe’s policies hurt south african economic interests?    
the fourth proposition takes the international level into account. there is strong 
external pressure on asean concerning Myanmar, but not concerning thailand. in 
spite of its strong regional identity and its accentuation of the ‘asean way’ of dealing 
with problems which differs from western-style interventions, asean has given 
in to pressure concerning Myanmar because of the high costs of non-intervention. 
the asean region’s dependence on foreign capital means that its reputation as a 
stable, well-governed region is a crucial economic asset. non-intervention, which 
would undermine this reputation, therefore became too costly. external pressure on 
the sadc, however, has not resulted in intervention, and in fact any intervention 
which took place against a background of western pressure would be ideologically 
problematic as it would betray african anti-colonialist identity and damage Mbeki’s 
credibility as the architect of the african renaissance.       
to summarize, interventions by rios can be explained by taking into account 
the interests of regional major powers and the costs of external pressure. a rio 
acts if intervention serves the geopolitical, domestic political or material interests of 
regional major powers, or if external pressure increases the cost of non-intervention. 
in rios with a stronger democratic identity than that of the sadc and asean, 
we may expect the promotion and preservation of democracy to occupy a more 
prominent place, and to become part of the hegemonic interest.
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chapter 10
political conditionality and democratic 
clauses in the eU and Mercosur
andrea ribeiro hoffmann
Introduction1
political conditionality has been institutionalized in the european Union (eU)2 and 
Mercosur, to the point that it has been incorporated in their basic treaties in the form of 
so-called ‘democratic clauses’, which can be used to refuse candidate member states 
and to expel members failing to conform. despite the consensus about democratic 
values among the founding members of these rios at the time of their creation, it 
was much later that they incorporated formal democratic clauses in their treaties: 
with the treaty of amsterdam, signed by eU member states in 1997, and with the 
protocol of Ushuaia, signed by Mercosur member states in 1998. the maintenance 
of a democratic regime changed from an implicit assumption to an explicit condition 
for the member states of these rios. 
This chapter first seeks to answer how and why political conditionality has been 
institutionalized within the eU and Mercosur. to the well-known ‘end of the cold war’ 
argument, complementary and more specific explanations will be added, exploring 
the role of enlargement processes and the cases in which political conditionality 
was actually invoked, such as during the political crises associated with general 
oviedo in paraguay and Jörg haider in austria. the empirical analysis is limited 
to treaties, and does not take into account the legal rulings and interpretations from 
regional courts or documents of other rio institutions (as distinct from rittberger 
and schimmelfennig 2006). as well as explaining the institutionalization of political 
conditionality in the eU and Mercosur, this chapter seeks to answer the question of 
whether the political conditionality of rios matters after all. in other words, whether 
it can be considered an effective instrument for guaranteeing democratic values and 
rules among member states. if that is the case, rios can ground their legitimacy in 
their ability to help achieve member states’ objectives regarding democracy.
various theoretical approaches cite various factors to explain the 
institutionalization of norms in rios, such as the rational interests of major actors 
(rational institutionalism), historical path dependence (historical institutionalism), 
1  i would like to thank danilo Marcondes de souza neto for research assistance with a 
grant from piBic/capes. the analysis and shortcomings remain my responsibility.
2  the term european Union will be used throughout the text, also when referring to the 
european community or the european communities.
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and ideational structures and actor’s identities (sociological institutionalism).3 in the 
literature about the institutionalization of political conditionality at the international 
level, the end of the cold war is the factor cited most often, as well as the priority 
given by major external powers – such as the United States – to promoting democracy 
over stability abroad (soares de lima 1998; pevehouse 2002). despite this trend, 
many rios have not so far included a democratic clause, such as the sadc, and 
others, such as asean, have explicitly rejected such a clause. the role of the major 
powers within rios, such as Brazil in Mercosur and france and germany in the 
eU is also mentioned.4 another factor cited is the background provided by the 
older international institutions of which eU and Mercosur member states are part, 
such as the council of europe (pevehouse 2002; schimmelfennig et al. 2003), the 
organization of american states (ribeiro hoffmann 2005) and the international and 
regional agreements referred to as the ‘international regime of human rights’.5 this 
chapter acknowledges these factors, but rather than testing their explanatory power 
in the cases of the EU and Mercosur, it will explore complementary and more specific 
explanations of the process of institutionalizing political conditionality in these two 
RIOs: the process of enlargement and specific political crises which occurred in their 
member states.
Institutionalizing and Applying Political Conditionality in the EU 
The institutionalization of the democratic clause
the six founding states of the eU were all democracies, but no references to 
democratic conditionality are found in the preamble of the treaties of paris and 
rome. art. 237 tec, dealing with new member states, accepted the accession of 
any european state. the shared understanding among eU member states about 
democracy only became explicit during the process of negotiating the accession of 
greece, spain and portugal. 
One of the first documents referring to political conditionality in the EU was 
the Birkelbach report of the european parliament of 1962, which ‘adopted clear 
and binding political conditions for admission which precluded acceptance of 
franco’s spain or salazar’s portugal, and which resulted in a freeze on relations with 
greece during the rule of the colonels’ (whitehead 1996). at the time, however, 
those negotiations did not involve explicit criteria to assess levels of democracy, 
but focused on economic questions; political conditionality remained informal and 
implicit. as negotiations with these countries advanced, political criteria were made 
3  for a review of neo-institutionalist perspectives see pollack (2004).
4  note that Member states pushing for greater institutionalization of conditionality are 
not necessarily the same as those Member states pushing for its use in each particular crises 
(see van der vleuten, chapter 9).
5  such as the Universal declaration of human rights (1948), the international 
covenants of civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights (1966), 
the european convention of human rights (1950), the european social charter (1989), eU 
charter of fundamental rights (2001), american convention on human rights (1969)
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more explicit. in 1976, the commission linked a favourable response to the greek 
application for full membership to the consolidation of the new democratic regime. 
the commission’s opinion about the (unsolicited) turkish application for full 
membership in 1987 also included an assessment of turkish democracy, stating that 
turkey had a parliamentary democracy close to community models and that it had 
made progress in the fields of human rights and respect for minorities (Whitehead 
1996, 267–9).
schmitter highlights the fact that these early conditionality provisions did not lay 
down precise criteria by which to judge the level or quality of democracy, but that, 
as first advanced by Geoffrey Pridham, they seemed to be genuinely free elections, 
a reasonably stable government, leadership by a credible (and pro-European) figure, 
and the inauguration of a liberal democratic constitution (schmitter 1996). greece, 
spain and portugal had to take steps to pass most, if not all, of these hurdles in order 
to be admitted to full eU membership. 
the single european act, signed in 1986, the same year as the accession of spain 
and Portugal, included a reference to democracy for the first time, but only in the 
preamble, which has no binding power:
deterMined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental 
rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member states, in the convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the european social 
charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice,
CONVINCED that the European idea, the results achieved in the fields of economic 
integration and political cooperation, and the need for new developments correspond 
to the wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe, for whom the european parliament, 
elected by universal suffrage, is an indispensable means of expression,
aware of the responsibility incumbent upon europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly 
with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to 
protect its common interests and independence, in particular to display the principles of 
democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached 
(sea, my emphasis).
almost 15 years later, the prospect of the accession of countries of central and 
eastern europe (ceecs) again pushed the institutionalization of the principle that 
eU member states should be democracies onto the agenda (Merlingen et al. 2001). 
in her study about eU foreign policy towards the ceecs, Karen smith shows how 
the concept and use of political conditionality was progressively included in the 
cooperation programmes and successive agreements signed by the eU with these 
countries (smith 2004). 
The first treaties signed with the CEECs were standard Trade and Cooperation 
agreements, like those signed with third countries such as latin american states. 
accession was not an objective, and conditionality was not formally stated. where 
it was mentioned, this was without a clear definition. Association Agreements were 
the next step, but the concept of an association agreement was not clear and did 
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not necessarily imply membership (smith 2004). in the past, only the association 
agreements with greece and turkey had mentioned the possibility of membership, 
and other states which joined the eU had not signed such treaties beforehand. the 
European Council of April 1990 decided that future ‘associates’ would have to fulfil 
basic economic and political conditions. the association agreements signed with 
the ceecs already articulated the concept of conditionality clearly, even though 
these states had not yet been guaranteed accession.
next, the commission proposed a new type of association agreement, the 
Europe Agreements, to mark the importance of the political initiative which they 
represented. the europe agreements signed in 1992 and 1993 were all very similar. 
They all stressed in their Preamble five conditions to be fulfilled by the signatories 
(rule of law, human rights, multi-party system, free and fair elections, and a market 
economy) and stated that their final objective was to lead to membership. But 
accession was not yet certain and no time horizon was defined. It was only at the 
copenhagen european council (June 1993) that the eU member states clearly stated 
that the CEECs could join if specific economic and political conditions were met. 
the political condition of these so-called copenhagen criteria was ‘to have stable 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protections of minorities’.
the treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, before the copenhagen council but 
already against a backdrop of serious discussions concerning political conditionality 
and the possibility of enlargement, for the first time included a reference to democracy 
in the body of the treaty, rather than only in the preamble. this reference, however, 
remained rather timid:
the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member states, whose systems of 
government are founded on the principles of democracy. 
the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the european convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms signed in rome on 
4 november 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member states, as general principles of community law. … (teU, article f, my 
emphasis).
The first treaty to define clearly the principles upon which the Union was founded 
was the treaty of amsterdam, signed in 1997, when most ceecs were already 
formal candidates:
the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member states (toa, part one, substantive amendments 8 (a) 1; my emphasis)
Yet, eU member states voiced concern that once members, relatively weak 
democratic regimes might experience a regression into authoritarianism without the 
eU being able to intervene. this concern led to the inclusion of an article stating:
the council, meeting in the composition of the heads of state or government and 
acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member states or by the 
1.
2.
1.
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commission and after obtaining the assent of the european parliament, may determine 
the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles 
mentioned in Article F(1), after inviting the government of the Member state in 
question to submit its observations. 
Where such a determination has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this Treaty 
to the Member State in question, … (toa, part one, substantive amendments, article 
1.9; my emphasis). 
in the treaty of nice, signed in 2001 shortly after the crisis in austria which will 
be discussed below, a paragraph was included adding a preventive mechanism and a 
sanctions mechanism to political conditionality:
on a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member states, by the european 
parliament or by the commission, the council, acting by a majority of four-
fifths of its members after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, 
may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member 
State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and address appropriate 
recommendations to that State. Before making such a determination, the 
council shall hear the Member state in question and, acting in accordance 
with the same procedure, may call on independent persons to submit within a 
reasonable time limit a report on the situation in the Member state in question. 
(treaty of nice, part i, substantive amendments, article 1)
The crisis in Austria
the political crisis in austria refers to the participation of the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (fpÖ) in the government in october 1999. the origins of the fpÖ 
went back to the extinct Verband der Unabhängigen (association of independents) 
created in 1949 by former soldiers who had fought in the second world war and 
former nazis, who had regained their political rights that year. in 1956, the Verband 
was replaced by the fpÖ, which is considered an extreme-right party (luther 2000). 
according to a freedom house report, nazis are welcomed in the fpÖ despite the 
fact that nazi organizations are illegal in austria, and a treaty of 1955 prohibits 
nazis from exercising freedom of assembly and association (freedom in the world, 
austria 2002). 
Despite its controversial profile, the FPÖ gained 27 percent of the votes in the 
parliamentary elections of 1999, becoming the second political force in the country, 
behind only the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (spÖ). after an unsuccessful 
attempt by the spÖ to form a coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei (Övp), 
a coalition was formed between Övp and fpÖ. thomas Klestil, austrian president 
at the time, requested a declaration from the government affirming, among other 
things, their adherence to the ‘spiritual and moral values which are the common 
heritage of the peoples of europe and the true source of individual freedom, political 
2.
1.
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liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the base of all genuine democracy’ 
(Markovits 2002).6 
the fpÖ’s participation in the austrian government created apprehension in 
Brussels as well.7 on 31 January 2000, president antonio gutierres of portugal, 
the country holding the eU presidency, declared that if the fpÖ took part in the 
government, the other eU member states would impose sanctions on austria. in 
spite of this, wolfgang schüssel from the Övp and Jörg haider from fpÖ took 
power on 1 february. on 3 february, gutierres announced the decision taken by 14 
eU member states to implement sanctions against austria. he stated that the values 
which formed the basis of european civilization were at stake (Bantekas 2000).  
the sanctions consisted of freezing bilateral relations between the 14 member states 
and austria, a declaration that the eU would not support the application of austrian 
citizens to international institutions, a statement that austrian ambassadors would only 
be received by the 14 Foreign Ministers at the technical level, and that no official visit 
by heads of state and government would be made. it is important to notice that the 
sanctions were not applied by the eU; the decision was not taken in the european 
council, but as a series of bilateral initiatives on the part of the 14 eU member-states 
(Merlingen et al. 2001). according to the treaty of amsterdam, the council could act 
only after having proved the existence of a serious and persistent breach of principles 
such as democracy and human rights, which had not been the case.
Besides the council, other eU institutions also made clear their opinions: 
the european parliament approved several resolutions (B5-0101, 0103, 0106, 
0107/2000) condemning the formation of a government including the fpÖ. the 
european commission disapproved of the practice of coordinating decisions outside 
eU institutions,8 but affirmed that it would monitor the situation in Austria and that if 
a violation of eU principles was found, it would initiate the procedures in the treaty 
of Amsterdam to suspend Austrian participation in the European Council, the first 
step in a procedure that could lead to expulsion.
the immediate reaction of the austrian population was positive towards the 
sanctions; people went to the streets to repudiate the coalition. after all, 73 percent 
had not voted for the fpÖ (wistricht 2000, 30; Musner 2000, 83). an opinion poll 
done in february 2000 indicated that 25 percent believed that the sanctions were 
justified and 40 percent understood why other Europeans rejected the FPÖ (Leconte 
2005, 637). on 1 May 2000, Jörg haider resigned the fpÖ leadership in favour of 
the vice-chancellor susanne ries-passer. on 12 september, the 14 eU member 
states suspended the sanctions, claiming that they had been a success.
6  for more details about the crisis in austria see ahtisaari et al. 2000; Bantekas 2000; 
leconte 2005; luther 2000; Markovits 2002; Merling et al 2001; Musner 2000; wistrich 
2000. 
7  The specific concerns regarded the limits on freedom of association and expression of 
political parties. as defended in the wise Men report: ‘the freedom of political parties in the 
european system is not unlimited’ (ahtisaari et al. 2000, 21).
8  see Merlingen et al. 2001, 60; ramon torrent calls this practice a 4th pillar of the eU 
(torrent 1998).
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Many analysts, however, point out that it had not been proven whether the 
austrian government had violated any eU principle (Bantekas 2000; heinish 2001, 
274). in fact, the report issued by the commission of wise Men, created by the 
european court of human rights on the request of the eU presidency to monitor 
respect for human rights in austria, contradicted the conclusion of 14 member 
states about the success of the sanctions. the report argued that the austrian 
government had not violated any human rights norms, and that the sanctions were 
provoking nationalist feelings among austrian population (ahtisaari et al. 2000; 
ford 2000). this last point was emphasized by falkner, who criticized the sanctions 
as discrimination against all austrians regardless of their political preferences, and 
as such counterproductive in terms of the desire by eU-level actors to strengthen 
european values and identity (falkner 2000, 5).  however, as Mendez emphasizes, 
while the austrian government received support in the wise Men report, the same 
was not true for the fpÖ, which was accused of promoting xenophobic feelings. the 
report did not regard the sanctions as unnecessary or excessive and suggested the 
establishment of a permanent institutional mechanism which would allow member 
states to react in a more adequate and efficient way to unwelcome challenges from 
extremist parties (Menendez 2000, 2)
Institutionalizing and Applying Political Conditionality in Mercosur 
The institutionalization of the democratic clause
the institutionalization of the democratic clause in Mercosur was a particularly 
interesting process because the integration of the southern cone of latin america 
developed in parallel to the re-democratization of its member states. The first 
democratic elections in argentina were held in 1983, in Brazil and Uruguay in 1985, 
and in paraguay in 1989. democracy was clearly, therefore, a common value among 
its founding members and was seen as a prerequisite for integration. however, 
the constituent treaty of Mercosur, the treaty of asunción signed in 1991, did not 
contain a democratic clause. there is no reference to it in the preamble, in article 
1 – which refers to the principles and objectives, nor in Article 20 – which refers 
to the accession of new members (and affirms that accession is possible for any 
member state of the latin american integration association9). The first reference to 
political conditionality in Mercosur is contained in the ‘declaration of the second 
presidential Meeting of Mercosur’ of June 1992, which states that:
The Presidents affirm that the proper functioning of democratic institutions 
is an indispensable condition to the existence and development of Mercosur 
(Declaração Presidencial da Segunda Cúpula Presidencial do Mercosul, my 
translation and emphasis).10
9  see http://www.aladi.org
10  full text see http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy/indeX-comisec/Mercosur/
Basicos/documentos/ declpresidenciales/iicumbrepteMjun92/lenas92.htm.
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In July 1996 Mercosur member states reaffirmed the importance of democratic 
conditionality by signing the ‘declaration of the democratic agreement’, in which 
their presidents affirmed that:
the proper functioning of democratic institutions is an essential condition to the 
cooperation under the treaty of asunción, its protocols and subsidiary acts. 
any alteration of the democratic order constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the 
continuity of the process of integration regarding the affected member. 
the parties will immediately consult each other, in the form they consider appropriate, 
in case of breach or menace of breach of the democratic order of a Member state. the 
parts will proceed in coordination and consult the affected Member state. 
in the case of unsatisfactory consultation, the parties will consider the application 
of pertinent measures. The measures range from the suspension of the right of the 
Member to participate in Mercosur’s forums to the suspension of rights and obligations 
emanating from Mercosur’s norms and agreements signed between its parts and the 
state in which the breach of the democratic order has occurred.
The Parties must include a clause of affirmation of the democratic principles in the 
agreements concluded by Mercosur with other countries or group of countries.’ 
(Declaração do Compromisso Democrático, my translation and emphasis).11 
the agreement was formally incorporated into the treaty of asunción by means 
of the protocol of Ushuaia, signed in July 1998 and in force since January 2002. the 
protocol provides for, after a period of consultation, the suspension of the rights of 
the member state where the democratic order has broken down to participate in the 
institutions of Mercosur, followed by the suspension of the rights and duties of the 
treaty of asunción and its protocols, as can be read below:
art. 1 - the proper functioning of democratic institutions is an essential condition to 
the development of the process of integration between the Member-states of the present 
protocol. (….)
art. 4 - in the case of breach of the democratic order in one of the parties to the present 
protocol, the other parties will promote pertinent consultations among each other and the 
affected state. 
 Art. 5 – When the consultations mentioned in the previous article result to be unsatisfactory, 
the parties to the present protocol, in conformity with the integration agreements in force, 
will deliberate about the nature and scope of the measures to be implemented, taking 
into consideration the gravity of the existent situation. such measures include from the 
suspension of the right of participation in the various organs of the process of integration 
to the rights and duties emanating from this process. .... (Protocolo de Ushuaia, my 
translation and emphasis).12
11  the associate members of Mercosur at the time, Bolivia e chile, concluded on the same 
day a similar protocol (Protocolo de Adhesion a la Declaracion sobre Compromiso Democrático 
en el Mercosur). see full text at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/paginabienvenidaportugues.
htm.
12  see full text at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/paginabienvenidaportugues.htm.
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The crises in Paraguay
Compared to the EU, Mercosur has a short history of enlargement. The first country 
to join as a full member was venezuela, in september 2006.13 given the polemic 
surrounding the democratic credentials of the chavez government, it will be 
interesting to follow the impact of the democratic clause in venezuela. it should 
be noted, however, that the inclusion of paraguay in the treaty of asunción was 
only considered in 1989 after the end of the dictatorship (vaz 2002, 126). so, the 
institutionalization of the democratic clause in Mercosur has so far not been linked 
with enlargement, but rather with two crises which occurred in paraguay, when the 
political conditionality of Mercosur was directly invocated. The first crisis took place 
in 1996, after a failed coup attempt by general oviedo, and the second in 1999, after 
the assassination of vice-president argana and resignation of president cubas.
 
First crisis  in order to understand this crisis, it is important to go back in 
history. in 1989, an uprising lead by general andrés rodrigues overthrew general 
alfredo stroessner, a dictator who ruled paraguay for 35 years. rodrigues was 
elected president in the same year, and during his mandate a new constitution was 
elaborated and approved, an important step in the re-democratization of the country. 
in 1993, the civilian Juan carlos wasmosy was elected, and named general lino 
Oviedo – who had played a prominent role in the uprising against Stroessner – as 
head of the army. oviedo, however, became ever more powerful, to the point that 
wasmosy decided, on 22 april 1996, to dismiss the general. the refusal of oviedo to 
obey this order precipitated a major political crisis. during that day, senators loyal to 
oviedo pressed wasmosy to resign. supported by the Us, argentinean and Brazilian 
governments, opposition parties and some street demonstrations, wasmosy refused 
to do so, but had to spend the night at the American Embassy – thus, technically 
speaking, in exile. the next day, supporters of wasmosy joined the police, navy 
and air force siding with him, dividing the armed forces. in order to avoid an open 
conflict, Wasmosy negotiated a political compromise with Oviedo, promising him 
the defence ministry post if he resigned his command. despite the discontent of 
many, wasmosy named oviedo Minister of defence on 25 april.14
 
Second crisis  wasmosy’s hopes that oviedo would be demoralized and lose his 
influence were in vain; on the contrary, he gradually emerged as a populist political 
leader, with support from impoverished guarani-speaking indian peasants. in 1998, 
oviedo won the colorado party’s primary to stand in the presidential elections 
against the party’s president, luis María argana. fearing oviedo’s election as 
president, wasmosy had him tried before a military court on the old coup charges, 
and he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. however, raul cubas grau, oviedo’s 
close ally, won the presidential elections on the slogan ‘cubas to the government, 
13 the accession treaty of venezuela is not yet in force (october 2007) because it was 
not reatified yet by Brazil and Paraquay.
14  for detailed description and analysis of the april crisis see oas 1996; stromberg 
1997; valenzuela 1997.
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oviedo to power’. three days after his inauguration, in august 1998, cubas freed 
oviedo. in february 1999, paraguay’s supreme court ordered cubas to re-arrest 
him. Cubas, however, defied the ruling, leading the Congress, supported by Vice-
president argana, to initiate impeachment proceedings on the grounds of misuse of 
power. argana was assassinated in March, triggering mass protests and massacres in 
the centre of asunción in which seven people were killed.
paraguayan politicians and population alike were divided between those who accused 
cubas and oviedo of the murder of argana, and those who claimed it to be the work of 
a faction inside the colorado party linked to former president wasmosy and aiming at 
destabilizing the government. cubas was forced to resign amid popular demonstrations, 
and sought asylum in Brazil. oviedo left the country as well, seeking political asylum 
first in Argentina, and then in Brazil.15 luis gonzales Macchi, the president of the senate, 
also a colorado party member and whose father had been Minister for Justice and labour 
for a long period under the dictator stroessner, took power as president. 
At the time of the first crisis in 1996, Mercosur did not have a formal democratic 
clause, but the governments of argentina, Brazil and Uruguay immediately became 
involved in the crisis. some hours after the statement of the american embassy in 
support of wasmosy on the evening of 22 april, the Brazilian ambassador, speaking 
for his own country as well as for argentina and Uruguay also publicly condemned 
any attempt to subvert democracy in paraguay. foreign Ministers guido di tella 
(argentina), sebastião do rego Barros (interim of Brazil) and alvaro ramos 
(Uruguay) met in asunción to discuss the crisis. on 23 april, oviedo received a phone 
call from the Brazilian General Zenildo Lucena, who had once been his instructor, 
with a message from president fernando henrique cardoso that if there was a coup 
in paraguay, he would impose severe economic and political sanctions.16
at the time of the second crisis in paraguay, triggered by the assassination of 
vice-president argana in 1999, Mercosur already had a democratic clause. it had 
been progressively institutionalized, as mentioned above, with the declaration of 
the Democratic Agreement signed in July 1996 (just after the first crisis), and the 
protocol of Ushuaia, signed in July 1998. when president raul cubas resigned, 
both argentina and Brazil immediately granted cubas and oviedo political asylum. 
Julio sanguinetti, Uruguayan president declared that cubas’ resignation was ‘the 
best solution for paraguay’. all three countries feared a coup by cubas and oviedo. 
In Argentina, official sources admitted that the order to grant asylum had come 
from president carlos Menem himself, who was in italy, having been in discussions 
with Bill clinton and the presidents of neighbouring countries in search of international 
15  ironically, stroessner had also received political asylum from Brazil. political asylum 
is foreseen in the Brazilian constitution for foreigners pursued in their own country for 
political, religious or racial reasons. territorial asylum is granted by the Ministry of Justice. 
if the foreign country issues a request for extradition on the other hand, this is decided by the 
supreme court and not by the government.
16  apart from the Us and Mercosur member-states, the general secretary of oas, césar 
gaviria, also announced promptly his support for the wasmosy government. the permanent 
council met and agreed unanimously about the desirability of using resolution 1080. the 
european Union also issued a declaration supporting wasmosy. see oas 1996; stromberg 
1997; valenzuela 1997.
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support. in Brazil, foreign Minister luis felipe lampréia stated that by giving cubas 
political asylum, the government was seeking to guarantee stability in the region, and 
that president cardoso was following the developments in asunción closely, having 
talked to President Cubas when violent conflict still seemed a real possibility. Brazilian 
president cardoso and Uruguayan foreign Minister didier opertti discussed the option 
of applying the Protocol of Ushuaia. Ironically, the only country which had ratified the 
protocol until that time had been paraguay itself;17 it was not due to come into force 
until January 2002. however, there was in the end no need to use the protocol as cubas 
and oviedo remained in exile, and Macchi took over the government.
The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Preservation 
of Democracy18
political conditionality has been directly addressed in the literature on democracy 
promotion. traditionally, analysts of comparative politics have stressed the importance 
of domestic factors in the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes, 
neglecting or even denying the ‘international aspect’. recently, the need to reassess 
the role of the ‘international’ has appeared on the agenda of both comparativists and 
ir scholars (anderson 1999; pevehouse 2002; stein 2001; whitehead 1996).
although in 1988, whitehead argued that international factors played a minor role 
in the transitions to democracy in southern europe and latin america, he reconsidered 
this view in the 1990s after summit meetings on democratization in 1994 in essen 
(eU), Miami (ftaa) and ouro preto (Mercosur). according to whitehead, new 
empirical developments seemed to signal a new stage in the promotion of democracy 
through regional cooperation. promotion of democracy of this nature would correspond 
with what he defined as the consent hypothesis, a sophisticated conception of the 
democratization process which takes into consideration the actions and intentions 
of relevant domestic groupings in both the country promoting democracy and in 
the target country, and the interactions between internal and international processes. 
this hypothesis states that international processes may contribute to (or impede) the 
generation of consent upon which new democracies are based in four ways:
by interfering in the establishment and stabilization of national boundaries;
by supporting particular national democratic actors, 
by having a demonstration effect – when neighbour countries wish to imitate a 
way of life associated with liberal capitalist democracies; and, most important 
for this research, 
by devising instruments that will reinforce consent for democracy in 
candidate countries wishing to join a regional organization, such as political 
conditionality. 
17  El Nacional (1999).
18  This section assesses only the efficacy of political conditionality upon member 
states, not upon candidates for accession. For the efficacy of political conditionality during 
the process of negotiation of accession, see pevehouse 2002; schimmelfennig et al. 2003; 
Zielonka 2006.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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other hypotheses concerning the promotion of democracy are contagion and 
control. Broadly speaking, contagion refers to the spread of democratization due 
to the geographical proximity of other democracies. this hypothesis does not 
consider actors’ motivations or channels of transmission, only simple geographical 
correlation. the control hypothesis is based on realist approaches, and states that 
democratization will occur when imposed by hegemonic powers in their unilateral 
foreign policy initiatives (whitehead 1996).
for the cases of greece, portugal and spain for instance, whitehead concludes 
that the eU was a powerful catalyst for democratization, but emphasizes the 
complex relationship between domestic and international factors in the process of 
democratization: 
the incentives for consolidation provided by the prospect or reality of ec membership 
have represented a durable and compelling set of inducements to remould the political 
regimes of southern Europe (a powerful confining condition of the democratizations 
process). it is unhelpful to classify such inducements as either external or internal, since 
they operate at various levels, and reshape the calculations and conduct of numerous 
political actors both at home and abroad (whitehead 1996, 272). 
in his contribution to the project coordinated by whitehead, philippe schmitter 
also acknowledges the necessity of reconsidering the impact of what he calls the 
‘international context’ upon democratization. however, he adds a fourth grouping 
of international factors to the three proposed by whitehead (contagion, control 
and consent), that of conditionality. he does not consider the impact of regional 
integration processes upon democracy only as part of voluntary initiatives supported 
by private actors, under the label of consent, as whitehead, but also (and mainly) 
as a coercive initiative backed by states. however, in contrast with the control 
category of whitehead, where democracy is pursued unilaterally by hegemonic 
states, the conditionality category of Schmitter is pursued multilaterally – that is 
to say, in the context of regional institutions: ‘its hallmark is the deliberate use of 
coercion on the part of multilateral institutions’ (schmitter 1996, 30). he considers 
conditionality, defined in these terms, the most rapidly expanding mechanism for 
the exercise of international influence upon the development of democracy. The use 
of conditionality in economic and monetary affairs has been a practice in the post-
war period, such as by the iMf, but ‘what is new is the tying of policy responses to 
political objectives’ (schmitter 1996, 42). he adds that despite the fact that the use of 
multilateral conditionality began with the transitions in the southern europe, it has 
increased with the transitions in south america, asia, eastern europe and africa. 
here we consider its effectiveness in preserving democracy.
Austria
despite the crisis of 1999, austria can be considered a stable democracy. according 
to world audit,19 Austria receives 11 points on a scale from 1–150 in the overall 
19  world audit is an international ngo which publishes scores and rankings based on 
information from freedom house, transparency international, amnesty international, human 
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ranking of 2005 (having 1 on a scale 1–7 for political rights and civil liberties; 25 on 
a 0–100 scale for press freedom, and 9 on a 0–100 scale for corruption), being in the 
first division and classified as ‘unquestionably free’ – an excellent result. 
after the successful elections of 1999, the fpÖ suffered a series of setbacks. as 
mentioned, haider resigned the party’s leadership in 2000 and became governor of 
carinthia. when he attempted to intervene at the national level again in september 
2003 he inflamed divisions within the FPÖ, leading to the collapse of the coalition 
and the call for early elections on november. this time the fpÖ won only 10 percent 
of the votes, 17 percent less than in 1999, ending up entering the government as a 
junior partner. In the local elections in 2003, this decline in the polls was confirmed. 
the fpÖ also did poorly in european parliament elections in 2004. 
the role played by eU political conditionality has been, on the one hand, 
positive for austrian democracy insofar as it has strengthened the case of haider’s 
opponents, and, on the other hand, counterproductive because of the use of sanctions 
as an instrument of punishment. Yet, it cannot be said that the removal of haider 
from national politics and decrease of fpÖ popularity was due only or mainly to 
eU political conditionality. some analysts suggest that fpÖ success in 1999 can be 
better explained by frustration with the grand coalition of the Övp and spÖ which 
had been in power since 1986, than by an appeal to the fpÖ’s platform. as soon as 
the population realized the consequences of the fpÖ’s participation in government, 
its support declined (freedom house 2004). according to this view, the decline of 
the fpÖ would have taken place anyway, even without eU intervention. the role 
of political conditionality as an instrument for the promotion of democracy was 
therefore positive but not essential, since domestic forces would have performed the 
same function. 
Paraguay
the case of paraguay is quite different from austria. the country is positioned in the 
third division in the world audit’s ranking, with 73 points in the overall ranking (3 
for political rights and civil liberties, 81 for press freedom and 129 for corruption). 
Countries in the third division are classified enjoying precarious freedom. The 
stability of the democratic regime in paraguay cannot be taken for granted. despite 
being in prison, Oviedo still manages to influence Paraguayan politics. In May 2000, 
there was another failed coup attempt against Macchi promoted by his supporters 
(BBC News 2000). in august of the same year, oviedo’s ally, Julio cesar franco 
was elected as the new vice-president, in a tough run-off against felix argana, the 
son of the assassinated former vice-president. in the elections of 2003, nicador 
duarte frutos became president. although a former ally of argana, he defended the 
granting of an amnesty to oviedo as a gesture to avoid political instability, in view 
of the number of seats in the congress under the power of the general. 
In 2004, Oviedo decided to return to Paraguay affirming that he ‘returned, will 
be set free and will govern paraguay’. he was immediately arrested in order to serve 
rights watch and the international commission for Jurists. for details and methodology of 
assessments see http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm.
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his sentence for the coup attempt of 1996, but his popularity has increased since 
then. people have been gathering in his support on the visiting days of the Quartel de 
vinas cué, where he is imprisoned, hoping to be able to vote for him in the elections 
of 2008 and  arguing that oviedo is a political prisoner (Isto É 2005; EFE 2005). 
developments in paraguay lead us to the conclusion that neither the stability of its 
democracy nor the positive effect of the democratic clause have yet been proven. the 
effect of Mercosur political conditionality as an instrument of democracy promotion 
was positive, but had only a superficial effect to the extent that it contributed to 
avoiding a coup. it did not lead to any deeper transformation of the paraguayan 
regime.
Concluding Remarks
Regarding the first question addressed in this chapter – the forces behind the 
institutionalization of political conditionality in RIOs – it can be said that for the 
eU, both the successive waves of enlargement and the developments following the 
crisis when it was invoked (austria) had a positive effect. for the case of Mercosur, 
enlargement has not played a role so far, but the inclusion of paraguay in the treaty of 
asunción was only considered after the end of the dictatorship. the two crises in this 
country can be said to have played a major role in the process of institutionalization 
of political conditionality within Mercosur. an interesting difference between these 
two rios is the way in which they have reacted to the applicability of political 
conditionality to a crisis. the treaty of nice means that the eU is formally able 
to act preventively, before any breach of democratic principles occurs. Mercosur, 
on the other hand, can only act formally after a breach has happened. this might 
reflect the status of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, which are 
much stronger in latin america than europe.20
Regarding the second question – that of whether political conditionality matters 
after all – the conclusion of both case studies leads to the same result despite the two 
different realities. austria can be considered a full democracy; domestic actors reacted 
against the possibility of threats to the democratic regime. the threat to democracy 
was hypothetical to the extent that the main problem was the rise of a party which 
failed to respect certain standards such as the right of immigrants and minorities, but 
which had risen to power in a democratic way. the fear was based on the history 
of the party, the declarations and attitude of its main leader, Jörg haider and the 
electoral program, but no actual violations had occurred.  it can be said that political 
conditionality had a positive effect in alerting political actors, but was not necessary 
in order to secure democratic values since domestic forces were also concerned and 
active. the use of sanctions as an instrument to protect democracy can even be said 
to have had counterproductive effects in a well-established democracy.
paraguay, however, cannot be considered a full democracy, despite meeting 
superficial democratic requirements. The threats to democracy during the two crises 
were clear, as they referred to coup attempts. developments following the crises 
20  i thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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had a positive effect in preventing the country from degenerating into a dictatorship, 
especially given the weakness of opposing domestic forces, but were insufficient to 
provoke any profound transformation of the regime. 
to conclude, political conditionality and democratic clauses can be considered 
positive instruments to secure the realization of democratic values of rio member 
states and may help deepen democratization if implemented with adequate 
instruments, and combined with domestic support. Under these circumstances rios 
can therefore be legitimized by their capacity to fulfil their member states’ objectives 
of strengthening democracy.
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chapter 11
legitimacy and democracy in regional 
integration organizations: 
closing or widening the gap?
andrea ribeiro hoffmann and anna van der vleuten
The Puzzle
as stated in chapter 1, our major aim in this book was to explore the connections 
between rios, legitimacy and democracy. in particular, we asked whether the 
creation and development of rios has contributed to widening or closing the gap 
which exists between citizens and policy makers as a result of the processes of 
regionalization and globalization. 
we have argued that the regional level and rios have peculiarities which 
make them an interesting object of study within the debate about legitimacy and 
democracy beyond the nation state. Unlike global and functional international 
organizations, rios are based around a certain territory, and a certain identity which 
gives meaning to this territory. this construction of a region consisting of territory 
and ideas encourages people living in the region to identify with the rio and its 
policies. furthermore, rios are not single-issue organizations but have a broad 
mission, which implies that regional governance can cut across all policy domains 
previously controlled by national decision makers.
we found that literature on legitimacy and democracy in rios has hitherto 
focused mostly on economic performance, or exclusively on one particular rio: the 
european Union, which, in turn, is conceptualized not as a ‘normal’ rio, but as a sui 
generis actor. this raised the question of whether it is possible to speak about rios 
in the same way that we speak about states: can we treat them as a homogeneous 
group in spite of the differences between them? and what does this mean for the 
validity and generalizability of our conclusions? in this regard, we acknowledge 
the differences between the eU and other rios, but we take the view that they are, 
nevertheless, all rios; the difference between them is not ontological, but rather of 
degree – the degree of scope and depth of cooperation and integration, the degree 
of institutionalization, the degree of supranationality, and state of development. 
Even excluding the EU, RIOs vary significantly: ASEAN, the SADC, Caricom 
and Mercosur do not all share the same objectives or the same type and level of 
institutionalization and they are in different stages of development. the point here 
is that the defining aspect of RIOs is not their degree of supranationality, but rather 
their territorially limited area, their claim to a common identity, and the broad scope 
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of their mission and activities. the degree of institutionalization and the range of 
aims and policies of a specific RIO do not change our basic assumption that ‘all 
social systems have to have some mechanism that gives them legitimacy’ (chapter 
1). They only differ as regards the specific mechanisms available for realizing input, 
control and output legitimacy.  although we do not categorize each rio we deal 
with in terms of the aspects mentioned above, from the cases studied in the chapters 
of this book, we can argue that institutional differences become relevant when 
investigating legitimacy and democracy insofar as they influence the possibility of 
representation and participation, and the effectiveness of policymaking. differences 
in policy output will influence the relevance of the legitimacy question: if an RIO is 
unable to make any decisions, it will surely suffer from a lack of output legitimacy, 
and this will eclipse its probable lack of input and control legitimacy.
with all these considerations in mind, let us return to the questions we asked in 
chapter 1: 
given the ‘state-oriented’ concepts of legitimacy and democracy, what do the 
concepts of legitimacy and democracy mean in non-national political systems 
such as regional integration organizations? 
to what extent do rios display input legitimacy, control legitimacy and 
output legitimacy? 
to what extent do regional parliaments and subnational state actors contribute 
to closing the legitimacy/democracy gap?
to what extent do non-state actors (civil society) contribute to closing the 
legitimacy/democracy gap? 
do rios display output legitimacy in the sense that they strengthen democracy 
in their member states? 
The reasoning behind these questions was, first of all, that we must know what 
we are talking about when we refer to democracy and legitimacy in a regional 
political system, and that we must have an idea about how to measure these concepts 
for empirical purposes within a comparative framework. to address this question, 
we looked firstly at the channels of representation and participation created by RIO 
member states themselves, such as regional parliamentary bodies and sub-national 
state actors. secondly, we examined the channels of representation and participation 
for non-state actors created by civil society, including business and sectoral interest 
groups, and incorporated to a greater or lesser extent into each rio. in table 11.1 
we give an overview of the relevant questions, and the chapters of this volume which 
have addressed them. 
The Outcomes
Based on the studies developed by the contributors to this volume, what can we say 
about the questions we raised? 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Table 11.1 Overview of questions and chapters
Question Chapter/ focus RIO investigated
1. How can we define 
legitimacy and democracy 
in non-national political 
systems?
Ch.2  – concepts of RIOs, 
legitimacy, democracy
Ch.3 – concept of regional 
democracy
2. to what extent do rios 
display input, control 
and output legitimacy 
mechanisms?
Ch.4 – selection of 
indicators and mechanisms 
of input, control and output 
legitimacy
31 rios: 8 from 
africa, 4 from asia & 
Pacific, 5 from Middle 
east & western asia, 
from 9 from western 
hemisphere and 5 from 
central and eastern 
europe & former second 
world
3. what is the role of 
regional parliaments and 
subnational state actors 
in contributing to rios 
democracy/legitimacy?
Ch.5 – regional parliaments, 
comparison and explanation 
of differences with regard to 
democracy/legitimacy
european parliament 
(eU), parlatino, parlacen 
(sica), parlandino 
(can), Mercosur 
parliament
Ch.6 – sub-national actors, 
contribution to democracy 
and input legitimacy
eU and Mercosur
4. what is the role of non-
state actors in contributing to 
rios democracy/legitimacy?
Ch.7 – non-state actors, 
input and control legitimacy
Mercosur
Ch.8 – non-state actors, 
input and control legitimacy
caricom
5. do rios play a role in 
strengthening democracy in 
member states?
Ch.3 – relationship between 
regional and domestic 
democracy
eU, caricoM, sica, 
Mercosur, can, sadc, 
asean 
Ch.9 – interventions, output 
legitimacy
sadc, asean
Ch.10 – political 
conditionality, output 
legitimacy
eU, Mercosur
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The first question: concepts
Regarding the first question, Berry Tholen and Juliana Erthal contributed to the 
elucidation of the concepts of legitimacy and democracy, and more particularly their 
role at the regional level. In Chapter 2, Tholen elaborated a definition of regional 
legitimacy drawing strongly from fritz scharpf, but focusing more strictly on the 
functional aspects of legitimacy in order to distance himself from the national level, 
and therefore adding a third type of legitimacy, namely control legitimacy, alongside 
input and output legitimacy. 
Input legitimacy is defined as the de facto representation and participation of civil 
society in the decision making processes of rios in order to develop well-informed 
policies. what is important here is that the mere existence of formal channels of 
participation is not enough. parliamentary bodies, for instance, contribute to input 
legitimacy only if they are open to all societal voices and debates are public. in 
corporatist and pluralist structures, the focus is on non-governmental organizations 
and the opportunities they have to participate in decision making. again, these actors 
can only contribute to input legitimacy if they are able to bring many different voices 
into the public debate, which depends on their practical capability to organize, the 
freedom of organization and speech, and the existence and openness of institutional 
arrangements at rio level to deliberate publicly. 
with regard to control legitimacy, arrangements typically concern checks on 
executive powers, and involve judicial review and parliamentary or corporatist 
control. regarding parliamentary arrangements, the criteria for evaluation are the 
powers and competencies of parliamentary bodies, and their capacity to turn to a 
court. for non-parliamentary mechanisms, the criteria concern the accreditation of 
non-state actors, and not only formal, but also their effective capacity to influence 
policy-making. 
finally, the criteria for evaluation of output legitimacy of a rio refer to its role 
in upgrading the common interest. the common interest can involve economic 
issues such as growth and the distribution of wealth, but as tholen points out, it 
may also involve the strengthening of democracy itself as the main objective. rios 
will therefore enjoy output legitimacy, not only if they produce economic benefits 
but also if they effectively contribute to the promotion of civic participation within 
the political systems of the member states, if their actions lead to guarantees of 
individual rights within their region, if the citizens of member states are empowered 
to stand up for their rights and interests by means of participatory arrangements and 
a legal system, and if there are mechanisms to sanction member states in the case of 
a threat of or an effective breach of democratic rules.
Having thus defined regional-level legitimacy, chapter 3 proceeds with a further 
elaboration of the concept of regional democracy based mainly on robert dahl’s 
definition of (national) democracy and polyarchy, and guillermo o’donnell’s 
definition of (national) delegative democracy. Dahl’s definition is, as Erthal calls 
it, a ‘minimal concept of regional democracy’. it focuses on the political dimension 
of democracy, and on the representation (not direct participation) of citizens in the 
exercise of political power. erthal also highlights the importance of the possibility 
of public contestation for regional democracy. this concept is based on the goals 
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of populist democracy, popular sovereignty and political equality, and the rule of 
majority, advanced by dahl. in addition, it takes into consideration the maturity 
and consolidation of democratic institutions, as advanced by o’donnell. the main 
argument is that a rio should not be judged against ideal models of (regional) 
democracies, but against real regional democracies, as implied in Dahl’s definition 
of polyarchy. RIOs, just like national political systems, cannot simply be classified as 
democratic or not, but rather, must have their level of democracy carefully assessed. 
additionally, any assessment of the quality of democracy within a rio should 
include its level of institutionalization and consolidation. erthal’s argument leads 
to the conclusion that, firstly, given the young age of RIOs in comparison to nation-
states, one should not expect rio institutions to be as democratic as nations-states, 
and secondly that rios can potentially be democratized: they are not ‘condemned’ 
to be democratically deficient.
The second question: indicators
The second question – to what extent RIOs display input, control and output 
legitimacy mechanisms? – was addressed by Bob Reinalda in Chapter 4. He agrees 
with ruth grant and robert Keohane, as opposed to the view of robert dahl and 
much regionalization literature, that the legitimacy of a RIO is not confined to the 
output dimension, and that the input and control legitimacy of a rio can also be 
assessed. reinalda has elaborated a broad set of indicators of rio legitimacy for use 
in empirical studies. this contribution can be seen, therefore, as a bridge between 
the conceptual discussion in the preceding chapters and the qualitative analysis of 
the effective legitimacy of rios in the later chapters. 
reinalda has made an extensive inventory of rios, indicating the presence or 
absence of each of the mechanisms which could allow input, control and output 
legitimacy. he shows that it is possible to assess the legitimacy of rios along 
comparative lines. his data indicates that, among the 31 rios analysed, 15 have 
mechanisms which have the potential to contribute to input legitimacy (13 scoring 
‘weak’; 2 scoring ‘present’; 0 scoring ‘strong’), 12 have the potential to contribute 
to control legitimacy (5; 4; 3) and 23 to output legitimacy (8; 10; 5). this chapter 
thus is a basis for an evaluation of the effective legitimacy of rios as compared to 
their potential legitimacy. Qualitative studies can use this inventory of rios and 
their mechanisms as a springboard for further research in order to check the extent 
to which these mechanisms are used in reality, and whether they actually work. this 
is done in the studies presented in the following parts of the volume, guided by 
questions three, four and five. 
The third question: regional parliaments and subnational state actors
the third question, concerning the role of regional parliaments and subnational state 
actors, is explored in chapters 5 and 6. as emphasized earlier, parliamentary bodies 
are viewed as potential contributors to input and control legitimacy. their existence 
and formal powers are basic requirements, but their transparency and openness to 
civil society are important variables as well. andrés Malamud and luís de sousa 
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investigate the characteristics of such bodies in the eU and a selected group of 
latin american rios: the european parliament (eU), parlatino, parlacen (sica), 
parlandino (can) and Mercosur parliament (Mercosur). they evaluate the extent 
to which these five parliaments have actually met the conditions for contributing to 
input and control legitimacy. 
regarding input legitimacy, they conclude that the record is poor since only 
in the european parliament are parliamentarians directly elected. the Mercosur 
parliament is supposed to have direct elections only in 2011. none of the latin 
american parliaments are accountable to citizens, nor do they have legislative 
power. regarding control legitimacy, parlacen is the only latin american institution 
capable of monitoring other regional bodies. the authors also offer an explanation 
for the significant qualitative difference found between the EP and the four Latin 
American parliaments, which is based on five variables: time (institutional maturity), 
sequence (the EP being the only to follow the ‘Monnet method’ – function preceding 
form, and incrementalism), the level of economic integration (from free trade area to 
common market), the strength and stability of domestic institutions and, finally, the 
type of domestic regime (parliamentary of presidential). Based on these variables, 
a profile was made of the ‘legitimacy potential’ of regional parliaments in the other 
regions also studied in the chapter.  
in chapter 6, Marcelo Medeiros explores the participation of sub-national state 
actors in the process of decision-making in Mercosur, also referring to the european 
Union. he attributes much importance to sub-national state actors, arguing that they 
can play an important role in the legitimacy of rios. Medeiros shows how these 
actors have strengthened their participation both at the national level of Mercosur’s 
main member states (argentina and Brazil) and directly at the regional level. the 
participation of subnational actors has the potential to enhance the legitimacy of 
Mercosur, the same way that decentralization in argentina and Brazil has contributed 
to democratization and an increase in efficiency, with a positive impact upon input, 
control and output legitimacy of domestic regimes (as long as the increase in power 
of subnational actors is accompanied by mechanisms of control). Medeiros suggests 
that if subnational state actors manage to increase their influence at the regional 
level, this may also have a positive impact upon Mercosur legitimacy.
The fourth question: non-state actors
the fourth question, about the involvement of non-state actors, is addressed in 
chapters 7 and 8. a main concern of this book is the question of to what extent 
the participation of non-state actors in rios can contribute to a closing of the gap 
between citizens and policy-makers as a result of the processes of globalization 
and regionalization. Using different sources (primary documents and interviews), 
Michelle ratton sanchez and gerda van roozendaal were able to establish whether 
non-state actors have had a de facto impact on the input and control legitimacy 
of RIOs. They worked with broad definitions of non-state actors in Mercosur and 
caricom, respectively. 
ratton sanchez concludes that Mercosur’s regulations concerning the 
participation of non-state actors offer the opportunity for input and control legitimacy 
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mechanisms. however, this rio fails to implement the objectives stated as a result 
of the confusing and restrictive terminology it uses to identify eligible actors, and 
the lack of regulation concerning procedures for participation and mechanisms for 
inclusion. Moreover, Mercosur bodies have the power to define when, where, how 
and who will be consulted, which causes a bias in the contribution of civil society. 
the lack of transparency is another major factor undermining Mercosur’s capacity 
to foster a de facto participation of non-state actors, and any potential positive effect 
on its legitimacy.  
van roozendaal investigates both the direct participation of non-state actors 
at the regional level, and their indirect participation via the national level. on the 
regional level, despite caricom’s commitment to strengthen the involvement of non-
state actors, this involvement has remained limited.  on the national level, only 
one member state was investigated, Barbados, being the country with the most 
developed social system of the caribbean. Barbados’s relatively advanced domestic 
system does not, however, seem to play an important role concerning caricom’s 
policies. van roozendaal’s main conclusion is therefore that caricom has failed to 
integrate non-state actors. she formulates four reasons for this failure: the lack of 
funds and capacity on the part of the rio, the lack of political will and the strong 
emphasis on sovereignty on the part of most governments, and finally, the lack of 
public understanding on the part of the population about caricom.  
The fifth question: links between regional and domestic democracy
Finally, the fifth question, about the role of RIOs in strengthening democracy in their 
member states, was addressed by the chapters 9 and 10. in addition, the link between 
domestic and regional democracy was dealt with in the last section of chapter 3. 
in the latter, erthal explores the relationship between regional democracy and 
the national democracies of member states. she bases her argument on the study 
conducted by steven fish, who concluded that the presence of strong national 
legislatives correlates to a strong level of democracy. following fish’s argument, 
erthal investigates whether there is any correlation between the level of democracy 
of member states and the strength of regional legislatives. Using the freedom house 
democracy index to assess the level of democracy in the member states of seven 
rios (the same rios discussed in this volume: the andean community, asean, 
SICA, Caricom, the EU, Mercosur and the SADC), Erthal finds a positive correlation 
between domestic democracy and regional democracy. 
these conclusions reinforce the observations made by Malamud and de sousa 
in Chapter 5, that domestic institutions constitute an important factor influencing 
the strength and legitimacy of regional (parliamentary) institutions. while erthal 
assessed the relationship between formal democratic institutions at the national and 
regional levels, Malamud and de sousa explored more extensively the role which 
regional parliamentary institutions can play in strengthening domestic democracies 
and vice versa. 
in chapter 9, anna van der vleuten calls attention to the point that having 
instruments to intervene in the case of threats or ruptures of democracy does not 
imply that a rio will necessarily act when facing a crisis. she investigated why 
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asean and sadc sometimes intervened to ‘preserve or promote democracy’, and 
sometimes not. she argues, based on these cases, that rios intervene in cases where 
intervention serves the geopolitical, domestic political or material interests of the 
regional major power, or where external pressure raises the ideological or economic 
costs of non-intervention. 
in chapter 10, andrea ribeiro hoffmann focused on the process of 
institutionalization of political conditionality within rios, and one particular 
mechanism by which rios can intervene in their member states when they face 
a rupture of democracy, or the threat of one: the so-called democratic clauses. 
she found that in the case of the eU, the process of enlargement and the crisis in 
austria played a major role explaining the creation of the mechanism. in the case 
of Mercosur, the crises in paraguay were the main driving force behind it. next, 
ribeiro hoffmann explored the impact of the use of the democratic clause upon the 
quality of democracy in austria and paraguay. she concludes that its impact was 
very limited. 
chapters 9 and 10 offer complementary analyses, exploring the potential of rios 
to contribute to the realization of basic values like democracy and rule of law in their 
member states, and which can be attributed, therefore, to output legitimacy. the 
main conclusion is that rios cannot be taken for granted as positive instruments 
for ensuring and promoting democracy in member states. despite their potential 
contribution, rios will not always intervene when needed, and when they do, their 
intervention may rather strengthen any status quo regime regardless of its democratic 
credentials and their impact on national regimes may be limited. 
Conclusion: the Gap
this volume deals with different aspects of the legitimacy/democracy issue in regional 
governance and offers qualitative analyses of different rios in different regions of 
the world. table 11.1 gives an overview of the chapters and their substantive and 
geographical focus. although the book has not presented qualitative analyses for 
all aspects of all rios, when read in combination, the chapters enable the reader to 
grasp the meaning and interconnectedness of the aspects studied.
in fact, one aspect of the concept of legitimacy that we emphasize in this book 
is precisely the interconnectedness of input, control and output legitimacy among 
rios. we argue that these three aspects are intrinsically linked. for that reason, any 
conception of the legitimacy of rios which is based exclusively on only one aspect 
of legitimacy, such as output legitimacy, will be limited and probably biased. By 
acknowledging the interconnectedness of the three aspects, it is possible to see how 
important it is to analyze, on the one hand, the role of parliamentary bodies and sub-
national state actors, and, on the other hand, the role of non-state actors in the process 
of policy-making of rios. we do not think there is a single ‘formula’ indicating how 
much of each of these aspects is needed in order to ‘classify’ a RIO as sufficiently 
legitimate. such an assessment needs to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
in addition, to say that we can compare rios is not to say that the same formula 
is valid for all of them. different constituencies will accord different levels of 
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legitimacy to the rios they take part in according to the kind of political culture 
they are embedded in. this political culture, in turn, will have developed within the 
framework of nation states – some over the past 500 years, in the case of several 
european states, others for a much shorter period, such as most african and southeast 
asian states which were decolonized only last century. for this reason, an important 
aspect of the legitimacy of rios is their role in strengthening the democratic values 
of its member states. 
we have explored the question of whether rios widen or close the gap which 
has opened between citizens and policy makers, as a result of the processes of 
globalization and regionalization. there is no easy, general answer to the question, 
but our most important finding is that it is the domestic level which is crucial in 
this respect, not the regional level in itself. the quality of regional parliamentary 
arrangements reflects the quality of domestic democracy. State sovereignty and the 
concentration of power in the hands of central governments at the national level are 
major obstacles to the participation of subnational state actors and non-state actors. 
participation by non-state actors at the regional level is connected to the development 
of civil society in rios member states. the effectiveness of democratic clauses and 
regional interventions is closely related to the strength of democratic institutions and 
democratic identity at the domestic level. from this, it follows that the shift from 
national to regional governance is likely to widen the legitimacy gap in those rios 
where domestic democracy is relatively weak already.     
here it becomes clear how limited it is to consider only the economic output of 
rios as a legitimizing argument. how can we say a rio is legitimate because of its 
economic benefits, if it widens the gap between policy makers and their constituents 
or has a negative effect on the level or quality of democracy among its member 
states? in our view, all these aspects must be taken into consideration if we want 
to make a serious assessment of the relationship between rios, legitimacy and 
democracy. we believe that the conceptual and empirical analysis developed in this 
book has made a contribution in that regard.

